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ABSTRACT 
Developing Islamic Finance Opportunities for Trade Financing: Essays on Islamic Trade 
vis-a-vis OIC Ten-Year Programme of Action 
Ahmet Suayb Gundogdu 
International trade has been defined as the engine of growth by international development 
institutions as more cross-border trade associated with more economic activity, higher 
employment, hence, poverty alleviation. If trade is the engine of growth, trade finance can be 
defined as grease for the engine. Hence, availing more funds to finance the enormous amount of 
international trade, counting about half of global GDP, is an important agenda for the OIC as well 
as many multilateral development institutions. The main reason behind the efforts to avail more 
funds for trade finance is to direct valuable financial resources from speculation to explore 
opportunities to increase international trade in a way to grease and roll the wheel of real 
economy. With reference to the OIC Ten-Year Programme of Action to Meet the Challenges 
Facing the Muslim countries in the 21
st
 century, this research aims to introduce outward-looking, 
cost-effective, and informal policy options for a resilient OIC trade integration to increase 
international trade among OIC countries.  
In this regard, the first essay aims to explore the determinants of recent increase in intra-OIC 
trade to ascertain if it is due to policy instruments implemented by OIC organs or some other 
externalities. It is argued that recent increase in intra-OIC trade percentage is likely to be the 
product of reverse effects of oil price surge and Euro appreciation but not trade diversion effect of 
OIC membership. OIC membership itself alone would not increase intra-OIC trade if not 
accompanied with policy instrument for trade facilitation to make cross-border trade easier 
among member countries. However, as customs revenue constitutes the bulk of public revenue 
for many OIC countries, they need to be convinced about benefit of trade facilitation. 
Accordingly, with reference to the unwillingness of OIC countries for trade facilitation, the same 
essay scrutinizes the effect of tariff and WTO Customs Valuation Agreement on customs’ 
revenue of OIC countries. The results suggest that increasing tariffs might increase customs 
revenue for big countries but not for small countries. Besides, the implementation of WTO 
Customs Valuation Agreement does not decrease customs revenue as its indirect undervaluation 
effect would be surpassed by its direct effect of less incentive for tax evasion.  
As a crucial crop for public finances in many OIC countries and initial stage of industrialization, 
special emphasis is given to development of the cotton sector under the OIC Ten-Year 
Programme of Action. The Third Expert Group Meeting on Enhancing Production Efficiency and 
International Competitiveness in OIC Cotton-Producing Countries adopted the Five-Year OIC 
Cotton Plan of Action (2007-2011). As per the mandate of OIC, two Islamic trade finance 
products are proposed, one for the cotton sector through the resources mobilized with 
mudarabah, by proposing salam for complete supply chain financing in the second essay, and 
another for resource mobilization based on 2-Step murabahah in the context of international trade 
as an alternative to commodity murabahah, sukuk as well as mudarabah in the third essay.  
In conclusion, based on further findings of the survey, the questionnaire and interviews; capacity 
building in trade facilitation for small countries to be complemented with OIC mutual recognition 
agreement for standard and conformity assessment within halal food standard development; 
integrated single window among OIC countries’ customs; OIC cumulation system of rules of 
origin for market access; inward processing relief as an alternative to free trade zones; 
development of the cotton sector among OIC countries to address production constraints of 
LDMCs and 2-Step murabahah to mobilize trade finance resources to boost trade of OIC 
countries, particularly for LDMCs, are proposed as a part of concretely defined and well-
grounded OIC trade integration framework.  
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SYNOPSIS 
With reference to the OIC Ten-Year Programme of Action, this thesis aims to introduce 
outward looking, cost-effective, and informal policy options for a resilient OIC trade 
integration based on the findings of essays employing econometric models on 
determinant of intra-OIC trade and OIC countries’ customs revenue, the findings of two 
case studies on Islamic Trade Finance, a survey, a questionnaire, deliverables of 
COMCEC initiatives and interviews conducted with senior officials of some OIC organs.  
Although there has been steady increase in intra-OIC trade (defined as intra-OIC imports 
as a share of total imports of OIC countries) in the last few years, recent literature on 
intra-OIC trade shows that OIC membership has not contributed much trade between OIC 
member countries. Then, what is the determinant of recent increase in intra-OIC imports 
from 14.4 per cent in 2002 to about 18 per cent in 2007? Given the Makkah Declaration 
and the OIC Ten-Year Programme of Action to increase intra OIC trade ratio, which is 
defined as trade among OIC countries over OIC countries’ trade with the world, to 20%, 
the first essay scrutinizes the determinant of intra-OIC trade by gravity modelling for the 
period of 1995-2007. Unlike recent literature, four important international trade 
determinants namely, tariff, a proxy for trade facilitation & liberalization, depreciation of 
real exchange rate and depreciation of US dollar against Euro are included to the model 
so as to mitigate omitted variable bias. It is argued that recent increase in intra-OIC trade 
percentage is likely to be the product of opposite effects of oil price surge and Euro 
appreciation rather than trade diversion effect of OIC membership. It is suggested that 
trade liberalization and facilitation measures should be synchronized to enhance intra-
OIC trade. Small OIC countries very often reveal unwillingness for further trade 
integration as government officials in these countries associate any forward move in trade 
integration with loss of valuable customs revenue, hence, burden on public finance. The 
same chapter scrutinizes the determinants of customs revenue in the context of WTO-
member OIC countries. An econometric model of OLS, fixed effect and random effect 
calculations is employed with panel data of 1995-2007. The results suggest that 
increasing tariffs might increase customs revenue for big countries but not for small 
countries. Besides, the implementation of WTO Customs Valuation Agreement does not 
xvii 
 
decrease customs revenue as its indirect undervaluation effect would be surpassed by its 
direct effect of less incentive for tax evasion. This part of the chapter indicates 
implementation of information and communications technologies in the form of 
integrated single windows to tackle the undervaluation issue as an alternative so leakage 
in valuable customs revenue for small OIC countries might be appeased. 
The cotton sector as a main foreign exchange revenue earner and a major source of 
employment is crucial for sustainable development in many OIC countries, especially in 
West Africa. The cotton sector was identified as a strategic sector in the “Draft road-map 
for achieving intra-OIC trade volumes targets” which was then adopted in 24th COMCEC 
Meeting in 2008 and entered to the OIC agenda. As a crucial crop for public finance in 
many OIC countries and initial stage for developing spinning and subsequent industries, 
special emphasis is given to development of the cotton sector under the OIC Ten-Year 
Programme of Action. The Third Expert Group Meeting on Enhancing Production 
Efficiency and International Competitiveness in OIC Cotton-Producing Countries, held in 
Antalya, Turkey, in October 2006, adopted the Five-Year OIC Cotton Plan of Action 
(2007-2011). The meeting adopted the following recommendation: 
(“Focus should be given to supply chain financing, start from providing input 
to post-harvest seed cotton purchase from farmers. To accommodate this supply 
chain financing existing, structural trade finance designs need to be expanded 
to some more OIC countries.”) 
Accordingly, the second essay presents a case study for employing Islamic finance 
instruments in a structured trade finance deal as an alternative to conventional financing 
in the context of the Five-Year OIC Cotton Action Plan. This essay goes beyond the 
existing case and proposes salam contract for complete supply chain financing starting 
from input financing and extend to post-harvest financing with the hope to pioneer 
literature in the area. Mark-up calculation is also provided for reference. After 
explanation of the facility structure and extended structure for supply chain financing 
with salam, a comprehensive risk analysis to identify possible risk, their causes, 
preventive actions and contingencies is conducted in order to show the holistic view 
introduced with this Islamic finance instrument. The concept of Islamic supply chain 
financing starting from input financing to post-harvest and pre-export finance is 
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explained in the context of SOFITEX, leading ginning conglomerate in Burkina Faso, 
West Africa. While availing the case of SOFITEX, some insight into the global cotton 
sector, the cotton sector in the region and financial standing of the subject cotton ginner, 
SOFITEX is provided so as to show how to embed structured Islamic finance tools within 
the context of real-life problems.       
Again, the ‘Draft road-map for achieving intra-OIC trade volumes targets’ mandates 
developing new Islamic finance mechanisms to be of use to increase trade finance for 
SMEs in LDMC OIC countries.  Hence, the third essay presents another case study which 
shows how to mobilize resources through Islamic financial instruments in order to avail 
more funds for trade finance accessible to SMEs in LDMC OIC countries. This essay 
shows how to mobilize resources through Islamic financial instruments to be utilized by 
importers in the context of international trade. Throughout the essay there are five entities 
namely, Bank-A, Bank-B, Bank-C, Importer and Exporter for illustration purposes. Bank-
A and Bank-B are recognized financial institutions and they operate internationally while 
the operations of Bank-C are limited to the domestic market. The examples revolve 
around the Bank-B’s business processes. It is Bank-B which provides imported input to 
the importer under Direct murabahah Sale. Again, it is Bank-B which mobilizes 
resources from Bank-A through mudarabah and alternative Reverse 2-Step murabahah 
agreements in favour of the importer. The details of disbursement for line of financing 
provided by Bank-B to Local Bank-C to be utilized by the importer through 2-Step 
murabahah Agreement are also provided for Letter of Credit and Documentary 
Collection settlements. Also, operational details including content of L/C, ICR and legal 
agreement of 2-Step murabahah are provided within a case of a Gambian importer 
procuring yarn from an Egyptian exporter. This product, 2-Step murabahah, is proposed 
as a remedy for L/C confirmation problem of Least Developed countries and as an 
alternative resource mobilization/liquidity management to sukuk and commodity 
murabahah in order to direct resources for promoting OIC countries trade rather than 
debt trading by circumventing Islamic Law. 
The results of essays, the survey, the questionnaire and interview are summarized in the 
conclusion chapter. Findings suggest that small countries mainly suffer from supply-side 
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constraints, which also include unavailability of trade finance and unavailability of any 
production for export, with reference to WTO Aid-for-Trade agenda and reluctance for 
further trade integration due to fear of customs revenue loss as it constitutes the bulk of 
state revenue. On the other hand, big countries suffer from market access difficulties such 
as customs valuation, low port efficiency, inland transportation, technical barriers, etc. of 
other OIC countries, specifically small countries. Hence, capacity-building in trade 
facilitation for small countries to be complemented with OIC mutual recognition 
agreement for standard and conformity assessment based on Halal standards, integrated 
single window among OIC countries’ customs and OIC cumulation system of rules of 
origin for market access is proposed to enhance intra-OIC trade. Also, inward processing 
relief as an alternative to free trade zones, development of the cotton sector and 2-Step 
murabahah to mobilize trade finance resources to address supply side constraints in 
LDMCs and boost trade of OIC countries are proposed as parts of a concretely defined 
framework in the conclusion chapter. With reference to the supply side constraint of least 
developed OIC countries, cotton sector development is strongly proposed to bring these 
countries in the sphere of OIC trade integration. Otherwise, these countries lack in export 
capacity and suffer from non-existence of any industry. Cotton production can play a role 
in breaking the vicious circle of poverty and create export capacity of LDMCs as 
identified by the OIC Five-Year Cotton Action Plan with reference to poverty alleviation 
directive of the OIC Ten-Year Action Plan. It is found that supply chain financing to the 
cotton sector in the form of discounted formal credit would help alleviate poverty subject 
to:  
(i) The discounted funds with formal credit should be assured to reach farmers but 
not informal credit providers which may include local banks, landlords, and 
unscrupulous managers of agricultural cooperatives who may apply local market 
interest rate to poor farmers while enjoying discounted funds mobilized through 
formal credits.  
(ii) The funds should focus on procurement of inputs for agricultural production but 
not purchase of consumption items giving rise to impoverishment farmers. In 
this regard, availed funds should be monitored to assured that they are used for 
procurement of input to boost agricultural production. 
(iii) Formal discounted credit should be accompanied by several infrastructure 
development projects in the form of transportation, irrigation, etc. which targets 
to increase agricultural productivity to make agricultural input financing 
xx 
 
sustainable by assuring reasonable level of yield for harvest and market access 
for sale of yield.  
 
Any formal credit targeted to the cotton sector should observe these concerns. 
 
It is also argued that in order for complete supply chain financing to be successful, it 
should be complemented with quality, quantity and value-increasing initiatives in order to 
make cotton production business profitable/sustainable: 
(i) Improving the productivity and yield levels (introducing better seeds, irrigation, 
mechanization of seeding); 
(ii) Decrease the contamination (use of special bags for harvesting, establishing 
basic warehouses in villages); 
(iii) Improving testing and classification of cotton (grant for HVI testing machines 
and training); 
(iv) Promoting investment opportunities in the cotton sector (Ginning machines) for 
processing and marketing of cotton in order to enhance international 
competitiveness; 
(v) Eliminating intermediaries between net cotton-exporting and net cotton-
importing OIC countries (trade bridges, bringing West African cotton to 
warehouses in the net cotton-importing OIC countries. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1 INRODUCTION 
Globalization coupled with the establishment of the multilateral trading rules-based 
system has necessitated economic integration among countries. This phenomenon has 
manifested itself through the formation of free trade areas (FTAs), customs unions, 
common markets or full economic unions among countries all over the world. The 
establishment of the European Union (EU) as well as other forms of FTAs are successful 
examples of such economic integration among different sovereign states.  
The dictates of the globalized economy now set the rules for the economic policies in 
terms of enhancing closer economic interlink among countries. In the wake of the new 
emerging global economic realities, the Organisation of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) 
member countries, with a view to expedite their economic growth and development, need 
to think proactively to catch up effectively and meaningfully with the rapid pace of 
globalization. It has, therefore, become imperative for them to take joint actions within 
the framework of the OIC, based on common values and ideals, in order to strengthen 
their economic positions in the globe. 
The OIC has fifty-seven members which came together to safeguard progress and well-
being of their people and Muslims around the world. The organization was established in 
Rabat, Morocco on 25 September 1969 during the first meeting of heads of states. The 
charter of the organization was adopted in 1972 during the third session of the Islamic 
Conference of Foreign Ministers. As the charter highlights, the organization aims to 
strengthen solidarity among member states; cooperation in the political, economic, social, 
cultural and scientific fields; and the struggle of all Muslim people to safeguard their 
dignity, independence and national rights.  
The OIC has three main bodies: the conference of heads of states, Islamic summit, meets 
every three years and formulates organization’s policies as the supreme authority; the 
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conference of foreign ministers meets every year to follow up progress on 
implementation of the Islamic summit’s decisions. Lastly, the general secretariat 
entrusted with implementation of the above-mentioned two conferences’ decisions.   
Throughout these summits the organization created several committees in order to 
coordinate cooperation in various fields. The most important of these committees are 
chaired by the head of states. Some of the very active ones are: The Standing Committee 
for Information and Cultural Affairs (COMIAC); The Standing Committee for Scientific 
and Technologic Cooperation (COMSTECH) and The Standing Committee for Economic 
and Trade Cooperation (COMCEC). At the Third Islamic Summit held in Mecca in 1981, 
COMCEC was established with the mandate of formulating programmes for economic 
cooperation within the OIC agenda. The COMCEC became operational at the Fourth 
Islamic Summit held in Casablanca in 1984 and the president of Turkey was elected for 
chairmanship. Since then COMCEC convened annual sessions regularly in Istanbul, 
Turkey.   
The OIC Ten-Year Programme of Action adopted at the Third Extraordinary Session of 
the Islamic Summit in 2005 clearly recognizes the importance of economic cooperation 
among member countries and calls upon them to sign and ratify all existing OIC trade 
and economic agreements, and to implement the provisions of the relevant OIC Plan of 
Action to Strengthen Economic and Commercial Cooperation among OIC Member 
States.
1
 After introduction, the OIC Ten-Year Programme outlines two themes and sub-
items as
2
:  
(i) Intellectual and Political Issues 
- Political Will which urge member countries to fully implement the 
provisions of OIC Charter and resolutions. 
- Solidarity and Joint Islamic Action 
- Islam, the Religion of Moderation and Tolerance 
- Multiplicity of Islamic Jurisprudence 
- The Islamic Fiqh Academia 
(ii) Development, Socio-Economic and Scientific Issues 
- Economic cooperation  
                                                 
1 Complete list of agreements can be found on COMCEC website http://www.comcec.org/EN/default.aspx#  last accessed on 23 
November 2009. 
2 “The OIC Ten-Year Programme of Action to Meet the Challenges Facing the Muslim Ummah in the 21st Century” is available 
online at http://www.oic-oci.org/ex-summit/english/10-years-plan.htm last accessed on 1st May 2010. 
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- Supporting the Islamic Development Bank which highlights 
strengthening IDB’s role to avail providing financial support in particular 
for Trade Finance through International Islamic Trade Finance 
Corporation 
- Social solidarity in the face of natural disasters 
- Supporting development and poverty alleviation in Africa 
- Higher Education, Science and Technology 
- Rights of Women, Youth, Children, and the Family in the Muslim World   
- Cultural and Information Exchange among Member States 
This research focuses on practical and economic related parts of the OIC Ten-Year 
Programme of Action as selected from three sub-items of the theme on ‘Development, 
Socio-Economic and Scientific Issues’, namely: 
(i) Economic cooperation by enhancing intra-OIC trade; 
(ii) Supporting development and poverty alleviation in Africa by cotton sector 
development particularly providing complete supply chain financing as per 
subsequent OIC Five-Year Cotton Action Plan; 
(iii) Supporting the Islamic Development Bank by mobilizing more resources for 
trade finance in favour of LDMC of OIC through International Islamic Trade 
Finance Corporation. 
The programme under ‘Development, Socio-Economic and Scientific Issues’ themes sub-
item on Economic Cooperation mandated that 
“The COMCEC to promote measures to expand the scope of intra-OIC trade, 
and to consider the possibility of establishing a Free Trade Zone between the 
Member States in order to achieve greater economic integration to raise it to a 
percentage of 20% of the overall trade volume during the period covered by 
the plan, and call on the Member States to support its activities and to 
participate in those activities at the highest possible level”.3 
According to the OIC Ten-Year Programme of Action, priority must be given to 
enhancing economic cooperation, intra-OIC trade, alleviating poverty in OIC member 
states with special emphasis on LDMCs, and addressing issues related to globalization, 
economic cooperation, environment, and science and technology. Furthermore, under the 
same themes entitled ‘Development, Socio-Economic and Scientific Issues’, the OIC 
Programme of Action calls upon the member states “to facilitate the freedom of 
movement of businessmen and investors across their borders”, “support OIC Member 
States in their efforts to accede to the World Trade Organization (WTO), and promote 
                                                 
3 Report on “Follow up the Resolutions of the OIC Third Extraordinary Summit accessed on 21 September 2009 at 
www.comcec.org/EN/belge/25.ICDT/AgendaN°4English2.doc  
4 “The OIC Ten Year Programme of Action to Meet the Challenges Facing the Muslim Ummah in the 21st Century” is available 
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concerted positions between the Member States within the WTO” and “Support 
expanding electronic commerce among the OIC Member States”.4 In this context, it 
might not be an overstatement to say that economic integration among OIC member 
countries can be considered as a pre-requisite for keeping pace with globalization. 
The Programme of Action clearly mandates COMCEC to promote measures to expand 
the scope of intra-OIC trade, and to consider the possibility of establishing a FTA among 
the OIC member states for achieving greater economic integration in order to raise intra-
OIC trade ratio, which is defined as trade among OIC countries over OIC countries’ trade 
with the world, to 20% by the end of the period covered by the plan (2005-2015). Indeed, 
this new direction could be deemed as a step further to the ongoing Trade Preferential 
System as identified in the preamble of the Framework Agreement on Trade Preferential 
System among member states of the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation.
5
 In the 
agreement it is  
“noted that due to the geographical dispersion of Member States, and the 
differences in their development levels which hamper the establishment of a 
comprehensive regional system for trade liberalization, a Trade Preferential 
System would be the most appropriate instrument to increase trade exchange 
among them.”6     
The issues covered in this research, hence, are also prime subjects of COMCEC agenda 
as follows
7
: 
                                                 
4 “The OIC Ten Year Programme of Action to Meet the Challenges Facing the Muslim Ummah in the 21st Century” is available 
online at http://www.oic-oci.org/ex-summit/english/10-years-plan.htm last accessed on 1st May 2010.  
5 The term “economic integration” refers to the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers for the flow of goods, services, and factors-
of-production between a group of countries or different parts of the same countries. The degrees of economic integration can be 
categorized into six stages: 
• Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), which is the weakest form of economic integration. In a PTA, countries would offer 
tariff reductions, though perhaps not eliminations, to a set of partner countries in some product categories. 
• Free Trade Area (FTA) occurs when a group of countries agree to eliminate tariffs between themselves, but maintain their own 
external tariff on imports from the rest of the world. The North American Free Trade Area is an example of a FTA. 
• Customs Union (CU) occurs when a group of countries agree to eliminate tariffs among themselves and set a common 
external tariff on imports from the rest of the world. This stage of economic integration will lead to increasing economic 
efficiency and establishing closer political and cultural ties among member countries. The European Union represents such an 
arrangement.  
• Common Market (CM) is a customs union with common policies on product regulation, and freedom of movement of factors 
of production. 
• Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) establishes a common currency among a group of countries. This involves the 
formation of a central monetary authority which will determine monetary policy for the entire group.  
• Economic Integration (EI) refers to the situation when the integrated countries have no or negligible control of economic 
policy, including full monetary union and complete or near-complete fiscal policy harmonization. 
6 Available at www.comcec.org/EN/belge/agreements/pdf/OIC-TPC.pdf last accessed on 22 September 2009. 
7 The COMCEC agenda is available online at http://www.comcec.org/EN/default.aspx last accessed on 21st December 2009. 
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- Agenda Item 3: Promotion of Intra-OIC Trade 
 TPS-OIC 
 Road Map for Enhancing Intra-OIC Trade 
 WTO Related Technical Assistance 
 Trade Finance Activities for resource mobilization to boast intra-
OIC trade 
- Agenda Item 5: Poverty Alleviation and Economic/Technical Assistance to OIC 
Countries 
 OIC Cotton Programme 
 
Before delving into the details of the research, the following sections details the aspects 
and institutions of the OIC trade among the member countries. 
1.1.1 Framework Agreement on Trade Preferential System (TPS-OIC)   
As per the Resolution establishing the Framework Agreement, the OIC General 
Secretariat was  
``requested to contact member states to expedite the formalities of their joining 
the Framework Agreement and urged member states to start, in the meantime, 
bilaterally or through COMCEC, exchanging lists of respective offers of 
concessions and initiate informal consultations as a prelude to the future 
negotiations on the said concessions.’’  
Having secured the minimum number of 10 necessary ratifications, the Agreement 
became effective in October 2002. As a result, the Trade Negotiation Committee (TNC) 
was formed.
8
   
1.1.2 Protocol on Preferential Tariff Scheme for TPS-OIC (PRETAS) 
The first round of trade negotiations was concluded successfully with the adoption of the 
final version of the Protocol on the Preferential Tariff Scheme for TPS-OIC (PRETAS). 
Having 10 necessary ratifications, PRETAS became effective in November 2009 as of 
25th session of COMCEC. The second round of negotiations was concluded in Ankara, 
in September 2007, with the adoption of the TPS-OIC Rules of Origin and progress on 
Para-Tariff and Non-Tariff Measures.
9
 
                                                 
8 TPS-OIC was targeted to be established by 1st January 2009. As a next step cooperation for the Rules of Origin of Goods and 
removal of Non-tariff Barriers, is to be completed under Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC) agenda. 
9 The new agreement on rules of origin was introduced as the rules of origin principles introduced in the Annex-III of Framework 
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1.1.3 Road Map for Enhancing Intra-OIC Trade Volumes    
In pursuance of a resolution passed at the 23rd COMCEC Ministerial Meeting in Turkey 
in November 2007, an Experts Group Meeting was held in Turkey to explore further 
ways and means of enhancing intra-OIC trade. The event was unique in that it brought 
experts from OIC member countries and international organizations together to devise a 
work plan aimed at helping achieve the 20% intra-OIC trade target, by 2015, set under 
the Makkah Declaration in 2005. The meeting aimed at not only to explore ways and 
means of ensuring realization of the targets but also to provide a monitoring mechanism 
to track progress. The deliverable of this meeting ‘Draft Road Map for achieving intra-
OIC Trade Volumes (Road Map)’ is provided as in the Appendix I. As indicated under 
development of strategic commodities prong in the Road Map, the implementation of the 
Five-Year OIC Cotton Action Plan is perceived as an integral part of OIC trade 
integration as sound cotton sector has strong potential to address supply side constraint 
for trade in many least developed OIC member countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Besides, the road map recommended introduction of new financing 
mechanisms/tools aimed to mobilize more resources for SMEs and LDMCs. The Road 
Map was adopted by 24th COMCEC Ministerial Meeting in October 2008 in Istanbul, 
Turkey.  
Following the adaptation of the Road Map for Enhancing Intra-OIC trade, the first 
Consultative Meeting on this plan was held on 11-12 February 2009 at the Islamic Center 
for Development of Trade (ICDT) Headquarter in Casablanca, Morocco to identify 
specific actions/activities and projects to be carried out by OIC organs. Along with the 
series recommendations, the consultative meeting produced the Executive Program for 
the Implementation of the Road Map as provided in Appendix-I.
10 
 
Going through Table 1.1, although the OIC member countries, albeit constitute a 
substantial portion of the world population, they merely account for about 11% of world 
                                                                                                                                                 
Agreement on Trade Preferential System among the Member States of the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation, drafted in mid-
1980s and become effective in 2002, was out of date.  
10 Final version of “the Executive Programme of the Road-Map for Achieving Intra-OIC Trade Volumes Targets (Executive 
Programme)” is available online on COMCEC website at www.comcec.org/EN/belge/25.ICDT/AgendaN°7-iEnglish-table.rtf  last 
accessed on 21 November 2009.       
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exports and about 10% of world imports. In 2008, intra-OIC exports reached US$ 265 
billion while intra-OIC imports soared to US$ 285 billion which together constitutes 
about US$ 550 billion worth of trade among OIC countries. This suggests almost 31% 
increase in trade among OIC countries. Similarly, OIC countries exports to the world 
grew by 35.52 % while OIC countries imports grew by 27.87 percent in 2008. In 2008, 
overall trade of OIC countries increased to US$ 3,380 billion from US$ 2,560 billion in 
2007 which amounts to a 32% increase. Growth in trade of OIC countries with the world, 
32%, surpassed the growth of OIC countries trade among themselves which is 30.99%. 
This is reflected by a slight decrease in intra-OIC trade ratio, which is the reference point 
for the Makkah declaration of 20% intra-OIC trade by 2015, from 16.64% to 16.60%.
11 
   
Table 1: Table 1.1: Evolution of the OIC Member States Foreign Trade between 2007-2009 
in US$ billion 
  2007 2008 2009 Change % 
World exports 13,800.00 15,775.00 12,147 -23.00% 
World imports 14,300.00 16,120.00 12,385 -23.17% 
OIC world exports 1,395.31 1,890.99 1,329.35 -29.70% 
OIC world imports 1,164.59 1,489.21 1,239.67 -16.76% 
Intra-OIC exports 200.20 265.32 207.92 -21.63% 
Intra-OIC imports 220.39 285.63 218.83 -23.39% 
Intra-OIC trade 420.59 550.95 426.75 -22.54% 
    Share in  
% 
   
OIC world exports/world exports 10.11% 11.99% 10.94% -8.73% 
OIC world imports/world imports 8.14% 9.24% 10.01% 8.33% 
OIC world trade/world trade 9.13% 10.61% 10.47% -1.30% 
Intra-OIC exports/OIC world exports 14.35% 14.03% 15.64% 11.48% 
Intra-OIC imports/OIC world imports 18.92% 19.18% 17.65% -7.97% 
Intra-OIC trade ratio 16.64% 16.60% 16.65% 0.30% 
Source: Islamic Center for Development of Trade, 2010 
As depicted in Table 1.1, in 2009 intra-OIC trade contracted by about 23% as it is the 
case for world trade. Unlike intra-OIC trade, OIC exports to world (US$ 1.3 billion) 
decreased by 29.7% while OIC imports from the world (US$1.2 billion) decreased only 
by 16.76%. This might suggest the effect of drop in basic commodity prices, which 
                                                 
11 Intra-OIC trade ratio is calculated as Intra-OIC trade over OIC World trade. 
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accounts substantial part of OIC countries exports to world. In 2009, intra-OIC exports 
decreased to US$ 208 billion while intra-OIC imports crumbled to US$ 219 billion, 
which together constitutes about US$ 124 billion of drop. This is almost a 22.5% 
decrease in trade among OIC countries. However, intra-OIC trade ratio defined as intra-
OIC trade over OIC trade with world, which is the reference point for Makkah 
declaration of 20% intra-OIC trade by 2015, did not decrease as decrease in overall OIC 
trade with the rest of the world surpassed that of decrease in intra-OIC trade.  
As pointed out by Gundogdu (2009), if interpreted literally these statistics might be 
misleading due to the ‘double dominance effect’. It would be wise to sort these effects 
before any interpretation.   
1.1.3.1 Dominance of oil in trade among OIC member countries 
If compared to intra-OIC trade with other regional integrations, to which OIC countries 
are members, one would discern a substantially higher intra-trade ratio.  
Table 2: Table 1.2: Comparison of Intra-regional Trade, Percentage (2006) 
Imports from AMU ASEAN CIS COMESA ECO ECOWAS GCC SAARC UDEAC OIC WORLD 
AMU 3.39 0.71 0.09 0.70 4.45 0.32 3.40 0.11 0.11 14.38 100 
ASEAN 0.12 5.07 0.02 0.05 0.44 0.61 4.48 0.07 0.06 10.95 100 
CIS 0.002 0.14 6.37 0.02 11.32 0.16 1.42 0.06 0.00 13.08 100 
COMESA 1.40 1.93 0.03 1.19 2.47 0.02 9.12 0.30 0.01 18.16 100 
ECO 1.81 1.76 3.07 0.24 7.48 0.21 6.95 0.90 0.02 18.97 100 
ECOWAS 0.90 1.23 0.01 0.11 0.84 8.63 1.74 0.44 0.26 13.93 100 
GCC 0.23 2.42 0.16 0.76 3.49 0.03 7.92 0.98 0.00 16.52 100 
SAARC 0.46 5.04 0.57 0.44 2.40 0.16 21.45 0.50 0.03 30.36 100 
UDEAC 1.69 1.11 0.00 0.42 1.74 10.12 1.16 1.24 3.43 19.85 100 
OIC 1.02 2.60 0.90 0.63 4.06 0.76 6.84 0.57 0.06 17.58 100 
Source: IDB 2008 Key Economic Indicators, Statistical Monograph No.28, 2008 
 
Table 1.2 compares several regional groupings, to which several OIC countries are 
member, intra-trade levels from imports side for 2006. A careful look at the above table 
would reveal the high trade complementarity of OIC countries. Intra-trade level of oil- 
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exporting GCC countries, 7.92%, jumps to much higher levels,17.58%, when they merge 
with oil-importing OIC countries. 
1.1.3.2 Dominance of certain countries 
OIC, in terms of economic indicators, is one of the most diverse groupings as it harbours 
obviously despairing countries like Indonesia to Djibouti, United Arab Emirates to Cote 
D’Ivoire, etc. Regardless of geographic disparity, what matters when it comes to OIC 
statistics is the GDP sizes. According to SESRIC’s Basic Social and Economic Indicators 
(BASEIND), Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia, Turkey and United Arab 
Emirates accounts for about 60 of OIC GDP in 2010.
12
 Similarly, these countries would 
sustain a dominant position in intra-OIC trade as well as over all trade of OIC countries 
with the rest of the world.  
Table 3: Table 1.3: OIC Trade and Intra-OIC Trade in US$ million, 2008&2009 
Country 
 
Imports from OIC Share  Exports OIC Share  
2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 
50 Countries 134,061 108,673 47% 50% 108,498 73,880 41% 36% 
SAUDI ARABIA 15,573 12,154 5% 6% 35,036 27,703 13% 13% 
MALAYSIA 15,794 11,868 6% 5% 20,772 17,595 8% 8% 
IRAN 18,694 15,136 7% 7% 13,804 14,238 5% 7% 
PAKISTAN 19,281 13,650 7% 6% 7,897 7,364 3% 4% 
INDONESIA 22,698 16,613 8% 8% 16,197 11,479 6% 6% 
TURKEY 29,179 17,706 10% 8% 32,595 28,634 12% 14% 
U.A. EMIRATES 30,349 23,031 11% 11% 30,524 27,024 12% 13% 
Intra-OIC 
Imports/Exports 
285,630 218,831 100% 100% 265,324 207,917 100% 100% 
Source: Compiled by the author from the data provided by Islamic Center for Development of 
Trade, 2010 
As a matter of fact, the seven big countries imported about US$ 110 billion from other 
OIC countries as opposed to US$ 108 billion imports of 50 Countries from OIC countries 
in 2009. Share of 50 countries in intra-OIC exports goes even down to 36% in 2009. 
Going through Table 1.4, a careful scrutiny in the statistics would reveal the fact that 
these seven countries tend to trade among each other even than oil dominates trade. That 
                                                 
12 Derived by the author from the database available at http://www.sesrtcic.org/baseind_1.php, last accessed on 18 November 2009. 
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is, there is still a very big potential for enhancing intra-OIC trade by stimulating trade of 
big OIC countries with the small OIC countries and trade among the small countries.   
Table 4: Table 1.4: Nature of Dominant Countries’ Trade in US$ million, 2009 
COUNTRY Imports from  
OIC Member 
States (million 
US$) 
Imports from 
World 
(million US$) 
Intra-OIC 
Imports 
(%) 
Main 
Suppliers 
Main intra-OIC 
imported products 
Saudi 
Arabia 
12,154 96,433 12.60 
U.A. Emirates, 
Turkey, Egypt 
Iron and steel, live 
animals; road vehicles. 
Malaysia 11,868 123,575 9.60 
Indonesia, 
Saudi Arabia, 
UA Emirates 
Petroleum and petroleum 
products; paper and 
paperboard; road 
vehicles. 
Iran 15,136 81,829 18.50 
UA Emirates, 
Kazakhstan, 
Turkey 
Iron and steel; cereals; 
textile yarn and fabric. 
Pakistan 13,650 31,583 43.22 
Saudi Arabia, 
UA Emirates, 
Kyrgyzstan 
Inorganic chemicals; 
fertilizers; petroleum and 
petroleum products. 
Indonesia 16,613 96,829 17.16 
Malaysia, 
Saudi Arabia, 
Brunei 
Petroleum and petroleum 
products; organic 
chemicals; fertilizers. 
Turkey 17,706 140,929 12.56 
Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, Algeria 
Petroleum and petroleum 
products; natural gas; 
textile yarn and fabric. 
United Arab 
Emirates 
23,031 187,847 12.26 
Turkey, 
Malaysia, 
Saudi Arabia 
Electrical apparatus; 
gold; iron and steel; 
textile yarn and fabric. 
Source: Compiled by the author from the data provided by Islamic Center for Development of 
Trade, 2010 
In brief, the statistics indicate the dominance of oil in intra-OIC trade. Very few dominant 
countries account for the bulk of intra-OIC trade by heavy trade among themselves, even 
than trade among them is dominated by oil. These facts are the base for defining the 
‘double dominance effect’ in intra-OIC trade.    
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1.1.4 OIC Cotton Programme
13
 
Cotton plays an important role in the socio-economic development of many of the OIC 
member states. Twenty OIC cotton-producing countries have a share of 28% of the world 
total cotton production, 24% of world total cotton consumption, 36% of world cotton 
export and 27% of world cotton imports.
14
 
Going through the ‘Action Plan for the OIC Cotton-Producing Countries’ Cooperation 
Development Strategy (2007-2011)’ report as prepared by Chairmanship of OIC Cotton 
Action Plan, particularly in Africa where more than 16 million people are involved in 
cotton production and representing 25% of the export revenues in 11 countries in Sub- 
Saharan Africa, spanning from Sudan to Senegal. The cotton sector in Africa plays a 
highly strategic role in the economy of many West African countries. Cotton has a 
considerable cross-sectoral impact on the economic growth, export revenues and the 
socio-economic development of the rural population. The region of West Africa is the 
second-largest exporter of cotton after the United States, comprising 15 per cent of the 
international market.  
Cotton is a major export in a significant number of OIC member countries, including 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad and Togo. Although cotton is an important crop for 
other member countries such as Pakistan, Egypt, Syria and Turkey, the share of cotton in 
the production and exports of these countries is not as remarkable as in the case of West 
African Countries.  Besides, these countries succeeded production efficiency and moved 
forward to higher value added spinning and textile industries. While in above mentioned 
West African countries, cotton accounts for between 5 and 10 per cent of the GDP, and 
exports of cotton account for over one-third of all exports and over 60 per cent of income 
from agricultural exports. Thus, cotton is the main cash crop and has proved to be 
economically viable with significant and positive impact on exports, economic growth 
and rural welfare. Cotton ginning, input supply, transport and marketing constitute a large 
share of these countries rural employment, export earnings and generate a significant 
                                                 
13 The information in this section is based on Islamic Center for Development of Trade. 
14 Based on the SESRIC report presented in the OIC Cotton Investment Forum 2007.  
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share of government revenue. Consequently, cotton makes up over 1/4 of the export 
revenue in 11 African countries, 1/2 of total revenue in Benin and 2/3 in Burkina Faso.
15 
 
A number of initiatives for the cotton sector have been launched in recent years by some 
international institutions since the issue became publicised in 2003 when four African 
cotton-producing countries, Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and Chad, demanded that the 
cotton subsidy and import tariff removal be part of the WTO Doha Development Agenda. 
After the initiative of the Cotton-4 countries, the damaging incidence of the subsidies by 
the US and EU to the welfare of the cotton producing LDMCs started to get more 
attention in the international community.  
The OIC Ten-Year Programme of Action gives special importance to the development of 
Least Developed OIC Countries that could be achieved through adding value to local 
production in particularly cotton sector by know-how, technology transfer from 
successful cotton producing member countries such as Pakistan, Egypt, Syria and Turkey 
within the concept of ‘reverse linkages’. As mentioned before, the OIC Ten-Year 
Programme of Action mandates alleviating poverty in OIC Member States with special 
emphasis on LDMCs. Again under same themes entitled ‘Development, Socio-Economic 
and Scientific Issues’ in Item-IV of “Supporting development and poverty alleviation in 
Africa”, it calls upon promoting activities aimed at achieving economic and social 
development in African countries, and upon participating in international efforts to 
support programmes aimed at alleviating poverty and capacity-building in the Least-
Developed Member States of the OIC. Based on this, West African OIC cotton producers 
successfully embedded cotton sector development in the OIC Ten-Year Programme of 
Action by leading towards Five Years Cotton Plan of Action (2007-2011). 
The OIC General Secretariat in cooperation with IDB and ICDT has organized a series of 
Expert Group Meetings on cotton as part of OIC’s Ten-Year Programme of Action. The 
third EGM on Enhancing Production Efficiency and International Competitiveness in 
OIC Cotton-Producing Countries, held in Antalya, Turkey, in October 2006, adopted the 
Five-Year OIC Cotton Plan of Action for 2007-2011. The 22
nd
 Session of the COMCEC 
                                                 
15 Based on Action Plan for the OIC Cotton Producing Countries’s Cooperation Development Strategy (2007-2011) available online 
at http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/comcec/Cotton%20Action%20Plan-En.pdf last accessed on 30th March 2010/ 
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also endorsed the action Plan. The plan aims at strengthening trade, investment and 
technology transfer in cotton producing member states, particularly to African Countries.  
Among many of the recommendations, attention in this research is given to the following 
recommendation to contribute to the issue as other recommendations by the meeting on 
productivity, marketing, etc. can be addressed in other researches: 
“Focus should be given to supply chain financing, start from providing input to 
post-harvest seed cotton purchase from farmers. To accommodate this supply 
chain financing existing, structural trade finance designs need to be expanded to 
some more OIC countries.”  
It should be noted that there is no track of literature on how to address complete supply 
chain financing issue by Islamic finance instruments, which is attempted by this study. 
1.2 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
This research aims to explore and respond to obstacles and remedies for OIC trade 
integration. In specific, this research aims to explore and analyse the present status of 
intra-OIC trade vis-a-vis hesitation of OIC countries for further trade integration due to 
possible customs revenue loss as burden on public finances.  In doing so, this study also 
aims to explore and model the potentiality of Islamic financial instruments for trade 
finance to facilitate intra-OIC trade and strategic cotton trade for OIC countries.  
The aims of this research are fulfilled through three separate yet interlinked essays; each 
of which has a specific aim. The aims and objectives for each essay are: 
(i) The aims of the first essay are  
a) to explore, given the double dominance effect and recent increase in 
intra-OIC trade, determinants of intra-OIC trade which was defined as 
intra-OIC trade as a share of OIC trade with world as defined 
according to the Makkah Declaration. Is recent increase in intra-OIC 
trade a product of policies of OIC organs or other externalities?  
b) to examine the determinants of OIC countries’ customs revenue and 
how to address OIC countries’ hesitation for further trade integration 
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from the aspect of possible loss of customs revenue and burden on 
public finance. In this regard, this part of the first essay embarks on 
finding an answer to the following question: Would any policies, 
particularly trade facilitation measures, for improving customs 
practices decrease customs revenue? 
(ii) The aim of the second essay is to develop a complete supply chain of Islamic 
financing for cotton sector as per recommendation of the ‘Third Expert Group 
Meeting on Enhancing Production Efficiency and International 
Competitiveness in OIC Cotton Producing Countries’ subsequent to the Five- 
Year OIC Cotton Plan of Action. The proposed Islamic finance structure is 
developed based on structured trade finance by which security is assumed in 
the form of commodity finance. A comparison of Islamic finance contract for 
murabahah and salam is to be evaluated in the context. This essay tries to 
answer: Can Islamic finance be a better alternative to conventional finance in 
real life example in the context of cotton sector development?   
 
(iii) The aim of the last essay is to develop an Islamic financial instrument to 
mobilize more funds for Islamic trade finance, particularly for SMEs and 
LDMC of OIC as stipulated in the Road Map. The most popular Islamic 
finance contract of murabahah is to be transformed into resource mobilization 
and liquidity management tool under the 2-Step murabahah Mechanism. 
Thus, the third essay aims to respond to the following research questions: 
Does the Islamic Finance industry lack resource mobilization and liquidity 
management tools? Would there be any other alternative to sukuk and 
commodity murabahah?  
1.3 RESEARCH RATIONALE AND MOTIVATION 
Intra-OIC trade and cotton sector development is on the top of the OIC countries’ and 
specialized institutions’ (such as IDB Group, ICDT, SESRIC, ICCI) agenda as per the 
mandate of the Makkah Declaration in 2005. However, initiatives and activities by OIC 
countries and the above-mentioned specialized institutions are arguably well framed.   
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This research, hence, stems out of motivation to develop a resilient framework for out-
ward looking and cost-effective OIC trade integration in order to constitute a base for 
future direction to avoid rigidly structured and highly institutionalized discourse.  
By no means does this research put a halt on the discussion but rather aims to initiate 
further discussions for enrichment of OIC trade integration and the cotton sector agenda 
by appealing for more attraction from the OIC community within a well-defined 
framework. A special emphasis is given to propose feasible and concrete building blocks 
by evidencing from other regional integration and national best practices to discourage 
vague ideas for the issues as benchmarking from best practices has somehow been 
ignored up to now.   
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
Although there has been substantial efforts in both public policy discourse and academic 
literature on devising a certain degree of integration among OIC countries, efforts up to 
now seem to have not yielded remarkable results, if no result at all. Perhaps a major 
reason for unsuccessful attempts has been the lack of a holistic approach to embed 
inherent issues into a well-designed framework. In this regard, OIC’s Ten-Year Plan of 
Action can be defined as a landmark in defining inherent issues, which have been 
dwelled on in many documents of OIC since its inception.  
This research first of all provides insight on these inherent issues as defined in the OIC 
Ten-Year Plan of Action. Although determinants of intra-OIC trade have been subject of 
many studies, very few, if not at all, provide insight on the convoluted causes of the ratio 
of intra-OIC trade defined in the Makkah Declaration. Additionally, this research 
provides insight into hesitation of some of the OIC countries for trade 
liberalization/facilitation, which has been the main reason of unsuccessful OIC trade 
integration attempts in the past, due to fear in loss of valuable customs revenues 
particularly for small OIC Countries and LDMCs.  
Another important inherent issue highlighted is the importance of cotton sector 
development in LDMCs as cotton is perceived to be the only product for these countries 
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to be part of intra-OIC trade. The major issues for development of the cotton sector in 
these countries is access to financing, as entities in those countries may not be entitled to 
hard currency financing due to lack of meaningful security in the form of 
government/bank guarantee or mortgage. In order to overcome such impediments Islamic 
Structured Trade Finance is proposed with reference to real-life example in this research. 
The lack of trade finance has been defined as a major obstacle for development of intra-
OIC trade. Hence, this research proposes an Islamic Trade Finance mechanism to 
mobilize funds to help LDMCs in the third essay. Unlike many other studies, this 
research aims to be voice of LDMCs within contemplated trade integration among OIC 
countries and propose actions to resolve inherent impediments of LDMCs before 
implementation of a trade integration framework.  
While addressing the major inherent issues, this research designed a resilient OIC 
integration framework with reference to experience of other regional integration 
initiatives, literature, the solutions developed to inherent issues herewith, the ideas of 
personalities from OIC on the matter, studies of other OIC organs and the results of 
survey conducted under this research. This should be considered as a welcome attempt in 
the field as a contribution to the literature but also policy making. This research, 
therefore, would be a reference point for policy makers and researchers who are in 
pursuit of exploring inherent issues of OIC trade integration, past efforts to address these 
impediments, and possible remedies. Resilient framework developed herein for OIC trade 
integration is also expected to lead to the enrichment of OIC agenda with clear direction 
towards OIC Trade Integration.   
Lastly, considering that this research is based on and conceptualises the real cases and 
responds to the Islamic financing needs of a particular field, its originality should be its 
other strength.  In particular, the proposed model with its rigour should be considered as 
an important contribution.  
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This research commences with some insight into scrutinizing the determinants of intra-
OIC trade and OIC countries’, in the context of WTO member OIC countries, customs 
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revenue. An econometric model of OLS, fixed effect and random effect calculations is 
employed with panel data of 1995-2007.  
In addition case studies are introduced to develop complete supply chain of Islamic 
financing for the cotton sector and alternative resource mobilization tools for Islamic 
trade finance. 
It should also be noted that discussions are based on the Road Map, the executive 
programme, the survey, the questionnaire and interviews conducted with OIC 
government officials and senior officials of some specialized institutions. “The survey on 
trade facilitation in OIC member countries vis-à-vis WTO trade facilitation negotiations 
on GATT Articles V, VIII and X and agreement on implementation of Article VII (WTO 
Customs Valuation Agreement) of GATT” was conducted during the Seminar on “Non-
tariff Barrier Impact on Market Access” in Tunisia, 4-8 October 2009. The outline of the 
survey is provided in Appendix IX. In addition, the results of “Questionnaire on 
Enhancing Economic and Commercial Cooperation among OIC Member Countries”, 
conducted in 2009 by SESRIC, are incorporated. 
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH 
The thesis is organized as follows:  
Chapter Two aims to shed light on the mechanism of recent increase in intra-OIC trade 
from the aspect of ‘double dominance effect’ by oil and dominant countries of intra-OIC 
trade. This chapter also goes through the OIC countries’ customs revenue issues as the 
possible loss of customs revenue is very often cited as lack of will for further trade 
integration. While doing so, literature review on OIC trade, integration, and intra-regional 
trade is provided.  
Chapter Three presents an Islamic Structure Trade Finance case study for SOFITEX, 
leading cotton ginning company in West Africa. While introducing the case, some insight 
on cotton sector and financial standing of the company is provided to place the case 
within real-life content and OIC Cotton Action Plan. The chapter also evaluates the 
presented Islamic finance structure for improvement in complete Supply Chain Financing 
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as per reference to the OIC Five-Year Cotton Action Plan. The chapter demonstrates how 
to use Islamic finance tools to address real life example under extreme cases while 
putting enough risk management mitigation steps. As per agricultural finance for impact 
on livelihood of rural population, special attention is drawn from the chapter in pursuit of 
reaching people in need rather than diverting funds to a middle-man or to wasteful 
consumption in addition to importance complementary rural infrastructure development.   
Chapter Four shows how to mobilize resources through Two-Step murabahah to be 
utilized for Islamic trade finance as a mean to boost trade of OIC countries. While doing 
so, special emphasis is given to drawback in sukuk and commodity murabaha. As 
highlighted Shari’ah compatibility of commodity murabaha is questioned. The proposed 
structure is explained in detail with a real-life example by which researchers or Islamic 
bankers can make use of it. As drawn from the chapter, the proposed Two-Step 
murabaha would be an even better liquidity management tool if embedded to organized 
exchanges.  
Chapter Five presents the key findings of the survey, the questionnaire and interviews 
and discusses outward-looking, cost-effective, and informal policy options for a resilient 
OIC trade integration based on the findings of essays.  It thus provides an integrated 
discussion by also articulating the policy implications of the study and the proposed 
model.  It also brings the thesis to a conclusion. 
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Chapter 2 
DETERMINANTS OF INTRA-OIC TRADE: POLICY OR 
EXCHANGE RATE 
2.1 INRODUCTION 
The effect of enhanced trade on economic growth is a well observed subject of many 
studies. Frankel and Romer (1999) demonstrate that a 1% increase in the trade to GDP 
ratio leads to increase in GDP per capita by at least 0.5%. Likewise, Islamic 
Development Bank (2006) indicates that among IDB countries who  trade more are likely 
to achieve higher economic growth as well as higher human development and lower 
human poverty. As per GDP growth contribution, trade (net exports of merchandise 
goods) on average contributed 0.72 % (or about 11%) to the overall growth of IDB 
member countries during the last decade. In this regard, it is not surprising to see a 
mandate for increasing intra-OIC trade at the top of OIC agenda. 
Nevertheless, it is needed to be noted that focusing on trade for growth without 
considering its implication on poverty may give rise to imbalances as highlighted with 
immeserizing growth concept of Bhagwati (1958). Growth may result in worsening of a 
country if it is export biased and if such bias gives rise to deterioration in the terms of 
trade. On the other hand, such case might not happen unless country is able to influence 
world prices. Besides, trade itself should not be only omen for growth and poverty since 
transfer of technology and the state of technology are related to poverty.   
As evidenced from many studies and policy briefs, intra-OIC trade is not in the desired 
level. Studies of Ekholm et al. (1996), Al Atrash and Yousef (2000), Amin, Hamid and 
Saad (2005), Makdisi et al. (2005) and Nugent and Miniesy (2006) focusing on the 
MENA region show the existence of tariff and non-tariff barriers, lack of trade-related 
services as well as trade information and impediments to trade cooperation as the main 
causes of relatively small intra-regional trade.  
Increasing intra-Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) trade with the dismantling of 
trade barriers, hence, has emerged at the forefront of the trade agenda of OIC Countries. 
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It was in 1997 when the OIC Summit in Tehran gave priority for increasing the intra-OIC 
trade. In 7-8 December 2005, the Third Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Conference 
produced the ‘Makkah Declaration’, when the Ten-Year Programme of Action setting a 
target of achieving 20% trade among OIC Countries by the year 2015 has been adopted.  
Although all the parties agree to boost intra-OIC trade, there is a confusion regarding the 
definition of intra-OIC trade. World Bank and IMF definition for intra-trade includes 
both exports and imports (average of exports and imports) while OIC organs’ (IDB and 
ICDT) definition includes imports or exports alone. In this paper, calculations and facts 
are presented mainly with reference to imports, which indeed is the reference point of 
OIC organ.  
As to the structure of the chapter, the chapter is organized as follows: Section two 
elaborate on aim, objectives and methodology while section three provides literature 
review. Section four presents the recent efforts for increasing intra-OIC trade. Section 
five introduces the model specification, variables, the methodology and expected signs 
for regression model on determinant of intra-OIC trade, while section six presents the 
results of the regressions for determinant of intra-OIC trade. Section seven presents the 
WTO Custom Valuation Agreement. Section eight introduces the model specification, 
variables, the methodology and expected signs for the regression model on determinant 
of OIC countries’ customs revenue. The ninth section presents the results of the 
regressions model on determinant of OIC countries customs revenue. The final section 
concludes with some policy recommendations.  
2.2 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
As identified in Chapter 1, this paper aims to explore and examine the determinants of 
intra-OIC trade. As the data indicates intra-OIC imports increased from 14.4% in 2004 to 
about 18% in 2007 which surged to 19.18 % in 2008 and retreated to 17.65 % in 2009. 
This research thus aims to locate the determining factors of such dynamism. This 
research also attempts to locate the sources of such growth: whether it really comes from 
policy efforts by OIC affiliate organs or whether it comes from some externalities. In this, 
specific emphasis is given to tariff, trade facilitation and liberalization, depreciation of 
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real exchange rate and depreciation of the US dollar against the Euro. Furthermore, this 
paper aims to elaborate and provide insight into the target of the Makkah Declaration and 
the Ten-Year Programme of Action to increase intra-OIC trade to 20% of global trade by 
the year 2015. Moreover, this paper also analyses the determinants of OIC countries’ 
customs revenue as it has a pivotal role in discussion of OIC trade integration.  
2.3 OIC TRADE, INTEGRATION AND INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE: 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are many works on trade in regional economic integration of various OIC 
countries, in particular on the MENA region as all parties are OIC countries. Makdisi et 
al. (2005) show the importance of trade openness on economic growth of many countries 
by using cross-country regressions which shows that the effect of trade openness, as in 
the  case of MENA countries, is smaller as compared to others. In another study by Nuget 
and Miniesy (2006) MENA countries are found to be trading less than predicted by the 
way of the gravity model. The reasons are given as less trade-friendly policies and weak 
governance. As they suggest sharing a same borderline has less impact on trade among 
MENA countries because customs procedures and transport infrastructure within the 
MENA region are much more detrimental for intra-trade. They further recommend 
elimination of existing restriction on current account transaction. Mohd. Amin et al.  
(2005) investigated the extent of economic integration among five members of the 
League of the Arab states namely, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Syria, by 
empirically testing the nature of intra-trade activities in the grouping. The gravity model 
is used in the scaled and unscaled forms for the period of 1991 to 2002 in both panel and 
yearly estimation. The result indicated that the failure of integration measures 
undertaken. The article recommended tariff reduction and the provision of better 
infrastructure to increase intra-trade activities among LAS members.  Atrash and Yousef 
(2000) by employing the Tobit procedure rather than ordinary least square, suggested that 
intra-Arab trade and Arab trade with the rest of the world are lower than what would be 
predicted by the gravity equation, suggesting considerable scope for regional - as well as 
multilateral - integration. The results also suggested that intra-GCC and intra-Maghreb 
trade are relatively low while the Mashreq countries exhibit a higher level of intra-group 
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trade. Limam and Abdalla (1998) in their research on intra-Arab trade state that intra-
Arab trade is weak regardless of several efforts to form different forms of regional 
integration. After examining main weak factors in intra-Arab trade by gravity model, 
Balassa’s revealed comparative advantage and export profiles they scrutinized means to 
increase intra-Arab trade by prospective trade liberalization under the Arab Free Trade 
Area. Going through comparative advantage they established partner countries and list of 
commodities in order to boost intra-Arab trade. As they suggested, in order to exploit this 
potentials there needs to de-linking of politics from economic relationship and improving 
transportation links.  
Islamic Development Bank (2006), Policy Committee Paper No.3 indicates that trade 
contribution to growth has shown increasing trend over time due to greater trade 
openness of OIC member countries.
16
 The contribution of intra-trade (net intra-exports of 
merchandise goods) in member countries’ growth was positive in the case of oil-
exporting countries, while it was negative in non-oil member countries and LDMCs. 
Econometric analysis suggests that a 10% increase in trade volumes of IDB member 
countries would improve their real per capita GDP growth by 0.2%. 
The main motives behind these researches have been revealing a relationship between 
trade and economic growth, hence, poverty alleviation. Sirinivasan and Bhagwati (1999) 
argues, with reference to the experiences of OECD, NBER and IBRD projects during 60s 
and 70s, that trade create and even sustain higher growth. Despite the common agreement 
among economist for positive effect of international trade on growth, the relationship 
between growth and poverty alleviation is not straightforward. Dollar and Kraay (2002) 
examined the impact of growth for income level of the bottom 20% of the income 
distribution and found that there is no systematic association between economic growth 
and income increase for the bottom fifth. The distributional consequences of trade 
openness are obvious: there would be losers and winners. Hence, open trade policies 
should be complemented by social protection measures which would translate as zakat in 
case of Islamic economics.    
                                                 
16 Islamic Development Bank (2006). Policy Committee Paper No.3. Trade and development: a case of IDB member 
countries. 
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Ghani (2007) in his research ‘Does OIC Membership Reduce Trade’ used traditional and 
theoretical augmented gravity models, which state that the share of the OIC countries in  
world trade is small. According to his data set running from 1997 to 2002, he highlights 
the fact that OIC countries account for 6.2% of world export and 5.8% of world imports.  
He suggests that the small share of OIC countries in world trade is related to low-level 
economic development as the fact is evidenced from many literatures on the relationship 
between trade and economic growth. Given the OIC countries’ interest in enhancing their 
trade volumes, he analyses the effect for a country to be member of OIC on its trade with 
OIC and non-OIC countries. As stated, he employed both traditional and theoretical 
gravity models and augmented these models with extra conditioning variables to 
accommodate the effect of difference among OIC countries in the form of culture, 
geography, history, membership to specific regional economic integrations, incidence of 
conflict and governance quality of the country. That is, he measured the effect of OIC 
membership as a residual after taking large differences in geography, culture, 
participation in regional and international organizations, history, institutional and 
governance quality of the country and incidence of conflict into account. His 
specifications for augmented traditional gravity model include bilateral trade between 
two countries as dependent variable, which included real terms so bilateral trade figures 
were deflated by the US Consumer Price Index for urban areas. In his model, he used two 
variables to assess trade creation and diversion effect of OIC membership. One of the 
variables gets the value of ‘1’ if both trading partners are members to the OIC, the other 
variable gets the value of ‘1’ if only one of the trading partners is member to OIC and 
other is not a member. Also, he used vector of variables that vary across the trading 
partners over time such as, product of GDP, GDP per capita, etc. In addition, he included 
vector of variables which do not vary over time and across the trading partners such as, 
distance between two trading partners as proxy for transportation cost, sharing of land 
border, being colonized by a same country, etc. He estimated the model with OLS and 
Rose (2004) method of being WTO membership on trade with partner country for 
benchmarking. He also included year-specific effect to the regression. In his traditional 
gravity model, Ghani (2007) used dyadic (country-pair specific) fixed and random effect 
estimation but not country-specific fixed and random effect. Subramanian and Wei 
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(2003) criticized this estimation as it does not take time-invariant country-specific 
variables. Besides, Ghani (2007) relied on variables from Rose (2004) for the effect of 
membership to an international organisation. Rose (2004) indicates that being a member 
of GATT/WTO is not significant for bilateral trade. In the same work, only year of entry 
to the GATT/WTO, but not specific agreements such as agreement on anti-dumping or 
WTO Custom Valuation Agreement, is taken to explain effect of trade between two 
countries.  Before going further to the result of Ghani (2007), it would be handy to 
provide some literature review on the gravity model.  
The gravity model for trade flows, first introduced by Tinbergen (1962) and Poyhonen 
(1963), has been many times applied to uncover the determinant of bilateral trade flows. 
As the name suggests, the model is derived from Newtonian Physics Theory explaining 
the attraction between two objects positively on the masses and negatively by distance. 
As per the gravity model of international trade, bilateral trade between two countries is 
positively related to economic sizes and negatively related to distance. Distance stands as 
proxy for the transportation cost while the GDPs stand as proxy for economic sizes in 
terms of market size and production capacity.  
The gravity model, defined within the notion of ‘increasing returns’, assumes that 
countries specialize in different product categories.
17
 Demand is assumed to be 
homothetic and identical across countries and firms pursuit monopolistic competition.
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Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand (1985) derived the gravity equation based on CES form 
utility and Armington assumption of differentiated goods by location of production. With 
the homogenous goods, Frenstra et al. (1998) derived a gravity equation from a 
reciprocal-dumping model of trade. Based on the assumption of increasing returns 
technology, Keith (2003) derived the model from demand function on ‘Dixit and Stiglitz 
model’ of monopolistic competition between differentiated and symmetric firms. There 
are some other studies such as Eaton and Kortum (1997), Evenett and Keller (1998), 
Haveman and Hummels (2004) in which complete and incomplete specialization are 
taken into account. With increasing return to scale and in differentiated product 
                                                 
17
 Feenstra, R.C. (2004). Advanced international trade: Theory and evidence. New Jersey: Princton University Press, Page 144. 
18 
Harrigan, J. (2001). Specialization and the volume of trade: Do the data obey the laws? NBER Working Papers 8675, pp.31. 
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framework, Helpman (1987) justified the gravity equation. Deardoff (1995) justified 
gravity equation from standard trade theories including Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin 
models. Bergstrand (1985) also examined theoretical foundations of gravity models in the 
previous studies related to monopolistic competition. Bergstrand (1989) stressed the 
effect of GDP per capita on bilateral trade. Higher GDP per capita is to be associated 
with easy cross-border trade and better transportation infrastructure which ultimately 
facilitate trade. He also argued that higher-income countries’ consumers tend to demand 
superior-perceived foreign products. In addition, Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) argue 
the existence of factors other than increasing return to scale accounting for empirical 
success of gravity equation. To study intra-industry trade Davis (1996) used the gravity 
model framework. Wei (1996) defined the ‘remoteness index’ as GDP-weighted average 
of distance as a proxy for trade cost. Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) and Helpman 
(1987) put light on possible ‘dispersion index’ such as price levels, relative distances, 
language dummies and border dummies which, together with GDPs, make the  gravity 
model work.  
As part of this modelling, countries sharing the same border are expected to trade more 
compared to countries that do not share a border. However, McCallum’s work on US and 
Canada states paved the way for a discussion on contradiction between empirical results 
and expected signs of the traditional gravity model.  Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) 
argued that the traditional gravity model suffers from omitted variable puzzles and 
developed a theoretical gravity model for solving the McCallum (1995) border puzzle. 
Unlike the traditional gravity model, dependent variables with theoretical gravity model 
are the natural log of the average bilateral trade over the products of trade partners’ 
GDPs. The theoretical model also uses country dummies for the multilateral resistance 
term. This multilateral resistance terms include country-specific price indices, as relative 
prices between two countries would affect trade between two countries.  
In his research, Ghani (2007), by using the traditional gravity model, found that the effect 
of OIC membership is not positive. However, when he used the theoretical gravity model, 
based on the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) insight for solving the McCallum (1995) 
border puzzle, he managed to produce positive or non-significant OIC effect.  
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It should be noted that focusing on trade volume alone might be misleading as price 
movements of traded goods and product composition of trade would affect gains of 
countries’ from international trade. Such gains or losses are measured by the concept of 
‘terms of trade’, which reflects the trend in a country’s export prices relative to import 
prices. The early research by Singer (1950) and Prebisch (1950) draw attention to 
developing countries’ terms of trade issue as price movement of primary/agricultural 
products relative to price of manufactured products might deteriorate wellbeing of 
primary/agricultural product exporting developing countries. The debate was 
substantiated by empirical research, which is known as Prebisch-Singer thesis, which is 
later supported by subsequent researches such as Bleaney (1993). The downward trend in 
primary commodities prices was argued to be product of surplus labour in developing 
countries. The widening gap between primary commodity prices and manufacturer prices 
was also attributed to income elasticity of demand for food, which is less than unity. 
Besides, any technical progress would decrease raw materials used for manufacturing. 
Although downward price trend for primary commodities has recently been questioned 
such with UNCTAD Trade and Development Report 2008, the issue is important for 
many OIC countries since their terms of trade are correlated to exports prices of their 
primary/agricultural product and imports prices of manufacturers. Still many OIC 
countries are heavily dependent on primary commodity exports. The recent favourable 
trend in terms of trade for primary commodity exporting OIC member countries indicates 
substantial benefit with membership to regional groupings.   
The effect of membership to a regional grouping on enhanced intra-trade has been the 
interest of many studies. By any means membership to a regional economic integration is 
expected to have a welfare effect. Many of these studies dwelled on trade creation and 
diversion effects of regional economic integration. Viner (1950) introduced the notions of 
trade creation and trade diversion to assess welfare effect of regional trade agreements. 
Meade (1955) in addition to cost structures included demand elasticises which shape 
trade flows after customs union and hence expanded the Viner’s methodology. Balassa 
(1965) introduced the ‘gross trade creation’ notion as a computable version of Viner’s 
trade creation and diversion terminology.  Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1969) analysed the 
non-economic objectives. They also proposed that if a small country intends to target 
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consumption, imports or output of specific goods, it is better to address those variables 
directly without intervening elsewhere. Bhagwati (1971) showed that even trade diverting 
PTAs may be welfare improving by arguing sufficient fixity of imports level.  In another 
study, Bhagwati (1993) highlighted the work of Viner (1950), “The Customs Union 
Issue”, as static welfare question and made important contribution to the literature by 
focusing on political economy dimension of preferential trade agreements. He 
emphasized the importance of examining dynamic time path question. As he compared 
the regionalism versus multilateralism, he questioned whether regionalism fragments the 
world economy. In both static and dynamic approaches to PTAs, gross trade creation 
notion reflects overall trade increase among member countries derived from formation of 
regional trade integration. It accounts for replaced domestic production after formation as 
well as replaced exports from non-members. Trade diversion is explained as substitution 
of imports from low-cost non-member countries with imports from high-cost member 
countries. External trade creation is referred to as increase in trade within a regional 
integration and increase of trade between formed regional integration with outsiders.  
First Aitken (1973) employed dummy variables in gravity modelling to assess Balassa’s 
gross trade creation measures in the context of the European Economic Community and 
European Free Trade Association. Via dummy variables in a cross-sectional equation, 
Aitken estimated two communities’ effects on the trade of members for the period of 
1951-1967 vis-à-vis gross trade creation and trade diversion effects of them. Similarly, 
earliest researches such as Bergstrand (1985), Thursby (1987), De Grauwe (1998), and 
Brada and Mendez (1988) tested trade creation effect of EFTA and EEC for several 
periods between 1950 and 1982 by using measures for common land-border, exchange 
rate volatility and relative prices. As they estimated, EFTA and EEC enhanced trade by 
50% to 280%. The trade creation effect is particularly found to be strong in 1970s in the 
EFTA and 1960s in the EEC. Frankel and Wei (1993), with a much broader sample of 
sixty-three developed and developing countries, scrutinized trade creation effect in 
NAFTA, APEC, ASEAN and two European blocs for 1980s. They estimated trade 
creation effect, while controlling for common border, exchange rate volatility and the 
product of real GDP per capita, with the gravity model. Like previous works, they found 
trade creation effect for different regional trade agreements formation particularly within 
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APEC and EEC. In case of the EEC their estimation suggested trade increase by 25% to 
80%. In case of APEC trade creation effect of regional trade agreement was found to be 
much stronger as trade increased by 170% to 350%.  
In their later studies, Frankel and Wei (1996) tested trade creation effect for more 
regional trade agreements by using date set from 1965 to 1990. Frankel and Wei included 
dummies for the products of GDP per capita, common border and relative factor 
endowment to their gravity model. However, they did not include exchange rate volatility 
though earlier studies suggest significance of exchange rate volatility in gravity models. 
In their similar studies they find trade creation effect with EFTA, ASEAN, NAFTA and 
EEC and diversion effect with NAFTA and EEC. For example, Frankel and Wei (1995) 
found that NAFTA, APEC, ASEAN and EEC increased trade by 43%, 215%, 146% and 
13%, respectively. Many of the studies then focused on regional trade agreements in 
Europe, East Asia and North America. On the other hand, although using different data 
sets, time periods and specifications for the gravity model, Aitken and Lowry (1973), 
Frankel, Stein and Wei (1985), German, Peterson and Gillard (1998) and Sologa and 
Winters (2001) focused on regional trade agreements in Latin America and found their 
trade creation effect for MERCOSUR, LAIA, Andean Pact, Central American Common 
Market. In later stages, Rose (2000), Frankel and Rose (2001) and Frankel and Rose 
(2002) embedded exchange rate volatility for currency union to gravity model. Unlike 
previous works, in these studies many new variables such as remoteness, land area, 
common colonizer, being landlocked, etc. were included to gravity model. For example, 
Rose (2000) included thirty explanatory variables in the model. Furthermore, a set of 
dummies for each regional trade agreement in the earlier studies were transformed into 
one dummy variable for any regional trade agreement. Regardless of these changes in the 
model, regional trade agreements were found to be trade-creating and the effect turned 
out to be even stronger.  
Recently, further research was published with different estimation methods, subject 
regional trade agreements and periods to estimate these measures in the context of 
regional trade agreements. For example, Gosh and Yamarik (2004) found that trade 
creation effect of regional trade agreement discerned with gravity models in the literature 
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is overstated. As they suggest, there is no consensus on explanatory variables to be 
included in gravity model for assessing trade creation and diversion effect of regional 
trade agreements. Some authors specified gravity equation with trade creation alone 
while others did so by trade creation and trade diversion with dummy variables for each. 
Also, myriads of other explanatory variables are employed in previous researches. The 
way of inclusion or exclusion of explanatory variables raised some questions on 
robustness of the models. In any case, the previous studies found trade creation in most of 
the regional trade agreements as subjects of these studies. Hence, he questions whether 
“the trade creation hypothesis picking up a ‘robust’ relationship across different 
specifications or a ‘fragile’ relationship generated by a unique specification”? 
In another study, Carrere (2004) assessed the regional trade agreements’ effect on trade, 
intra-regional trade and trade with the rest of the world of Sub-Saharan African countries. 
The Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa (UEMOA), the Economic and 
Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) as both preferential trade areas and 
monetary union, together with the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), the Common Market for Easter and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the 
Sothern African Development Community (SADC) as preferential trade area, are 
included. While traditional determinants, including geography and transport cost, are 
controlled, Cerrere (2004) compared the effect of preferential trade agreements and 
currency union on trade for the period of 1962-1996 in Africa. By employing augmented 
gravity model relying on a transportation cost function, trade creation and diversion 
effects of preferential trade agreements in Sub-Saharan Africa is estimated through 
specific dummies variables assigned with random effect. First, the average impact of each 
preferential trade agreement and second, how these impacts evolved is estimated.  The 
results suggest that African regional trade agreements significantly enhanced intra-trade 
through trade diversion at the initial stages. While regional trade agreements in Africa 
give rise to trade diversion, currency unions rather had trade-creation effects.         
Elliott and Ikemoto (2004) used modified gravity model in order to assess the impact of 
ASEAN AFTA on intra-ASEAN trade and trade of ASEAN countries with non-ASEAN 
countries. In order to have comparison, they included four preferential trade agreements 
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namely, ASEAN, APEC, NAFTA and EU. However, while assessing the effect, they 
rather put emphasis on the signing year of AFTA but not implementation of common 
external tariff as implementation of AFTA took some time. Hence, they found that trade 
flows have not been significantly affected by AFTA. In the model, they did not include 
important determinant of international trade such as tariffs, sector-specific trade 
facilitation efforts. Gundogdu (2007), however, included tariff and other important 
explanatory variables of international trade in the context of ASEAN AFTA and found 
that ASEAN AFTA itself is not trade-diverting, and found that ASEAN trade facilitation 
efforts within AFTA measures enhanced ASEAN imports from both members and non-
member countries of Japan, Korea and China.  
Cernat (2001), however, draws attention to the trade creation effect of regional trade 
agreement formation through removal of invisible trade barriers as an auxiliary trade 
facilitation measures to these agreements. As he suggests, by an augmented gravity 
model to estimate trade creation and diversion effect for the ASEAN Free Trade 
Agreement (AFTA), NAFTA, EU and other south-south regional trade agreements 
between 1994 and 1998, this kind of trade-creation effect is much stronger in the case of 
south-south regional trade agreements. Trade facilitation measures as compliments to 
these agreements boosted trade among regional partners and their trade with third parties. 
Hence, consistent trade-creation effect found with gravity models has a strong 
foundation.    
The researches on intra-OIC trade were popular even in 90s. It was at the 8
th
 Islamic 
summit in Tehran where OIC countries adopted a resolution on ‘Preparation of the 
Ummah’ for the 21st century in the Areas of Economic, Trade and Financial Cooperation 
among OIC Countries. One of the areas of cooperation was enhancing intra-OIC trade. 
Literally target set as 3% increase in intra-OIC trade in three years to hit 13% by 1421H. 
In pursuance of this, Bendjilali (1997) in his research examined the relationship between 
exports of goods and services among OIC member countries and the main 
macroeconomic variables so as to shed light on the determinants of, as he defines, intra-
bilateral trade among OIC countries. In his research Bendjilali tried to provide some 
insight on target of 3% increase in three years for policy makers in OIC countries, OIC 
31 
 
organs, and business communities in OIC member countries. In his model, depended 
variable is nominal imports from one OIC country to another. In addition to regular 
gravity model explanatory variables, he included Islamic Development Bank trade 
finance availed for importing country and a dummy variable to assess the effect of 
membership to a regional economic cooperation namely, Gulf Cooperation Council, 
ASEAN, Arab Maghreb Union. The result of econometric analysis, traditional gravity 
modelling, showed that inter OIC trade is positively affected by the size of their 
economies, the extent of Islamic Development Bank trade financing, their joint 
participation in regional integration schemes, and negatively affected by transportation 
and communication costs as proxy for the distance. Based on these findings, he 
recommends, among some other measures, extending trade finance to further enhance 
intra-OIC trade. With reference to this work, in the next section some insight is given on 
Islamic Development Bank’s role in intra-OIC trade and its trade finance facilities in 
specific. Given the Islamic Development Bank’s trade finance facilities as a small 
fraction of intra-OIC trade, the effects of OIC organs policies as a factor of enhancing 
intra-OIC trade are scrutinized.  
Based on this discussion, in the coming sections determinants of intra-OIC trade are 
discussed with the objective of investigating and exploring the reasons of recent increase 
in OIC countries’ trade with the rest of the world and among themselves. Is this increase 
due to policy instruments by OIC organs or some other dynamics? In order to avoid 
above-mentioned complications several explanatory variables such as a proxy for trade 
facilitation to address omitted variables are included.  
In the 1990s, trade facilitation started to emerge as the top trading agenda for 
international organizations. With the objective of smoothening international trade 
transactions, APEC in its Osaka Action Agenda (1995) included trade facilitation in its 
work plan under the title of “Trade and Investment Liberalization and Facilitation”. 
Based on ‘Trade and Investment Liberalization and Facilitation’ subject APEC members 
announced individual action plans, as adopted in the Manila Action Plan, and 
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implemented them under several trade facilitation measures as per their domestic 
regulations.
19
 
Trade facilitation has long been in the agenda of the WTO with several distinct stages. 
However, the Singapore Ministerial Conference (1996), which gave a mandate for a more 
comprehensive look at trade facilitation, was a milestone. Three WTO members decided 
to establish three specific working groups, namely ‘transparency in government 
procurement’, ‘trade and investment’ and ‘competition policy’.  As the Ministerial 
Declaration instructed the WTO Goods Council to focus on possible means for 
simplifying trade procedures, this issue was referred as trade facilitation. In order to 
identify the WTO rules in the trade facilitation area, the Goods Council was directed “to 
undertake explanatory and analytic work, drawing on the work of other relevant 
organizations, on the simplification of trade procedures”. These four tasks on 
transparency in government procurement, trade and investment, competition policy and 
trade facilitation are known as ‘Singapore Issues’ since the Singapore Ministerial 
Conference initiated them. It was trade facilitation of the Singapore issues which broke 
the Cancun deadlock as the other three issues were dropped from the Doha Development 
Agenda after strong opposition from developing countries.
20
  
The importance of trade facilitation in international trade has turned out to be more 
eminent with the inclusion of this item at the top of the agenda of international 
organizations. However, there is still not a standard definition of trade facilitation in the 
public policy discourse. Wilson et al. (2003), in this regard, provided the definition of 
trade facilitation by several international organisations as “the use of technologies and 
techniques which will help members to build up expertise, reduce costs and lead to better 
movement of goods and services” (APEC Economic Committee , 1999): 
OECD, TD/TC/WP21 attributed to Reven (2001): “simplification and 
standardization of procedure and associated information flows required to move 
goods internationally from seller to buyer and to pass payments in other directions” 
                                                 
19 Ippei Yamazawa, APEC’s progress toward the Bogor target: A quantitative assessment of 1997 IAP/CAP, pp.11-16. (Tokyo: PEEC 
Japan Committee, 1998). 
20 WTO Secretairat website, accessed on 28 April 2010 at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey3_e.htm   
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WTO/UNCTAD, Ecommerce and Development Report (2001: 180): 
“simplification and standardization of procedures, including activities, formalities 
and practices involved in collecting, presenting, communicating and processing 
data required for the movement of goods in international trade” 
APEC (2002): “trade facilitation generally refers to the simplification, 
harmonization, use of new technologies and other measures to address procedural 
and administrative impediments to trade” 
UNECE (2003): “comprehensive approach to reducing the complexity and cost of 
trade transactions process, and ensuring that all this activities can take place in an 
efficient, transparent and predictable manner, based on internationally accepted 
norms, standards and best practices”. 
Heinz (2003) addressed the difficulty of setting boundaries for the definition of trade 
facilitation as it cuts across business efficiency, transportation, government controls and 
regulations, information and communication technologies as well as the financial 
sector.
21
  
Usually trade facilitation refers to government regulations but literature on trade 
facilitation, as suggested by Heinz, goes beyond the government regulations and extends 
to information and communication technologies. For example, Freund and Weindhold 
(2000) found a significant effect of information and communication technologies, 
internet in specific, on trade flows among 56 countries in their gravity model. They found 
that the effect of internet on trade for poor countries is much higher than the effect of 
internet for richer countries as more internet presence decreases the traditional 
determinants of trade among countries such as speaking the same language or having a 
same colonizer in the past. They assessed the effect of web host increase in a country on 
its trade for 1998 and 1999. As they assessed, 10% increase in the number of web host 
associates with 1% increase in trade of a country. Hence, they suggest diffusion of 
internet as an imperative part of trade facilitation in particular for poor countries.   
                                                 
21 Heinz, S. (2003). Strategies to enhance trade facilitation Implementation in UNECE Member States. UNECE Committee for Trade, 
Industry and Enterprise Development Seventh Session. 
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Woo and Wilson (2000), on the other hand, confine the definition within efficiency 
improvement in the administration, procedure and logistics in the ports and customs. 
They expand the definition to include harmonization of standards and streamlining 
regulatory environment for conformance to international agreements and conventions.  
Gundogdu (2007) listed international agreements and conventions with the patronage of 
World Customs Organization as:  
(i) International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs 
Procedures, Kyoto Convention 1973 as revised Kyoto Convention in 1999 
became operational in 2006. This convention set standards for every aspect of 
customs clearance to harmonize procedure across the globe. 
(ii) Customs Convention on Temporary Admission also known as Istanbul 
Convention. As the name reveals, the convention is signed in Istanbul in 1990 to 
facilitate temporary admission of goods.  The convention introduced ATA Carnet 
for goods and CPD Carnet for vehicles. The main rational behind the convention 
was facilitate customs duty exemption procedure for goods imported with a 
specific purpose such as exhibition, humanitarian mission etc. and expected to be 
re-exported within a specific time period.  
(iii)International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding 
System. Also known as HS System aimed to harmonize tariff classification of 
goods for customs clearance across the signatories.  
Indeed, specific elements of trade facilitation were part of General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) 1947. Most prominent of them are Article V on Freedom of Transit, 
Article VII on Valuation for Customs Procedures, Article VIII on Fees and Formalities 
connected with importation and exportation and Article X on Publication and 
Administration of Trade Regulations. These articles were transformed into specific WTO 
agreements in due course particularly in the Tokyo Round of GATT such as the 
Agreement on Import Licensing, Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Measures, Technical 
Barriers to Trade, Pre-shipment Inspection, Rules of Origin and Customs Valuation.   
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There has been substantial literature on assessment of trade facilitation measures with 
gravity modelling.  
Wilson et al. (2003) scrutinized the relationship between trade facilitation, GDP per 
capita and trade flows in the context of the Asia Pacific Region. In order to assess the 
effect of trade facilitation they identified four broad indicators as electronic-business 
usage, regulatory environment, port efficiency and customs environment. Based on 
country-specific data on these indicators in a gravity model, the relationship between 
trade flows and these indicators are estimated. In addition to these indicators and standard 
explanatory variables of gravity model, they also included tariffs. They found regulatory 
barriers deter trade while enhanced port efficiency substantially boosts trade. In addition 
to enhanced port efficiency, electronic business and improvement in customs has positive 
effects on trade flows though with a lesser impact as compared to port efficiency.   
Piermartini and Nordas (2004) examined the effect of infrastructure on trade performance 
with a gravity model. In addition to bilateral tariffs, the model included infrastructure 
quality indicators including road, port, customs clearance efficiency, airport and 
telecommunication to assess their impact on bilateral trade in the automotive, textile and 
clothing sectors.  After including multilateral resistances from tariffs and remoteness into 
the fixed effect model, the quality of infrastructure appeared as an important determinant 
of trade. While the effect of tariffs turned to be negative as expected, port efficiency is 
assessed as the most important infrastructure indicator for trade flows.  
Wilson et al. (2005) also investigated, through a panel of disaggregated manufactured 
goods in the period of 2000-2001 for 75 countries, the relationship between trade 
facilitation and trade flows. They defined four trade facilitation categories as e-business 
infrastructure, port infrastructure, customs environment and regulatory environment. By 
employing gravity model they estimated the impact of these categories on bilateral trade 
flows. They found the main gains from trade facilitation come from a country’s own 
efforts rather than that of a trade partner. Furthermore, trade facilitation items in relation 
to GATT articles of V, VII, VIII and X on legal and administrative reforms would 
significantly boost trade. As mentioned above, Article V on Freedom of Transit, Article 
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VII on Valuation for Customs Procedures, Article VIII on Fees and Formalities 
connected with importation and exportation and Article X on Publication and 
Administration of Trade Regulations are the main clauses of GATT on trade facilitation.  
Kim and Park (2005) estimated the potential effect of trade liberalization and facilitation 
efforts on bilateral trade among 15 APEC countries by a gravity model. As trade 
facilitation indicators, they incorporated standard and conformity assessment, information 
and communication technologies, customs procedures and business mobility to their 
model. They found significant trade-creation effect for trade facilitation measures 
complementary to trade liberalization in the form of tariff reduction. Hence, they suggest 
any FTA should include arrangements for trade facilitation and should not just put 
emphasis on tariff reduction. Furthermore, they suggest that trade-creation effect of trade 
liberalization and facilitation is much stronger for highly interdependent countries such as 
Korea, China and Japan than the average of the APEC countries.     
Soloaga et al. (2006) embedded poisson equation to the gravity model in order to assess 
the effect of several improved trade facilitation scenarios on increase in trade. They had 
scenarios for improvement in regulatory environment, port efficiency, service sector 
infrastructure and customs environment. As they found, port efficiency of both importer 
and exporter is important but unlike Wilson et al. (2003), they did find stronger effects on 
bilateral trade from port efficiency of the importing country than the exporting country.  
Gundogdu (2007) assessed the effect of trade facilitation efforts of ASEAN countries on 
bilateral trade in East Asia namely ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea for the 
time period of 1997-2004 the research being the first one to assess the significance of 
mutual recognition agreements as a trade facilitation tool on trade flows. In doing so, he 
introduced a methodology within a gravity model for this purpose. His resulting analysis 
indicates enhanced trade both among ASEAN countries and between ASEAN countries 
and non-member East Asian countries as a result of ASEAN trade facilitation measures. 
Hence, he concluded that the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement is not trade diverting itself 
though recent efforts in the area of Mutual Recognition, integrated Single Window may 
give rise to some trade diversion as they exclude non-members. He proposed enhancing 
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the coverage of mutual recognition agreements as the result of the model suggested that 
cooperation in the area of standard and conformity assessment can boost intra-regional 
trade. He also highlighted the importance of decreasing delivery time for time-sensitive 
goods i.e. perishable goods as a priority subject of trade facilitation efforts. Trade 
facilitation projects require substantial financial resources. He also draws the attention to 
the fact that once these high-cost projects are implemented, all trading partners of the 
country benefit. In this regard, he opened an avenue for further discussion on the source 
of funds for trade facilitation projects, as many trading partners would get a free ride out 
of implementation of trade facilitation projects.  
In 2009, Islamic Center for Development of Trade (ICDT) in collaboration with the 
UNCTAD estimated the impact of the TPS-OIC, under total derogation of customs duties 
(removal of all obstacles to trade). The results suggest a static US$19 billion rise of intra-
OIC trade (1997 data). With the dynamic effects stimulated by more foreign direct 
investment, horizontal integration, removal of non-tariff barriers, cumulating rules of 
origin, etc. this gain argued to be even higher.  
Again Gundogdu (2007), as cited from United Nation ESCAP Trade and Investment 
Divisions survey including some OIC countries such as Bangladesh to identify most 
problematic trade facilitation areas, indicated the rank of these areas as depicted in Table 
2.1.    
Table 5: Table 2.1: Some of the Most Problematic Factors in International Trade Identified 
by the Private Sector:  
Most problematic areas in trade facilitation Rank 
Customs valuation 1 
Inspection and release of the goods 2 
Tariff classification 3 
Submission of documents for clearance 4 
Obtaining an import licencing 5 
Payment of fees and penalties 6 
Technical and sanitary requirements 7 
Identification of origin of the goods  8 
Source: Gundogdu (2007) as cited from UNESCAP Trade and Investment Division, Asia Pacific 
Research and Training Network on Trade 
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Customs valuation with a direct monetary implication on both public authorities and 
importers ranks on the top of the list. Gurler (2002) discusses the implications of the 
WTO Customs Valuation Agreement and emphasises on difficulties in implementation of 
the WTO Agreement on Customs Valuation in the case of African OIC member 
countries. The issue of customs valuation turns to be more important in the case of 
developing countries, including many OIC countries, as the bulk of the public income are 
generated from customs. As Gurler (2002) cites from WTO, in case of African countries 
50 to 60% of government income comes from customs. As Gurler (2002) states “the main 
implementation difficulties are related to the fear that the Agreement would limit their 
customs administrations to deal with the cases where goods were deliberately 
undervalued, which in turn would result in a loss of revenue from customs duties”. The 
government income implication of the issue is perceived to be one of the main reasons 
for many OIC countries being hesitant for further trade integration.  
It should also be stated that there has been substantial literature on customs valuation as 
an integral part of trade facilitation.        
According to ICDT Annual Report 2009, tariff incomes accounts for more than half of 
the government revenues in some developing countries, particularly in Africa. Hence, the 
public authorities of these countries are unwilling to have any change in as-is let alone 
implementing a comprehensive preferential trade agreement with drastic tariff cuts. It is 
suggested that successful implementation of any preferential trade agreement depends on 
compensation of potential revenue loss for government due to tariff cuts. For those 
countries, if not levying value added tax on imports, introduction of value added tax for 
imports is suggested as a remedy to potential loss of government revenue. 
Walsh (2003) defines Customs Valuation as an integral part of trade facilitation together 
with issues related to charges levied on imports, quota, licensing arrangement and the 
application of preference systems. He also explained provisions, together with their 
implementation procedures, of the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement. In addition, 
Finger and Schuler (2000) presents customs valuation within the wider sphere of reforms, 
which are based on transparency, accountability, objectivity and balance. After 
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presenting historical background of customs valuation issues, Rege (2002) accounts the 
resentment of developing countries for application of transaction values as it would 
supposedly decrease the customs revenue due to undervaluation.  
Indeed, tax evasion in customs through misclassification and undervaluation of imports is 
a momentous issue especially in developing countries. King (2003) indicated common 
under-invoicing and lack of effective valuation processes in developing countries, which 
highlighted the importance of capacity-building for implementation of any customs 
valuation system. On the other hand, Filmer (2003) presents the concerns of importers, as 
there exist some threat of assuming higher value as well as delaying clearance in customs 
so as to direct importers for illegal settlements. In the same fashion, Ghimire (2005) 
identified the discretionary power of customs authorities as a major issue with the 
customs valuation process. Finger and Schuler (2000) observe the lack of remedy and 
diagnose with WTO Custom Valuation Agreement for least-developed countries for their 
problem with customs administrations. They suggest capacity-building in the form of 
computer systems and databases for sound implementation of the agreement as a proper 
administrative environment does not exist in many developing countries.  
There are many studies on tariffs and customs revenue. According to Pritchett and Sethi 
(1994) importers tend to evade tariffs as it gets higher. Hence, increase in tariff revenue 
would be less than expected after increased tariff rate due to tax evasion. Accordingly, a 
decrease in tariffs would not necessarily mean decrease in revenue as lower tariffs 
decrease the marginal benefit to avoid taxation. Hence, customs revenue may increase as 
a result of increase in tax base. Both Ebrill et al. (1999) and Khattry and Rao (2002) 
worked on revenue-maximizing optimum tariffs rate. In regional focus, Abgeyegbe et al. 
(2004) examine the effect of trade liberalization on customs tax for not only aggregate 
but also subcategories for Sub-Saharan Africa.  
On the other hand, not much has been done for the quantitative effect of the WTO 
Customs Valuation Agreement, tariffs and imports on OIC countries customs revenue. As 
a result special section in this chapter on determinant of OIC countries customs revenue 
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in connection to implementation of WTO Customs Valuation Agreement is introduced as 
an extension model to identify determinant of intra-OIC trade.  
In addition to these works employing econometric models on OIC countries trade, there 
are some other descriptive researches on OIC integration. For example, SESRIC’ study 
“Integration into the World Economy: Experience of the OIC Countries” (2005), which 
was prepared by and presented to the OIC Economic Conference held during the 20
th
 
Session of the COMCEC, highlights the role of regional integration efforts under 
efficient and effective institutional framework as a preliminary step for a larger scale 
integration.  
In extending the debate, Dabour (2004) examines the implications of establishment of an 
Islamic Common Market. While examining these implications and various constraints he 
emphasises the importance of gradual economic integration. SESRIC (2003) propose 
alliance for OIC countries’ stock exchanges and clearing house. Ilkin (2003) analyses the 
use of information and communication technologies (ICT) and e-commerce in OIC 
countries. He recommends capacity-building in the ICT sector and establishment of inter-
banking payment systems in electronic form to promote intra-OIC trade.  
From another approach, Gurler (2002) discusses the implications of WTO agreements of 
Customs Valuation, Pre-shipment Inspection, Rules of Origin and Import Licensing on 
OIC countries. He specially emphasises the difficulties in implementation of these 
agreements especially in the case of African OIC member countries. As he states (2002: 
Page 64) “many of the difficulties encountered by developing country members in 
implementing these agreements are compounded in African countries”. He counts vast 
border and land between these countries, lack of trade finance, high duties, red tape and 
lack of resource as the main causes. In the case of customs valuation agreement, he 
proposes capacity-building through customs reform to address possible leakage of 
customs revenue after implementation of the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement. He 
accounts for Pre-shipment Inspection activities for verification of the quality, the 
quantity, the price including currency exchange rate and cost of financing, and customs 
classification.  Though pre-shipmen inspection is seen as an important tool for assurance 
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of proper customs valuation for many OIC countries, Gurler (2002) did not observe the 
crucial relationship between pre-shipment inspection and customs valuation. In case of 
the Agreement of Rule of Origin and Import Licensing, he confined himself merely to 
explaining the agreements and status of implementation of these agreements in African 
OIC member countries. However, he rightly addressed the issue of cost implication with 
implementation of these agreements for OIC countries as the implementation of these 
agreements necessitates capacity-building in trade facilitation in the form of 
computerization of customs procedures, training for customs officers, customs reform 
etc. He did not connect the issue of capacity-building in trade facilitation with OIC trade 
integration though in his research of Gurler (2000) he examines the role and function of 
trade arrangements in the formation of an Islamic Common Market or any other 
prospective economic integration. Then, after providing conceptual background of 
regional integration he evaluated regional economic groupings among OIC member 
countries and their possible role for an Islamic Common Market. He classified regional 
economic grouping in six categories based on the level of the integration as:  
(i) Preferential trade area 
(ii) Free trade area 
(iii)Customs union 
(iv) Common market 
(v) Monetary union 
(vi) Economic union 
In this research he also provides comprehensive background information on OIC trade 
integration initiatives since its inception. Similarly, Hzaine (1998) conducted a survey on 
major economic groupings within the OIC and, based on this, offered some policy 
options for an Islamic Common Market. He proposed abolishment of overlapping 
groupings and policy harmonization (rule of origin, ECT compensation system) for an 
Islamic Common Market. However, the Framework Agreement on Trade Preferential 
System among Member States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference noted that 
``due to the geographical dispersion of Member States, and the differences in their 
development levels which hamper the establishment of a comprehensive regional system 
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for trade liberalization, a Trade Preferential System would be the most appropriate 
instrument to increase trade exchange among them.”22  
As a result, Ariff (1998) discusses the notions of regionalism and globalism and proposes 
outward looking, cost-effective, low-profile, informal policy options for OIC integration. 
As he highlights, “some regional schemes had failed largely because they were too 
ambitious at the outset”. He warns that targets should be kept within reach so success can 
breed success, and also rightly points out the difficulties in reaching a consensus in large 
economic groupings, as is the case with the OIC. Besides, he argues that the cost of 
rigidly structured, highly institutionalized OIC integration might exceed the expected 
benefit of out of this formation. Although Ariff (1998) touched upon very important 
issues of OIC trade integration, he did not propose specific OIC integration framework 
based on concrete pillars. 
2.4 POLICIES TOWARDS INCREASING INTRA-OIC TRADE  
The role of international organizations in promoting international trade has been the 
subject of many studies. Rose (2004) concluded that being a WTO member has no 
significant role to promote international trade.
23
 However, in his recent study, Ghani 
(2007) argues, from the evidence of gravity model estimation, being an OIC member 
country has positive or non-significant effect on bilateral trade. Indeed, being a member 
of an organization alone may not explain more trade if there is no initiative from the side 
of this organization to enhance intra trade. Since the OIC has developed such strategies, it 
is worth mentioning OIC initiatives to enhance intra-OIC trade at this stage as the subject 
in question requires. 
After the United Nations (UN), the OIC is the second largest inter-governmental 
organization with a membership of 57 states spread over four continents. It was in 1970 
when the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM) decided to establish a 
permanent secretariat, headed by a secretary general, in Jeddah in their meeting in Saudi 
                                                 
22 Available at www.comcec.org/EN/belge/agreements/pdf/OIC-TPC.pdf last accessed on 22 September 2009. 
23 Kim (2006) re-estimated, by excluding oil, agriculture and textile sectors, the model used by Rose and shows that WTO does, 
actually, promote international trade. Subramaniam and Wie (2003) modified the same sample, specification of the gravity model and 
the definition of WTO membership. They showed that WTO membership increases a country’s international trade. 
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Arabia.
24
 Since then there have been many initiatives among member countries in 
economic and trade cooperation under the OIC umbrella. The resolution of the Makkah 
Summit in 2005, however, is a milestone in accelerating trade cooperation efforts with a 
mandate to increase intra-OIC trade 20% by 2015. Accordingly, along with the Ten-Year 
Programme of Action specific duties have been assigned to the several OIC affiliates:
25
  
(i) Islamic Development Bank – IDB (Jeddah); 
(ii) Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Center for Islamic 
Countries    (SESRIC) (Ankara); 
(iii) Islamic Center for the Development of Trade ICDT (Casablanca); 
(iv) Islamic Chamber of Commerce and Industry ICCI (Karachi). 
These institutions have been carrying out several projects under the pivotal role of the 
Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation of the OIC (COMCEC) agenda 
related to economic and trade cooperation among OIC member countries. For instance, 
the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) has prepared feasibility works for Medium Term 
Trade Financing and implemented it. In addition, IDB has also established the 
International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation (ITFC), which is expected to be the arm 
of the IDB with a mandate to enhance intra-OIC trade. Furthermore, IDB has been 
cooperating with the COMCEC in the development of the Tariff Preferential Scheme for 
OIC (TPS-OIC) through the Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC) on the Tariff 
Preferential Scheme and its outcome in the form of a Protocol on Preferential Tariff 
Scheme for TPS – OIC (PRETAS). As part of this, PRETAS, an agreement with tariff 
reduction rates, has been developed. As a next step cooperation for the ‘Rules of Origin 
of Goods and removal of Non-tariff Barriers’ is to be completed under the TNC agenda. 
The Islamic Center for the Development of Trade (ICDT) in Casablanca is in full charge 
of the Trade Information Network of the Islamic Countries (TINIC). Moreover, SESRIC 
undertook the renewal of the most important strategic document of the COMCEC Plan of 
                                                 
24 OIC webpage accessed on 27 June 2008 at http://www.oic-oci.org/oicnew/page_detail.asp?p_id=52  
25 
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Action. It is again SESRIC which prepared the inventory of the decisions taken regarding 
the economic and trade cooperation within the framework of the OIC.  
With the focus on trade creation rather than trade diversion and in cooperation with 
COMCEC, a number of policy measures have been identified to implement these 
measures which includes trade development, promotion of non-reciprocal market access 
to the LDMCs to enhance their trade as well as setting-up of sub-targets for trade for the 
individual member countries in various regions based on their trade potential. 
2.4.1 The Role of Islamic Development Bank26 
One should note the pivotal role and contribution of IDB for promoting intra-OIC trade. 
IDB embarked on operations within the framework of the Ten-Year Action Programme 
and established, accordingly, ITFC. 47 OIC member countries as well as six finance 
corporations have signed the agreement. ITFC is expected to be the essential institution 
of IDB with a mandate to enhance intra-OIC trade with a five-prongs strategy including 
trade finance, trade facilitation, trade promotion, capacity building and strategic product 
development. Indeed, trade finance business is not something new to IDB. With the 
inception of ITFC all trade windows of IDB would be combined under one entity so as to 
create synergy for embarking many initiatives for enhancing intra-OIC trade under the 
Ten-Year Action Programme.  
The ITFC with authorized capital of US$3 billion and subscribed capital of US$613 
million became operational in January 2008 and took over all the trade finance business 
and trade cooperation programmes of the IDB Group under a single umbrella. The 
principal objective of the ITFC is to promote and enhance trade of member countries 
and to supplement the efforts of IDB in this regard by providing trade finance and 
engaging in activities that facilitate intra-OIC trade and international trade of MCs. 
ITFC delivers these objectives through two parallel lines of approach, namely Trade 
Finance Operations and the Trade Cooperation and Promotion Programme. 
In short, the ITFC fulfils its objective by undertaking the following functions:  
                                                 
26 Based on the work experience of the author with Islamic Development Bank Group. 
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(i) Finance trade, alone or in cooperation with other financial institutions; 
(ii) Assist OIC MCs and institutions to access private and public funds from 
international markets for short-term trade financing; 
(iii) Provide assistance for the development of investment opportunities in MCs 
to enable them to enhance their international trade capabilities; 
(iv) Develop and diversify financial instruments and products for trade 
financing; 
(v) Provide technical assistance and training to Trade Promotion Organizations 
(TPOs) and financial institutions in MCs;  
(vi) Promote and facilitate intra-OIC trade and international trade of MCs; 
(vii) Support trade promotion activities of TPOs. 
 
The ITFC trade finance arm emphasizes on enhancing intra-OIC trade through 
providing short-term trade finance facilities and establishing trade links between the 
entities in different OIC member countries. Accordingly, the share of intra-OIC trade in 
overall ITFC trade finance approvals for 2008 reached to 83%. By availing trade finance 
facilities in the era of global financial and economic crisis, ITFC support OIC member 
countries to sustain their economic and social development. 
As explained above, the ITFC is charged with the responsibility of providing trade 
financing for economic operators in OIC Member countries with particular emphasis on 
enhancing intra-OIC trade. A summary of IDB group trade finance approvals, from 
inception to date 1977-2010, is presented in below: 
Table 6: Table 2.2: Islamic Development Bank Trade Finance 
Import Trade Financing Operations (ITFO) US$ 23.710 billion 
Export Financing Scheme (EFS) US$ 1.670 billion 
Islamic Banks Portfolio (IBP) US$ 3.040 billion 
Unit Investment Fund (UIF) US$ 0.906 billion 
ITFC Trade Finance Operations (2008) US$ 2.505 billion 
ITFC Trade Finance Operations, (2009) US$ 2.166 billion  
ITFC Trade Finance Operations, (2010) US$ 2.554 billion  
Source: International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation 
 
By the end of 2010, the cumulative IDB Group trade financing stands at US$36.551 
billion with intra-OIC trade financing representing 75% of this total trade financing. ITFC 
commenced business activities at the beginning of 2008 and during this first year of 
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operations, 70 trade finance operations in 24 OIC member countries were approved for a 
total of US$ 2.505 billion. The total share of intra-OIC trade finance approval in 2008 was 
83%, representing a modest increase from 77% achieved the previous year. The level was 
almost sustained from 2008 to 2010  
Financing for small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) and LDMCs in member 
countries is one of the highest priorities for ITFC. In this regard, 44% of total private 
sector approvals in 2008 were in favour of entities in the SMEs category and 43 % went to 
LDMCs and assisting them to mainly import raw and semi-finished industrial products to 
be used for the manufacture of goods meant mainly for export markets. ITFC approval in 
favour of LDMCs amounted to 45% of all approvals, for 2010.  
Another area of focus for ITFC is the development of strategic commodities particularly 
in LDMCs in order to assist these countries to alleviate poverty and sustain the jobs 
available in agro-industry sectors. Especially, providing funds for input financing turns to 
be an urgency to put the economies of LDMCs into track as the production cycle has been 
damaged in the recent fertilizer price surge, food crisis and global financial crisis. Given 
the huge volume of OIC countries imports and its relatively low capital, ITFC focused on 
high-impact operations and improving its ratios of LDMCs, SMEs, Strategic 
Commodities as explained earlier. Also, special emphasis is given to increase private 
sector financing. However, the public sector still constitutes more than half of the annual 
approvals. 
The SMEs are the main driving forces of the economies of many OIC countries, 
particularly for LDMCs and it is for this reason that ITFC is keen to promote new 
financing tools to boost financing for LDMCs and SMEs in order to enhance intra-OIC 
trade. Furthermore, ITFC identified several initiatives and counter-measures to maintain 
the same level of support to member countries and their public and private institutions to 
minimize the effects of the global financial crisis. 
The ITFC’s trade promotion and development arm, the Trade Cooperation and 
Promotion Programme (TCPP), focuses on strengthening Trade Promotion 
Organizations (TPOs) through intensive capacity-building activities and promoting and 
47 
 
enhancing intra-trade through facilitating trade promotion activities in OIC countries. In 
view of the need to fulfil the above-stated objective, TCPP has been developed as the 
trade promotion and facilitation arm of ITFC, with a mission of planning and delivering 
effective and tailor-made trade-related technical assistance projects to the concerned 
trade institutions and SMEs in OIC member countries. TCPP, as a facilitator and 
catalyst to promote intra trade and enhance export capacities of MCs and in coordination 
and cooperation with partners, carried this role through providing sustainable trade 
development solutions to OIC countries’ trade promotion institutions and government 
agencies. The final objective is aimed at supporting, enhancing and developing the 
private sector exports in OIC member countries. In 2009, ITFC through TCPP organized 
and/or supported 36 activities/projects under the four business lines of the programme, 
which are trade promotion, trade facilitation, capacity building, and development of 
strategic products. A total of 36 member countries participated in these activities and/or 
received financial support from ITFC. The activities undertaken are classified as 
follows:  
(i) Meetings that cover trade information facilitation, capacity building, Aid-for-
trade, intra-trade promotion, Halal food, development of strategic products, food 
crisis; 
(ii) Training courses on export strategies and international marketing were conducted 
for the benefit of some exporting companies/establishments (SMEs) in some 
member countries; 
(iii) On-the-job trainings for the benefit of selected Trade Promotion Organizations 
(TPOs) and selected Chambers of Commerce; 
(iv) Organizing and sponsoring participations of TPOs and SMEs from OIC member 
countries in the international trade exhibitions and business matching events.  
The following is the examples of the activities/projects implemented under four business 
lines of the programme in 1430H. 
1st Business Line: Trade Promotion 
The objective of the 1
st
 Business Line as being trade promotion is to act as a catalyst and 
facilitator for intra-OIC trade, TCPP sponsors the participation of national TPOs and 
SMEs in buyers-sellers meetings, trade-bridge programmes and international trade 
exhibitions, business forums; enabling them to reach out to new markets, identify new 
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business opportunities, establishing partnerships and acquiring information on sectors and 
business culture of their targeted markets. 
The following examples can be given as part of such activities: Collective Participations 
of TPOs from selected MCs in ITFC Pavilion at INTRADE 09 Malaysia 10-12 
November 2009.  
The ITFC/TCPP organized and sponsored collective participations of Trade Promotion 
Organizations from 8 MCs (Oman, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, Indonesia, UAE, 
and Pakistan) in the ITFC Pavilion at INTRADE 09 where given the opportunity to 
present their countries’ economic development and to reach out to new markets, and to 
identify new business opportunities. This was one of the trade promotion activities 
implemented by ITFC, having direct and immediate impact on trade, aims at increasing 
the volume of intra trade, enhancing trade cooperation among MCs. ITFC is committed 
to support participations of TPOs, mainly from CIS and African countries in international 
trade exhibitions to enable them to access new markets and promote their export products 
in their target markets. 
2nd Business Line: Trade Facilitation 
Trade facilitation as the second business line of TCPP aims at enhancing economic 
integration among OIC MCs and supporting their integration into the world economy. To 
this end, TCPP provides financial support for the activities such as meetings, 
conferences, seminars and workshops related to harmonization of international trade rules 
and regulations, transport and logistical services, e-trade, Halal food regulations with a 
view of strengthening administrative capacities of OIC member countries to enable them 
to develop and implement their national policies in these areas.  
Among the activities of trade facilitation ‘Aid for Trade Initiatives for SPECA and 
ESCWA Regions’ can be mentioned.   
ITFC/TCPP launched the regional initiative on Aid for-Trade (AfT) Road Map for the 
United Nations Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia (SPECA) 
countries (Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan 
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and Uzbekistan) in collaboration with the Governments of Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, 
Finland and many international and regional organisations as WTO, United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), International Trade Center (ITC), United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), Asian Development Bank (ADB) to discuss the means and 
modalities for the organization of the Experts Group Meeting and Ministerial Meeting 
held in 2010 in Kyrgyz and Azerbaijan. The ITFC expressed its readiness and willingness 
to sponsor the Experts Group and Ministerial meetings organized in 2010. This initiative 
is expected to identify trade development needs of the relevant countries and prepare the 
Road Map for the implementation of trade development programmes, which will 
strengthen competitiveness of the beneficiary countries in global markets.  
3rd Business Line: Capacity Building  
The main objective of the Capacity Building-oriented business line is to enhance trade 
support capacities of institutions in MCs as an indigenous source that support and 
strengthen private sector competitiveness in international markets. Capacity development 
is the key to sustainable trade development. Without having qualified human resources 
and efficient organizations, it would be difficult to plan and implement national trade 
development policies. It is for this reason, ITFC/TCPP gives special importance to 
capacity-building activities and allocates considerable amount of its annual budget to 
organize on-the-job training programmes and training seminars for trade support 
organizations and SMEs on various subjects ranging from international marketing and 
export strategies to trade finance and export credit insurance etc. In 2009, the total 
number of activities/project implemented under capacity building was fourteen, in which 
over 35 OIC MCs, mostly from French-speaking and CIS countries participated.  
Capacity Development Technical Assistance Projects should be mentioned among the 
projects undertaken by the Capacity Building business line. ITFC/TCPP has extended its 
effort in the field of capacity building by initiating and sponsoring three technical 
assistance projects to strengthen training departments of some TPOs (IGEME, 
MATRADE, High School of Trade of Tunisia) in order to serve other TPOs and 
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enterprises of OIC MCs through offering specialized training programmes to improve 
their international trade competitiveness. The validation symposium of the first phase of 
the projects was held in Istanbul, Turkey during 4-5 November 2009. ITFC plans to 
provide funds to implement similar projects for some other TPOs from French-speaking 
and CIS countries in the near future.  
4th Business Line: Development of Strategic Product 
The objective of the Development of Strategic Product business line is to Assist MCs to 
develop their trade capacities and competitiveness in the sectors and products where they 
have comparative advantages. Among its projects revitalization of the groundnut sector in 
selected Sub-Saharan countries should be mentioned. 
ITFC/TCPP launched the implementation of a project ‘Revitalisation of the Groundnut 
Sector’ in Senegal, Gambia and Guinea Bissau. Groundnut is the principal source of 
export earnings of Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal and accounts for almost 70% of 
the rural labour force in these countries. Due to the high importance of groundnuts for the 
economies of these countries, the ITFC has initiated and funded a preliminary study, 
which aims at assessing the current situation of the sectors in each of the three countries 
and providing solutions to overcome the constraints, with a view to support the increase 
of improved, higher value-added groundnut production and of exports to both 
international markets and OIC states. 
In addition, the IDB Group is very keen on cooperating with the COMCEC in the 
development of Tariff Preferential Scheme for OIC (TPS-OIC) through the Trade 
Negotiating Committee (TNC) on the Tariff Preferential Scheme and its outcome in the 
form of a Protocol on Preferential Tariff Scheme for TPS – OIC (PRETAS). PRETAS, an 
agreement with tariff reduction rates, has been developed. TPS-OIC is targeted to be 
established by 1st January 2009. As a next step cooperation for the Rules of Origin of 
Goods and removal of Non-tariff Barriers, shall be completed under Trade Negotiating 
Committee (TNC) agenda. In order to enhance intra-OIC trade the IDB has signed the 
Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with Malaysia and Turkey. These MOU are 
expected to boost close cooperation and co-financing. Similar MOU are expected to be 
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signed with other member countries and institutions as well. Reference to Economic 
Cooperation of the OIC Ten-Year Programme Resolution I.3, the IDB has organized 
activities to provide support to its member countries in the process of acceding to the 
WTO or contemplation thereof.  Basically, the IDB activities on WTO-related matters 
target the acceding members in order to facilitate and expedite their accession process by 
providing awareness among these members related to the WTO Agreements and related 
issues. In addition to technical assistance, IDB has conducted Workshops on WTO 
issues, Trade Policy Courses, Seminars, sectoral studies (on Agriculture, Investment, 
Services, Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, and E-Commerce), and 
consultative meetings in conjunction with the last six WTO Ministerial Conferences 
especially for those member countries acceding to the WTO. 
The presented information so far suggests substantial increase in efforts by OIC affiliates 
to boost intra-OIC trade. However, a close look at the details might reveal possible 
ineffectiveness of these activities. For example, trade finance provided by IDB Group 
although accounting for billions of dollars is still meagre compared to intra-OIC trade 
volume. Per annum, IDB Group trade finance availed would make less than one percent 
of intra-OIC imports alone. As a result, unlike Bendjilali (1997) trade finance is not 
perceived as an independent variable of intra-OIC trade in the model to be introduced in 
this chapter. In addition, existing trade cooperation and promotion activities seem to be 
ad hoc but not well organized within a framework. Given the double dominance 
mentioned previously, it is plausible to seek the cause of recent increases in intra-OIC 
trade in other dynamisms but not necessarily with the efforts of OIC affiliates.  
2.5 MODEL SPECIFICATION FOR DETERMINANTS OF INTRA-OIC 
TRADE: EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
As mentioned previously, this part is constructed around the gravity model in identifying 
the determinants of intra-OIC trade.  This section aims to detail the model specification. 
2.5.1 Methodology 
The determinants of intra-OIC trade is examined through an econometric model namely, 
the traditional gravity model where bilateral trade between two countries is positively 
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related to economic sizes and negatively related to geographic distance. It should be 
noted that the data set is designed in balanced panel structure.   
Since its introduction, dating back to works of Tinbergen (1962) and Poyhonen (1963), 
the Gravity model for trade flows has been employed to scrutinize determinants of 
bilateral trade flows. The model itself is derived from Newtonian Physics Theory. The 
attraction between two objects positively related to the masses and negatively to the 
distance between them. Similarly, in case of international trade, the model indicates 
positive correlation between economic sizes and trade flows and negative one with 
geographic distance. That is,  
 (2.1.)
 
where: 
Fij stands for trade flow from country i to country j;   
Yi and Yj are the economic sizes of the two countries; 
Dij is the geographic distance between country i and county j; 
A stands for gravity constant  
By taking natural logs, a linear form of relationship between log trade flows and the 
logged economy size and distance would be obtained as:  
 (2.2.)
 
Since the introduction of the model, theoretical basis of the model and variables have 
been subject to many studies as explained in the literature review part of this chapter. 
However, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) argued that the estimation of the traditional 
gravity model suffers from omitted variable bias as equations do not have a theoretical 
foundation. Recent research on intra-OIC trade excluded the effect of bilateral applied 
tariff rates as an independent variable for intra-OIC trade. This, together with the effect of 
real exchange rates as well as improvement in trade facilitation and liberalization level of 
countries, might give rise to omitted variable bias in the gravity model estimation. This 
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paper, hence, unlike other intra-OIC trade research, aims to show the effect of price 
levels between importing and exporting countries through the inclusion of relative 
depreciation of real exchange rates as well as including the depreciation of the US dollar 
against the Euro into the econometric model as determinant of intra-OIC trade. It should 
be noted that the independent variable envisioned being the real imports of OIC countries 
from the rest of the world, that is both member and non-member countries. Based on the 
result of the econometric model, another econometric model is introduced to provide 
some insight on OIC countries’ customs revenues.    
2.5.2 The Model Specification 
The rudimentary gravity equation is augmented by including specific variables to fulfil 
the objectives of this chapter. The functional form employed for this research is as 
depicted in the following equation: 
 (2.3.)
 
where: IMP stands for real imports of OIC member countries from the rest of the world, 
GDP stands for real gross domestic product, DIST stands for weighted distance, TARIFF 
stands for weighted tariff and DEXR stands for real exchange rate. Together with real 
exchange rate, applied tariff is taken into account as an explanatory variable. Dummy 
variable for imports of OIC member countries from non-OIC countries and border effect 
have also been included. Natural logarithms of the variables are taken. Hence, real 
imports of OIC countries from non-OIC and OIC countries are expressed in a log-linear 
form in equation 2.4. below: 
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   (2.4.)
 
where superscripts i and j stand for the importer (an OIC member country) and exporter, 
respectively and t donates years.  
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In this model, dependent variable is real imports of OIC member countries from the rest 
of the world for the period of 1995-2007. Dependent variable, IMP
ijt
, is the real imports 
of country i from j at time t. GDP
it
 and GDP
jt
 are real Gross Domestic Product at time t 
for country i and j. DIST
ij
 stands for the weighted distance between two countries.
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ApEXR
ijt
 is appreciation of country i’s real exchange, includes both relative nominal 
exchange rates and price levels, in year t. TARIFF
ijht
 is weighted tariff rate of country i 
imposed on product imported from country j in year t.
28
  
It should be mentioned that it is difficult to get a quantitative measure for trade 
facilitation and liberalization. Recently, the World Economic Forum released very 
relevant data with the Global Enabling Trade (ETI) Report in June 2008 in that regard.
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However, data is not provided for all OIC member countries for the time period of 1995-
2007. Hence, trade openness index is used as a proxy for a country's level of trade 
liberalization and facilitation. TO
it
, Trade openness index is measured as percentage of 
trade to GDP.
30
 Herein, membership to other regional organizations such as ECOWAS or 
the effect of Generalized System of Preferences is not included since the tariff variable 
captures their main effects on imports.  
                                                 
27
 The distance data used herein is the weighted distance of country i’s and country j’s big cities. The basic idea is to calculate 
distance based on big cities of two countries. Hence inter-city distances are weighted by the share of the city in the overall country’s 
population. The general formula developed by Head and Mayer (2002) used for calculating distances between countries i and j is:  
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where popk designates the population of agglomeration k belonging to country i. The parameter θ measures the sensitivity of trade 
flows to bilateral distance dkl. The distance used in this paper calculation sets θ equal to -1, which corresponds to the usual coefficient 
estimated from gravity models of bilateral trade flows. The main motivation to use weighted distance is to capture the effect of big 
cities rather than pure distance between two capital cities (CEPII manual.).  
28 This variable denotes weighted average tariff rate in the percent ad valorem term which is specific to the trading partners, product 
categories and year and includes the lowest applicable rates as well as all available preferential rates. Bilateral trade values are used as 
weight. To avoid log zero in case tariff level is zero, 100 is added.  
)100( ijhtijht TARIFFLnLnTARIFF   
29 The ETI focuses on four trade-enabling issues: (1) market access, (2) border administration, (3)transport and communications 
infrastructure and (4) business enivironment. The market access index measures the extent to which 
the policy and cultural framework of a country welcomes foreign goods into the country. The border administration index assesses the 
extent to which administration at the border facilitates entry to a country. Once inside, transport and communications infrastructure 
index measures whether the country has the requisite infrastructure to facilitate the movement of goods from border to destination. 
Finally, the business environment index considers the overarching regulatory and security environment impacting the transport 
business in the country. 
30 Note that using this indicator as a representation of openness may be misleading. Even when this indicator has a relatively small 
value, it does not necessarily imply high trade barriers. It may, in fact, be caused by a large proportion of GDP being created by non-
traded activities and other factors. 
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BORD
ij
 is a dummy variable: if country i and j share a common border the dummy 
variable gets the value of 1, zero otherwise. Likewise, COMCOL
ij
 is a dummy variable. If 
country i and j had a common colonizer the dummy variable gets the value of 1, zero 
otherwise. If country i and j are used to be part of same country, the dummy variable of 
SMCTRY
ij
 gets the value of 1, zero otherwise. LnFXUSDEUR
t
 stands for value of one US 
dollar against the Euro. The main objective of including this variable is to show the effect 
of depreciation of the US dollar. The Euro alone, not SDR, is preferred since the Euro 
area has traditionally been one of the main partners of OIC member countries. Besides, 
valuation of the SDR includes the US dollar itself and the portion of the US dollar in the 
SDR has changed for the time period, 1995 to 2007, of this chapter.
31
 Note that, synthetic 
Euro exchange rate values before its introduction has been calculated by geometrically 
weighting the bilateral exchange rates of the twelve Euro area countries.
32
  
One further variable as proxy for trade creation and diversion effect of the OIC is 
introduced. EXTRA_OIC
ijt
 is dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the observations if 
country j (country of origin) is not a member of OIC in year t.
33
 This dummy variable 
captures the change in exports of third countries to the OIC members. Hence, if there is 
decrease in exports of third countries it should be interpreted as trade diversion and vice 
                                                 
31
 SDR is International reserve assets created by the International Monetary Fund and allocated to its members to supplement existing 
reserve assets. They represent each holder's assured and unconditional right to obtain other reserve assets, especially foreign exchange. 
IMF cannot allocate SDRs to itself but receives them from members through various financial transactions and operations. Entities 
authorized to conduct transactions in SDRs are the Fund itself, participants in the Fund's Operations Division for SDRs and 
Administered Accounts, and prescribed "other holders". The SDR can be used for a wide range of transactions and operations, 
including the acquisition of other members' currencies, the settlement of financial obligations, the making of donations, and the 
extension of loans. SDRs may also be used in swap arrangements and as security for the performance of financial obligations. Forward 
as well as spot transactions may be conducted in SDRs. The SDR is the unit of account for the Fund. The value of the SDR is 
determined daily by IMF on the basis of a basket of currencies with each currency assigned a weight in the determination of that 
value. In the derivation of the SDR value, the currencies of the basket are valued at their market exchange rates for the US dollar, and 
the US dollar equivalents of each of the currencies are summed to yield the rate of the SDR in terms of the US dollar. 
On January 1, 1996, the SDR valuation basket weights were 39 per cent for the US dollar, 21 per cent for the deutsche mark, 18 per 
cent for the Japanese yen, and 11 per cent each for the French franc and pound sterling. On January 1, 1999, the currency amount of 
deutsche mark and French francs were replaced with equivalent amounts of euros, based on the fixed conversion rates between those 
currencies and the euro, announced on December 31, 1998 by the European Council. The weights in the SDR basket were changed to 
US dollar, 39 %; euro, 32 %(in replacement of the 21 % for the deutsche mark and 11 % for the French franc); Japanese yen, 18 %; 
and pound sterling, 11 %. As of January 1, 2001, the SDR valuation basket weights are the sum of the values of the amount of each 
currency in the following amounts: US dollar, 45 per cent; euro, 29 per cent; Japanese yen, 15 per cent, and pound sterling, 
11 %(UNSTAT DEFINITION). http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cdb/cdb_dict_xrxx.asp?def_code=130 
32 Bank of England calculation. Since 11 May 1999, the Bank of England has published a daily effective trade-weighted exchange rate 
index for the euro area. It is also compiled on the basis developed and used by the IMF. The weights reflect the pattern of trade 
between the euro-area as a whole and countries outside the euro area. (Trade between countries within the euro-area is excluded, so 
the weights are based solely on extra euro-area trade). Sterling has the biggest weight, with the US dollar the next largest. 
 
The index is calculated by weighting together the individual exchange rates for the 12 euro-area currencies against non-euro area 
currencies. So it represents an effective index for the 12 euro area currencies as a group. This permits the index to be calculated prior 
to 31 December 1998, using “synthetic” euro exchange rates. These are calculated by geometrically averaging the bilateral exchange 
rates of the original 11 euro-area currencies using “internal weights” based on the country shares of extra euro-area trade. 
33 All countries of destination, importers, in this model are OIC members.  
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versa. Usage of similar variables has been substantiated with several publications 
mentioned in the literature review part of this chapter. First, Aitken (1973) for example 
used such variables to assess trade creation and diversion effect.  
2.5.3 Data 
Annual real imports of 57 OIC member countries from 1995 to 2007 are collected from 
WITS (World Integrated Solution Database). Weighted distances, border dummy, 
common colonizer and same country dummy were collected from CEPII database. Real 
exchange rates index of importing country, Gross Domestic Product, together with 
consumer price indexes and exchange rates, are obtained from World Development 
Indicators Database. Depreciation of real exchange rates of the importing country is 
calculated by the author. Weighted average of applied tariff rates, in which import values 
are used as weight, were derived from the Trade Analysis and Information System 
(TRAINS).
34
 Depreciation rates of the US dollar against the Euro are derived from the 
Bank of England.
35
  
2.5.4 Expected Signs of Coefficients 
Gravity models explain bilateral trade by trading countries’ economic sizes and distance. 
Accordingly, as the GDP of trading countries increase, trade among them is expected to 
increase while increase in distance between trading partners are associated with decrease 
in trade. Hence, coefficients of GDP of both importing and exporting countries are 
expected to be positive while coefficient of distance should be negative. As tariff 
imposed by the importing country is expected to decrease exports, tariff coefficient 
should be negative. Basically, it is assumed that the more open a country is to trade, the 
higher will be the level of trade facilitation. Hence, trade openness, proxy for trade 
facilitation and liberalization, would be positive. Meanwhile, a real appreciation of an 
                                                 
34 Please refer to WITS for the formula. http://withs.worldbank.org  
35 On 31 December 1998, in accordance with Article 1091 (4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, the irrevocable 
conversion rates for the euro were adopted by the EU Council. This was upon a proposal from the Commission of the European 
Communities and after consultation with the European Central Bank. The euro conversion rates took effect at 00:00 (local time) on 1 
January 1999 (1 January 2001 for Greek Drachma).  
In compliance with the legal framework for use of the euro, the irrevocable conversion rate for the euro for each participating currency 
is the only rate to be used for conversion either way between the euro and the national currency unit, and for conversions between 
national currency units. 
Prior to 1999, a synthetic euro exchange rate has been calculated by geometrically weighting the bilateral exchange rates of the (then) 
eleven euro area countries using "internal weights" based on the country shares of extra euro-area trade. 
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importing country’s currency would positively affect the flow of commodities to the 
importing country. Hence, coefficient of appreciation of real exchange rate is expected to 
be positive. The dummy variable for the border effect is expected to be positive as 
countries sharing a border are expected to trade more. The coefficient of common 
colonizer variable is also expected to be positive since the presence of people speaking 
same languages, sharing similar culture and even measurement scales would make 
positive contribution to trade. As expected the coefficient for value of the US dollar 
against the Euro is to be positive if appreciation of the dollar against the Euro increases 
the imports of OIC member countries.  
EXRTA_OIC approximates the change in exports from third countries to OIC members 
as a result of OIC efforts in enhancing international trade including trade facilitation and 
liberalization efforts. Hence, if there is a decrease in exports from third countries to OIC 
members, this dummy should be negative. On the other hand, if the exports from third 
countries increased this variable should be positive.  
2.6 DETERMINANTS OF INTRA-OIC TRADE: FINDINGS 
2.6.1 Test Results for the Traditional Gravity Model 
Before including the additional variables, the regression for the traditional gravity model 
was conducted. In this model it is considered that imports of OIC countries depend on the 
economic sizes of their GDP, GDP of partner countries, distance and dummy variables 
aforementioned. 
The results of cross-sectional pooled OLS estimation as depicted in Table 2.3 clearly 
support the gravity model. Coefficient of both exporter’s and importer’s GDPs are 
positive and significant while the effect of distance is negative. Unexpectedly, the results 
of Model-1 shows that sharing a common land border is insignificant. Barry et al. (2004) 
employed the gravity model for analyzing the impact of China’s growth on 13 Asian 
countries’ exports and, they, similar to result of Model-1, found that sharing a common 
border is not significantly different from zero. The reason is argued to be relatively small 
trade of bordering countries in the region compared to their total trade with the rest of the 
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world. Besides, mutual dispute, impeded trade flow due to geographic barriers, 
nonexistence of trade complementarity, etc., might account for such result. 
Table 7: Table 2.3: Regression Result for the Traditional Gravity Model 
 
Model-1 Model-2 
   
Log Real GDP of Importer 
 
0.232* 
(0.013) 
0.332* 
(0.025) 
Log Real GDP of Exporter 
 
0.365* 
(0.012) 
0.472* 
(0.024) 
Log Weighted Distance 
 
-0.681* 
(0.036) 
-0.470* 
(0.061) 
Log Weighted Tariff 
 
 -0.186* 
(0.040) 
Appreciation of Importer’s Real FX   1.276* 
(0.179) 
Increase in Importers Trade Openness  0.244* 
(0.078) 
Non-OIC Exporter  
 
0.209* 
(0.059) 
0.246* 
(0.087) 
Border  
 
0.187 
(0.198) 
0.990* 
(0.320) 
Common Colonizer 
 
0.177* 
(0.065) 
0.551* 
(0.093) 
Number of Observations 7267 2989 
R2 0.783 0.790 
Notes: (a) Regressand: Log real import (OIC countries) 
(b) Intercept is suppressed 
(c) Standard errors in the parenthesis 
(d) ‘*’Values are significant at 5% level 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) argued that traditional gravity equations suffer from 
omitted variable bias. As a matter of fact, appreciation of an importer’s real exchange 
rate, incorporating relative exchange rate and price level, tariff, improvement in trade 
facilitation are very significant determinants of international trade. Exclusion of them is 
likely to lead omitted variable bias in the model. Hence, in Model-2, results with 
inclusion of these variables are also provided. Border effect turns to be positive and 
significant as expected. Though inclusion of these variables as the determinants of trade 
is crucial, it is not easy to find data especially on tariff. Consequently, this decreases the 
number of observations. After a concise focus on the importance of above-mentioned 
possibly omitted variables, the regression model for the determinant of OIC countries’ 
imports is run with inclusion of those variables. One would, from Table 2.4, realize that 
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the result of OLS and random effect support each other while they somehow contradict 
with the result of fixed effect in the model. The coefficient for real GDP of importer, 
contrary to expectations, turned to be negative and insignificant with fixed-effect 
estimation.  
Table 8: Table 2.4: Regression Result for the Determinant of OIC Countries’ Imports 
  
OLS 
Fixed 
Effect 
Random 
Effect 
     
Log Real GDP of Importer 
 0.380* 
(0.027) 
-0.163 
(0.563) 
0.424*    
(0.038)     
Log Real GDP of Exporter 
 0.495* 
(0.025) 
0.860* 
(0.394) 
0.523*   
(0.034)      
Log Weighted Distances 
 -0.413* 
(0.060) 
 -0.433*  
(0.087)        
Log Weighted Tariff 
 -0.169* 
(0.040) 
-0.197* 
(0.048) 
-0.186*   
(0.039)     
Increase in Importer’s Trade 
Openness  
 0.255* 
(0.077) 
0.903* 
(0.587) 
0.233* 
(0.106) 
Appreciation of Importer’s Real 
FX 
 0.735** 
(0.433) 
1.930* 
(0.521) 
1.556*    
(0.386) 
Border Effect 
 1.266* 
(0.327) 
 1.237*   
(0.504)  
Common Colonizer  
 0.554* 
(0.092) 
 0.643* 
(0.140)         
Same Country 
 -1.866* 
(0.557) 
 -1.871*    
(0.878)     
Value of USD against Euro 
 0.841* 
(0.287) 
0.785* 
(0.260) 
0.775*  
(0.235)        
Non-OIC Exporter 
 0.266* 
(0.087) 
 0.952 
(0.128) 
Number of Observations  2989 2989 2989 
R2  0.147 0.043 0.145 
 
Notes: (a) Regressand: Log Real Imports of OIC Countries  
(b) Intercept not reported;  
(c) Standard errors in the parenthesis 
(d) ‘*’ Values are significant at 5% level 
(e) ‘**’Values are significant at 10% level 
(f) Hausman Test: Prob>Chi2=0.754 
However, it should be noted that Hausman test supports the random effect calculation.
36
 
The results show that the coefficient of determination or R
2
 is relatively low, but similar 
                                                 
36
 Hausman Test Result:  
b = consistent under HO and HA; obtained from xtreg 
B =inconsistent under HA, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
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to the results of other studies such as Rose (2004), where the intercept is not supressed 
and data includes bilateral trade of numerous countries as both exporters and importers. 
After the inclusion of additional variables to Fixed Effect Model, however, R
2
 increases.  
As can be seen in the result depicted in Table 2.4., the coefficients of the other variables 
turn out to be as expected. However, having once been part of a same country appears to 
have negative impact on exporting to OIC countries. This might be attributed to hostile 
feelings aroused in the process of getting independence or separation of the previously 
shared country. Given the positive and significant coefficient of common colonizer 
variable, one may argue that OIC countries that used to be part of the same country tend 
to trade less given the other determinants of their imports.  
Figure 1: Figure 2.1: OIC Imports in US$ Million  
 
 Source: Based on Data provided by Islamic Development Bank Economic Policy and Statistic 
Division 
As Table 2.4. demonstrates, the coefficient for non-OIC exporter , albeit positive, turns to 
be insignificant with random effect calculation contrary to OLS estimation by which the 
same coefficient turns to be significant and positive. Given these estimations, at least it is 
possible to argue that being a non-OIC country, given the applied tariff, distance, etc., 
exporting to OIC is not unfavourable. As a matter of fact, Figure 2.1 shows not only the 
strong growth in intra-OIC imports but also strong growth in OIC imports from non-OIC 
                                                                                                                                                 
Test: HO difference in coefficients not systematic 
Chi2(6) = (b-B)’((v_b-V_B)^(-1))(b-B)  
Prob>Chi2=0.754 
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countries in recent years. In his recent study, Ghani (2007) found, with the theoretical 
gravity model, positive or non-significant OIC membership effect for trade of OIC 
countries. That is, there exists evidence to argue that OIC is not trade diverting itself in 
the present context according to this calculation. Exports to OIC countries increased for 
both OIC and non-OIC countries in the time period.   
Gundogdu (2007) had similar conclusions in assessing the effect of ASEAN trade 
facilitation measures on intra-regional trade in East Asia. He ascertained that for the time 
period from 1997 to 2004, imports of ASEAN member countries increased from both 
ASEAN member countries and non-ASEAN East Asian countries due to the 
improvement in trade facilitation measures and removal of non-tariff trade barriers under 
AFTA regional integration. In the same fashion, Cernat (2001) explained net trade 
creation effect of trade facilitation in the context of African RTAs. Very often regional 
free trade agreements come with not only tariff reduction/quota derogation but also trade 
facilitation measures including implementation of Single Windows, cooperation in 
standard and conformity assessment leading to Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRA), 
harmonization of tariff nomenclature, custom valuation and procedures.
37
 Once these 
measures are implemented all parties exporting to the region get benefits (Gundogdu 
2007). However, note that due to their nature some trade facilitation measures are more 
intra-trade friendly. For example, MRA and Rule of Origin Cumulation System as 
compared to Single Windows and harmonization of tariff nomenclature, though all 
enhance trade of a country, are more intra-trade promotion-oriented since they favour 
only the participating countries while others favour all trading partners.
38
 Figure 2.2 
shows that OIC member countries have experienced higher trade openness levels used as 
proxy for trade facilitation and liberalization herein, than industrialized countries since 
1990. These can be attributed the dominance of the oil trade of OIC countries as the 
index is a measure of trade over GDP. However, recent widening of the trade openness 
level between OIC countries and industrial countries can possibly be attributed to the 
                                                 
37
The Single Window System as a trade facilitation idea enables international traders to submit regulatory documents  such as custom 
declarations, import-export permit, certificate origin, etc. at a single location and/or single entity with electronic processing.  
A mutual recognition agreement (MRA) is an international agreement between two or more countries to recognize one another's 
conformity assessments test for goods including quality control. Recently the term is applied to agreements on the recognition of 
professional qualifications in ASEAN. Refer to Gundogdu (2007) for more details.  
38 Cumulation rule allows products originating in the other member countries of a regional integration agreement not to be regarded 
as non-originating when used in a processing in one of the other member countries.   
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trade facilitation and liberalization efforts. These improvements came as a part of 
requirement of participation into regional economic integration or unilateral efforts.  
Figure 2: Figure 2.2: Trade Openness as a Proxy for Trade Facilitation 
 
Source: Calculated by the author based on IDB 2008 Key Economic Indicators, Statistical 
Monograph No.28 
As indicated in Table 2.5, there has been substantial increase in OIC grouping’s trade 
openness since 1990.  
Table 9: Table 2.5: Openness of OIC Economies in Categories 
 
1990 1995 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
SSA 51 63 65 69 72 74 78 
MENA 56 62 68 70 77 82 85 
Asia 61 79 86 81 86 89 85 
CIT 37 77 88 91 95 95 93 
LDMC 45 57 62 62 64 63 61 
Non-LDMC 57 70 75 76 82 86 87 
OIC 56 68 73 74 80 84 85 
Developing Countries 41 49 58 61 66 68 68 
Industrial Countries 40 42 47 48 52 53 57 
World  40 43 49 51 55 57 60 
Source: Calculated by the author based on IDB 2008 Key Economic Indicators, Statistical 
Monograph No.28 
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As compared to industrial countries,   performance of OIC grouping is remarkable. For 
example, Turkey implemented massive trade facilitation and liberalization efforts in late 
1990s due to EU Customs Union Requirement. Tunisia also unilaterally benchmarked 
Singaporean Single Window of TradeNet to improve its custom efficiency.
39
 As an 
example from Africa, Guinea’s, one of OIC’s Sub-Saharan member countries, MFN 
applied simple (11.9 %) and weighted (12.5 %) tariff averages were above the regional 
average. As a member of the Economic Community of West African Countries 
(ECOWAS), Guinea has adopted the group’s Common External Tariff (CET), and as a 
result Guinea’s tariffs decreased from their earlier levels.40  
In providing empirical support, Cernat (2001) argued that Regional Trade Agreement 
(RTA) formation might have increased trade with both regional and third countries in the 
case of South-South RTAs after puzzling with net trade creation effect of African RTAs. 
He emphasized the effect of trade facilitation measures which came along with tariff 
reduction for explaining net trade creation effect of African RTAs. The question remains 
then how can one explain the recent increase in intra-OIC trade as a share of total imports 
given that OIC itself is, according to result analysis, not trade- diverting and 
improvement in OIC member countries trade facilitation and liberalization efforts as well 
as Terms of Trade (TOT) improvement probably boosted not only OIC exports but also 
non-OIC exports to OIC countries?  
Figure 2.3 shows the recent growth in both intra-OIC imports and imports from non-OIC 
countries. One would see that recent increase in intra-OIC trade as a share of total OIC 
imports, from 2002 to 2006, comes from surpassing growth rate of intra-OIC imports 
over imports from non-OIC countries. Both rates are positive but magnitude of the former 
is higher than the latter.   
 
 
                                                 
39 Jayanta, R., Shweta, B. (2005). Key issues in trade facilitation, summary of World Bank/EU workshops in Dhaka and Shanghai in 
2004. World Bank Policy Research Paper 3703. 
40 Islamic Development Bank Economic Policy Brief No: 69 
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Figure 3: Figure 2.3: Growth of OIC Imports 
 
Source: Calculated by the author based on data provided by Islamic Development Bank 
Economic Policy and Statistic Division 
According to the result of OLS Fixed Effect and Random Effect estimation from Table 
2.4, OIC countries tend to import more in real terms with appreciation of US Dollar 
against Euro. Then, recent Euro appreciation against the US Dollar obviously has 
negative effect on real OIC imports. On the other hand, this negative effect on real terms 
has not materialized in nominal terms because of the fact that the recent increase in oil 
prices against the US dollar has, at least, no negative effect on import capacity of oil 
exporting OIC member countries such as Saudi Arabia and UAE. Besides, member 
countries like Turkey mainly use the US dollar for their imports transaction and their 
foreign exchange earnings are, mainly, in Euro.
41
 This phenomenon is also tractable from 
the recent Terms of Trade (TOT) improvement. Over all OIC terms of trade index has 
improved from 93 in 2001 to 112 in 2005.
42
  
Going through Table 2.6, these kinds of details are important because Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and United Arab Emirates represent a significant – more 
than 50% - of the overall intra-OIC exports of the 57 OIC member economies. 
  
                                                 
41 Refers to the author’s experience with Turkish Exporters Union in supervising Inward Processing Licenses. 
42 Source: IDB 2008 Key Economic Indicators, Statistical Monograph No.28 
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Table 10: Table 2.6: The Share of Big OIC Economies in Intra-OIC Trade and TOT*  
 
Intra 
Exports 
Total 
Exports 
Intra 
Exports 
Total TOT in 
2001 
TOT in 
2005 
UAE 19,535 139,353 11.8% 11% 93 143 
Turkey 14,984 85,142 9% 6.7% 98 101 
Saudi Arabia 31,032 208,867 18.7% 16.5% 106 182  
Malaysia 11,839 160,556 7.1% 12.7% 100 102  
Indonesia 10,707 103,964 6.5% 8.2% 94 60*  
% Contribution 53.1% 55.2% 53.1% 55.2%    
* In 2006, total intra-OIC merchandise exports is 165,820; total OIC merchandise exports is 
1,263,283 in US $ million ; in 2000 TOT index is 100; in 2004 Indonesian TOT is 105.     
Source: Based on IDB 2008 Key Economic Indicators, Statistical Monograph No.28,  
On the other hand, the Sub-Saharan member countries constitute the meagre part of the 
total OIC GDP and trade. It should be noted that in the present context of the model it 
could only be argued that appreciation of the US dollar against the Euro affects imports 
of OIC countries from both OIC and non-OIC countries.  
However, intra-OIC trade is defined as a ratio of imports of OIC countries among 
themselves over their total imports from the rest of the world. The question then is how 
we can search for evidence from the same dataset for the significant effect of appreciation 
of the US dollar against the Euro on this ratio?  
One method would be looking at the effect of appreciation of the US dollar against the 
Euro on imports of OIC countries from non-OIC countries. If it is insignificant, then it 
would be argued that appreciation of the US dollar against the Euro affects OIC imports 
from OIC countries. For this purpose, a proxy variable is created by multiplying the 
dummy variable of non-OIC exporter and variable of value of the US Dollar against the 
Euro. As Table 2.7 shows the proxy variable turns to insignificant for both Random 
Effect and OLS estimations.
43
        
 
 
 
                                                 
43 Fixed Effect estimation is not possible as data set is based on country pairs.  
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Table 11:  Table 2.7: The Effect of Euro/USD Exchange Rate on Non-OIC Exports to OIC  
  
OLS  
Random 
Effect 
     
Log Real GDP of Importer 
 0.386* 
(0.027) 
 0.427*    
(0.037)     
Log Real GDP of Exporter 
 0.499* 
(0.024) 
 0.525*   
(0.034)      
Log Weighted Distances 
 -0.455* 
(0.061) 
 -0.463*  
(0.089)        
Log Weighted Tariff 
 -0.170* 
(0.040) 
 -0.183*   
(0.039)     
Increase in Importer’s Trade 
Openness  
 0.263* 
(0.077) 
 0.238* 
(0.103) 
Appreciation of Importer’s 
Real FX 
 0.733** 
(0.432) 
 1.556*    
(0.385) 
Border Effect 
 1.296* 
(0.326) 
 1.237*   
(0.504)  
Common Colonizer  
 0.595* 
(0.092) 
 0.668* 
(0.141)         
Same Country 
 -1.961* 
(0.556) 
 -1.921*    
(0.878)     
Value of USD against Euro 
 0.369 
(0.542) 
 0.548  
(0.446)        
Non-OIC Exporter 
 0.297* 
(0.092) 
 0.189 
(0.130) 
The Proxy 
 0.639 
(0.631) 
 0.312 
(0.521) 
Number of Observations  2989  2989 
R2  0.149  0.147 
Regressand: Log Real Imports of OIC Countries 
Intercept not reported 
Standard errors in the parenthesis 
* Values are significant at 5% level 
** Values are significant at 10% level 
Figure 2.4 show that intra-OIC imports and exports used to exhibit similar patterns and 
very close percentages before 1998. The difference between intra-OIC imports and 
exports widened after 1998. Since 1998, then the Council of European Union set the 
conversion rates for its members’ currencies based on market rate on 31 December 1998, 
one would discern a pattern change in intra-OIC trade as well. 
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Figure 4: Figure 2.4: Trends in Intra-OIC Trade Indicators (1990-2007)  
 
Source: Calculated by the author based on data provided by Islamic Development Bank 
Economic Policy and Statistic Division 
These evidences seem to be more than coincidence for the role of the USD/Euro 
exchange rate on intra-OIC trade. Following from Figure 2.4, intra-OIC exports 
experienced decrease in 1999 and 2000 while intra-OIC imports improved for the same 
period. However, both ratios have been improving alongside the recent Euro 
appreciation. This contradicts with positive and significant variable of the value of the US 
Dollar against the Euro on OIC imports in real terms. Then there must be another 
dynamic, which surpasses the negative effect of recent Euro appreciation, for increase in 
intra-OIC imports as a share of OIC imports from the world.  
This other dynamic perhaps is the effect of oil, which requires further attention. Table 2.8 
presents data on the intra-OIC oil exports/imports by SITC's (Rev.3) 1-digit commodity 
level for 2005. The impact of oil to intra-OIC trade statistic is obvious from the table. 
Table 12: Table 2.8: Intra-OIC Oil Trade, 2005 *  
* Fuels, Lubricants, and related materials; SITC's (Rev.3) 1-digit commodity level 
Source: Comtrade database  
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Year 
Intra-OIC Imports
Intra-OIC Trade
Intra-OIC Exports
 
From Intra-OIC 
(US$ million) 
 
(1) 
From the World 
(US$ million) 
 
(2) 
% in intra- 
OIC trade 
 
(3) 
Share of intra-OIC oil 
trade in world oil trade 
(4) 
Imports 38,923.7 79,047.2 36.7 49.2 
Exports 31,763.9 452,888.9 27.8 7.0 
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As can be seen in Table 2.8, Column (3) shows the intra-OIC oil imports (exports) over 
intra-OIC total imports (exports), while Column (4) shows the OIC oil imports from 
(exports to) OIC countries over OIC oil imports from (exports to) the rest of the world. 
One would easily discern the discrepancy between intra-OIC imports and intra-OIC 
exports as a share of world trade due to OIC countries’ dominance in the oil export 
business. Figure 2.4 has already shown this obvious discrepancy after 1998.  
Accordingly, one would argue that the main reason behind recent the increase in intra-
OIC imports as a share of world import is oil price increase. However, this argument 
cannot explain the whole phenomenon without Terms of Trade (TOT) improvement of 
OIC countries and the effect of exchange rates. In very simple form, recently both intra-
OIC imports and OIC imports from the world have increased but magnitude of intra-OIC 
imports growth is higher than that of imports from the world.  
Assume a world where only OIC countries are oil exporters and amount of oil exported is 
constant over the time. Also assume that OIC countries imports, together with oil from 
other OIC countries, only cars from the rest of the world in Euro and number of cars 
imported is constant over the time. These assumptions are made based on the result 
analysis of the econometric model. Recall from the econometric model that 
appreciation/depreciation of the Euro has no effect on real OIC imports from non-OIC 
countries so a constant number of imported cars becomes a slightly reasonable 
assumption. Under such assumptions, the result of econometric analysis is discussed as 
per a hypothetical world for which relevant data is specified in Table 2.9. 
Table 2.9 shows that intra-OIC imports has increased from 14.4% to 24.3% as the oil 
price increase from US$60 to US$114 while Euro/USD exchange rate is intact. 24.3% 
intra-OIC retreated to 17.6% as the Euro appreciates to a new level of US$1.5. Recalling 
that this chapter began with an inquiry of recent increase in intra-OIC imports from 
14.4% in 2004 to about 18% in 2007, it is important to contextualise this within the oil 
dynamics as well. 
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Table 13:  Table 2.9: Intra-OIC Imports Scenario  
60 1 30,000 5,064,000 30,000,000 14.4% 
        
Oil Price 114$; 1 Euro is 1$      
114 1 30,000 9,633,000 30,000,000 24.3% 
        
Oil Price 114$; 1 Euro is 1.5$     
114 1.5 30,000 9,633,000 45,000,000 17.6% 
Source: Compiled by the author  
Under the circumstances of the oil price of US$60 and Euro/USD exchange rate of 1, the 
intra-OIC imports are 14.4%.  And, in the case of the second scenario, where the oil price 
hits US$114 and Euro/USD exchange rate remains at 1, the ratio would increase to 
24.3%. However, depreciation of the USD against the Euro would decrease this ratio to 
17.6% as indicated in the third scenario.  
This part, hence, sheds light on the determinant of intra-OIC trade in a way to contribute 
the realization of the Makkah Declaration and the Ten-Year Programme of Action to 
increase intra-OIC trade to 20% of global trade by the year 2015. The findings of the 
estimations, the time period of 1995-2007, indicate that OIC member countries have 
started to trade more and more with each other and the rest of the world. This can partly 
be attributed to their unilateral efforts as well as requirement of membership to regional 
free trade areas such as COMESA, ECOWAS, etc. in dismantling the inherent trade 
barriers and tariff reductions.  
In this regard, there are still substantial trade facilitation improvement opportunities that 
exist in eliminating trade barriers among OIC member countries, reducing red tape, 
improving infrastructure and reducing financial constraints. However, according to the 
estimations herein, these kinds of efforts should certainly be encouraged to generate more 
income growth, as it would not only boost intra-OIC trade but also enhance OIC 
countries trade with non-members as they will make trading easier for all parties once 
implemented; that is, they are not expected to divert trade. Accordingly, in order to 
Oil Price 
in USD 
(A) 
Euro/USD 
Exchange 
Rate (B) 
Car price 
in Euro 
(C) 
84,400 unit OIC 
Imports from OIC 
Countries 
(A)*84,400=(D) 
1000 cars OIC 
imports from 
the rest of the 
world 
(C)*1000=(E) 
 
Intra-OIC 
Imports in % 
(D/D+E) 
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achieve the 2015 target, there should be more endeavours on intra-trade-oriented trade 
facilitation measures such as the Mutual Recognition Agreement, cooperation in unified 
rule of origin by developing an OIC cumulation system. Developing a full 
implementation of the Protocols on Preferential Tariff Scheme and Framework on OIC 
Trade Preferential System (OIC-TPS) is also very crucial to pave the way for achieving 
intra-OIC trade targets.   However, stressing too much on the 20% target might result in 
shutting our eyes to the truth. As a matter of fact, this target can be achieved by 
improvement in trade between a couple of the big OIC economies given their dominance 
in intra-OIC trade statistics as well as in the trend in the USD/Euro exchange rate and oil 
price surge. Given the dominance of oil in OIC trade statistics targets also should be set 
for non-oil trade. From a developmental aspect more attention should be given to 
enhancing trade of small OIC economies especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. The target of 
20% should be subdivided for country grouping such as Least Developed Member 
Countries and Sub-Saharan African Member Countries so enhancing intra-OIC trade 
would be more meaningful in developmental aspects.  This should be melted in a strategy 
for transformation in customs.  
However, OIC countries, especially small OIC countries, are sometimes hesitant to 
transform their customs as public authorities tend to associate any transformation in the 
form of trade liberalization or facilitation with decreased customs revenue.  
Figure 5: Figure 2.5: Customs and Other Import Duties (% of Tax Revenue) in 2007 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 
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This worry is especially intense with Least Developed Countries as the customs revenue 
constitutes the bulk of the tax revenue. As indicated in Figure 2.5, among OIC countries, 
the share of customs revenue in tax is as meagre at 2 per cent in the case of Turkey to 71 
per cent in the case of the Maldives. As WTO members, both are obliged to implement 
the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement. WTO defines customs valuation as a customs 
procedure applied to determine the customs value of imported goods as per the WTO 
Customs Valuation Agreement which intends to provide fair, neutral and uniform 
valuation in order to protect importers from the risk of arbitrary valuation by customs 
authorities. However, introduction of this agreement may give rise to some concern 
especially for those OIC countries having high customs revenue to tax revenue ratio as it 
may lead revenue loss due to under-invoicing by traders.
44
 
The sensitivity of customs valuation is observed through real-life experience between 
domestic spinners and fibre importers to influence government for public discourse in 
their favour. Customs duties can be in the form of specific duty such as US$ 1 per kilo, 
ad valorem duty which depends on the value of the goods or a mix of these two methods. 
For customs transactions under ad valorem duty, determination of value of the goods is 
very sensitive as the customs duty is calculated by multiplying customs valuation with ad 
valorem rate of the duty (e.g. 10 per cent of the customs valuation). Hence, the issue of 
customs valuation has implication far ahead of tax collection or transfer pricing as it can 
distort the prices in favour of some parties while depriving others. For example, domestic 
spinners would pressure the government to sustain minimum price for customs value of 
fibre imported by arguing otherwise they cannot survive. In the same fashion fibre 
importers, mainly textile and apparel producers, would ask government to accept actual 
price paid for customs value of the imported fibre so they can stay competitive in the 
global market and retain their share in export markets. Given the sensitivity of the issue, 
customs valuation has been in the agenda of international trade negotiations for quite 
some time.  
                                                 
44 
According to Country Policy Review of WTO, Turkey implemented, albeit with some reservation, WTO Customs Valuation 
Agreement as of 07/01/2003 while not surprisingly Maldives did not.  
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Formal discussions on customs valuation goes back to the establishment of the League of 
Nations but it was the general conference of the United Nations for Trade and 
Employment in 1947 when the discussions on the customs valuation issue had a common 
base to be incorporated in Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). The article defines the general principles of customs valuation based on the 
‘actual value’ of the imported merchandise on which duty is assessed, or of like 
merchandise while discouraging valuation based on the value of merchandise of national 
origin or on arbitrary or fictitious values. However, GATT-contracting parties end up 
with different valuation systems as the article allows countries substantial flexibility in 
defining the ‘actual value’ of imports. The first international standards on customs 
valuation according to Article VII was developed in 1950. 13 European governments 
then developed the Brussels Definition of Value (BDV), based on the concept of ‘normal 
price’, in an effort to achieve greater harmonization of customs valuation practices. Many 
other countries adopted the same for their customs valuation practices.
45
 Indeed, the BDV 
suggest invoice price to be used for customs valuation purposes but flexibility is given to 
customs authorities in case invoice price cannot be used.
46
 Then, customs authorities can 
use another method based on the normal price which can be determined by customs on 
the basis of the available information to them in the context of conditions and other 
circumstances for the specific valuation transaction.
47
 The application of BDV caused 
widespread dissatisfaction among traders as downward variation of declared value from 
normal price was taken into account up to 10 % and upward variation was fully taken into 
account. The level of traders’ dissatisfaction grew even more when price changes were 
not reflected to the reference list by customs authorities on time and transactions 
contained new or rare products not captured in the list. Obviously, a more flexible and 
uniform valuation method was needed as per the Tokyo Round objective for achieving 
the expansion and ever greater liberalization of world trade through the progressive 
dismantling of obstacles to trade. In 1979, The Tokyo Round Valuation Code, or the 
                                                 
45 
Against the normal price concept of BDV, on the other hand, big countries viz Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Untied States 
used a "positive" concept of valuation laying down the standards based on the price actually agreed on in sale. 
46
 For example, suspiciously under invoicing, transaction between related importer and export, goods on consignment, etc. 
47
 A normal market price is defined as “the price that a good would fetch in an open market between a buyer and seller independent of 
each other”. Goorman, A and Wulf, L 2005, ‘Customs Valuation in Developing Countries and the World Trade Organization Valuation 
Rules’, in L Wulf and J Sokol (eds), Customs Modernization Handbook, World Bank, Washington D.C., pp.155-181. 
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Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of GATT, concluded. The system 
introduced was based on the price actually paid or payable, namely ‘transaction value’, 
for the imported goods in order to provide a fair, uniform and neutral system for the 
valuation of goods for customs purposes while accommodating commercial realities. 
Many developing countries were reluctant to join the new valuation agreement due to the 
fear of substantial loss of customs revenue triggered by undervaluation of imported goods 
by traders.
48
 This aversion came to an end with the establishment of the WTO after the 
Marrakesh Agreement which also replaced the Tokyo Round Code by the WTO 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of GATT (also known as WTO Custom 
Valuation Agreement) as the agreement became binding for all WTO members.
49
 The 
WTO Customs Valuation Agreement (WTO CVA) is not intended to be used for 
combating dumping nor does it bring provisions for purpose of determining export duties, 
quota administration, internal taxation and foreign exchange controls. In essence, it is the 
same as the Tokyo Round Valuation Code which applied solely for levying ad valorem 
duties on imported goods.   
Based on the empirical results and the discussion in the preceding section, the following 
section aims to shed light on the effect of tariffs reduction, imports and implementation 
of WTO Customs Valuation Agreement on customs revenue of OIC countries. In 
addition, the relationship among tariff reductions, imports and the agreement is to be 
scrutinized in the context of WTO member OIC countries.  The determinant of OIC 
countries’ customs revenue is examined with an econometric model where the level of 
customs revenue is explained by imports, tariffs and implementation of the WTO 
Customs Valuation Agreement.  
                                                 
48
 The agreement officially came into force on January 1, 1981 and was adopted by various signatories from the mid 1980s onward. 
The Tokyo Round Valuation Code was signed by more than 40 contracting parties. 
49
 Came at the end of Uruguay Round, Marrakesh Agreement offered least developed countries an extra flexibility in implementing 
WTO agreements. Agreement on Implementation of Article-VII of GATT 1994, also known as WTO Customs Valuation Agreement, 
provides contracting developing countries with certain flexibility for implementation. For example, it is stated in Article-20 of the said 
agreement that developing countries not party to the Tokyo Round Valuation Code may delay application of the provisions of WTO 
Customs Valuation Agreement (CVA) for period up to five years. Besides, they may delay application of paragraph 2(b).iii of Article-1 
and Article-6 (provisions related to computed value method) for additional three years.   
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2.7 WTO CUSTOMS VALUATION FRAMEWORK 
In the beginning, instead of delving into the details of the whole WTO agreement, 
concise explanation on the customs valuation system introduced by the new agreement 
(WTO CVA from the Annex 1A of the Marrakesh Agreement) is provided below.
50
 The 
methods provided by the provisions in the Part I of the agreement are organized as 
follows:  
(a) Transaction value method governed by Article 1  
The primary method of custom valuation is proposed to be transaction value. As stated in 
Article 1, the value is to be determined on the basis of the price actually paid or payable 
for the goods when sold for export to country of importation after adjusted in accordance 
with Article 8.
51
 Price actually paid refers to total payment made or to be made in future 
by seller. Payment does not need to be in the form of money transfer. That is, payment 
can be direct or indirect. It can be in the form of Letter of Credit or bill of exchange for 
Documentary Collection.  
 
Transaction Value method would not be implemented in case:  
 
- There are restrictions for the disposition or use of the goods; 
- The sale price is subject to some condition or consideration for which a value 
cannot be determined with respect to the goods being valued;  
- The part of any subsequent resale, disposal or use of the goods by the buyer is to 
be accrued by seller and appropriate adjustments cannot be made in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 8 of the agreement;  
- The buyer and seller are related.  
 
Article 15 defines the relatedness. Accordingly, persons are deemed to be related if they 
are officers or directors of one another’s businesses; legally recognized partners in 
business or employer and employee. Also, in cases where  
  
- any person directly or indirectly owns, controls or holds 5 per cent or more of 
the outstanding voting stock or shares of both of them; 
- one of them directly or indirectly controls the other; 
                                                 
50 
World Trade Organization (WTO) 1994, Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade,  viewed 28 July 2009,  http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/cusval_02_e.htm.  
51 
Article-8 elaborates on portion to be added or subtracted to the price actually paid to be paid under the provision of Article-1. 
Among many of them are commissions, brokerage, cost of handling charges associated with the transport of the goods to the place of 
importation, the cost of packing, royalties and fees which are not included in the price actually paid or payable.  
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- both of them are directly or indirectly controlled by a third person; 
- together they directly or indirectly control a third person; or 
- they are members of the same family 
 
they are deemed to be related. However, relatedness itself would not necessarily make 
transaction values unacceptable if the importer can demonstrate that the relationship did 
not influence the price.  
(b) Transaction value of benchmark from identical or similar goods method by Article 2&3  
In case the customs value of the imported goods could not be determined from the 
provisions of Article 1, importer may demonstrate the price of sales to any unrelated 
buyer in the same country for identical or similar goods at about the same time as the 
goods being valued. Transaction value of identical or similar goods needs to be at the 
same commercial level and in substantially the same quantity. If benchmark in the same 
commercial level and/or quantity is not possible, adjustment needs to be done 
accordingly. For example, exporter may apply certain discount for each quantity level. 
Upward or downward adjustment to the value can be done according to this information 
while benchmarking. This process is to be carried out by consultation between importer 
and custom authorities.       
(c) Deductive value method by Article 5  
In case the custom value of the imported goods could not be determined from the 
provisions of Article 1, Article 2 and Article 3, importer may ask for benchmark from the 
value of the identical or similar imported goods in the country. Benchmark is to be based 
on unit price of benchmarked imported goods in the “greatest aggregate quantity”. For 
example, in case benchmarked imported goods sold in two sales (first in 600 units with a 
price of 95 currency unit and second in 300 unit 100 currency unit), as the greatest 
number of unit sold is 600 the unit price in the greatest aggregate quantity of 95 currency 
unit would be base for customs valuation. Then this would be subject to further 
deduction, as the additions usually made for profit and general expenses such as 
transport, insurance, taxes, etc. within the country in connection with domestic sale. Note 
that in any case, benchmark should be at or about the same time and between unrelated 
persons.  
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(d) Computed value method by Article 6 
Again, in case the customs value of the imported goods could not be determined from the 
provisions of Article 1, Article 2, Article 3 and Article 5 importer may request for 
application of Article 6 for computed value method. However, as accorded in Article 4, 
importer may request to reverse the order of application of Article 5 and Article 6. 
Computed value consists of the cost/value of input used in production process, profit and 
general expenses of producer/exporter located out of the jurisdiction of importation 
country.
52
 Accordingly, use of computed value method is likely to be confined for those 
cases where the importer and exporter are related. Hence, exporter is ready to supply the 
necessary costings and provide facilities for any subsequent verification for the customs 
authorities of importation country.
53
  
In case customs value could not be determined from the provisions of Article 1 through 
Article 6, customs value is to be determined by reasonable means consistent with the 
provisions of Article 1 through Article 6 on the basis of data available in the importation 
country. That is, customs value is to be determined, to the greatest extent possible, based 
on previously determined customs values. This is defined as the Fall-back method by the 
WTO. However, with reference to Article 7, customs authorities need to refrain from 
customs valuation based on: 
(i) Selling price of domestically produced products in domestic market; 
(ii) Selling price of the goods in the market of exportation country; 
(iii) Selling price of the goods in the third market; 
(iv) The cost of production other than provisions of Article 6; 
(v) Arbitrary or fictitious values; 
(vi) Minimum values. 
 
Developing countries are allowed to suspend the application of minimum value 
restriction by making reservation. The provisions of the agreement consistently state that 
                                                 
52 
Where figures provided by the exporter on its own profit and general expenses are not consistent with those reflected in sales of the 
same class or kind of goods produced by the exporter for the importation country, customs authorities of importation country may base 
upon relevant information other than supplied from the exporter. On the other hand, whether certain goods are “of the same class of 
kind” as other goods is be determined arbitrarily on a case-by-case basis.     
53 
Developing countries not party to the Tokyo Round Valuation Code are given option to delay the application of provisions related 
to computed value method for additional three years after five years of grace period of implementation of other provisions as stated in 
the Article-20 of the WTO CVA.   
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customs authorities are to select the lower value of two alternatives. Accordingly, Article 
7 restricts customs authorities to apply a system which provides for the higher of two 
alternatives.  
Part II of the agreement elaborates on administration, consultations and dispute 
settlement issues. A legal framework of WTO Committee on Customs Valuation and 
WCO Technical Committee of Custom Valuation is also provided in this part. 
Accordingly, WTO Committee on Customs Valuation shall annually review and inform 
the Council for Trade in Goods on implementation issues. In addition, flexibility with 
deadlines for implementation of the agreement for developing countries is defined. 
Obviously, the WTO valuation system is very favourable for importers as it restrains 
customs authorities from challenging the declared value without documentary evidence 
and increasing value without opportunity to claim against. And, implementation date of 
the WTO Customs valuation agreement would constitute a sound explanatory variable to 
scrutinize effect of trade facilitation measures on customs revenue. 
2.8 MODEL SPECIFICATION FOR DETERMINANTS OF OIC CUSTOMS 
REVENUE 
2.8.1 The Model Specification 
The functional form for determinant of customs revenue employed in this study is as 
follows: 
 (2.5.)
 
where CR stands for customs revenue of OIC member countries, which is expected to 
depend on imports (IMP), tariffs (TRF), implementation of WTO Custom Valuation 
Agreement (CVA), value-added tax (VAT)  and other customs duties (OCD). According 
to Baunsgaard and Keen (2005), often more than half or more of the VAT is collected at 
the border in many developing countries. Although it is an important component of 
customs revenue for some countries, both other customs duties and value-added tax is 
dropped due to the difficulty in obtaining data. Then basic equation is augmented by 
),,,,( itititititt
it OCDVATCVATRFIMPFCR 
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including indirect effect of tariffs and implementation of WTO CVA through imports in 
order to fulfil the objectives of this study.  
Natural logarithms of the variables are taken. Hence, customs revenue of OIC countries is 
expressed in a log-linear form: 
 
ititititititit eIndCVACVAIndTRFTRFLnLnIMPLnCR  543210 )100(        
(2.6.)
 
where superscripts i stands for the importer (an OIC member country) t donates years.  
Dependent variable is customs revenue of country i, an OIC member country, for the 
period of 1995-2007. IMP
it
 is imports of country i at year t. TRF
ht
 is weighted tariffs rate 
of country i imposed on products imported in year t.
54
The coefficient for tariffs is 
expected to be positive as revenue is calculated in ad valorem. 
One variable as proxy for the effect of implementation of WTO Customs Valuation 
Agreement is introduced. CVA
it
 is dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the 
observations if country i implemented WTO CVA in year t.
55
This dummy variable 
captures the change in customs revenue as a result of the implementation of the 
agreement. Hence, if there is decrease in customs revenue it should be interpreted as 
negative direct effect of the implementation of WTO CVA and vice versa.  
Both tariffs and implementation of WTO CVA is expected to have indirect effect on 
customs revenue through imports. An increase in tariffs or the implementation of WTO 
CVA may decrease imports, hence, decrease customs revenue. In order to estimate the 
indirect effects, two variables are created through multiplying existing tariffs and CVA 
variables by existing imports variable. IndTRF
it
 captures the indirect effect of tariffs 
thorough imports on customs revenue while IndCVA
it
 captures the indirect effect of the 
                                                 
54
 This variable denotes weighted average tariff rate in the percent ad valorem term which is specific to the trading partners, product 
categories and year and includes the lowest applicable rates as well as all available preferential rates. Bilateral trade values are used as 
weight. To avoid log zero in case tariff level is zero, 100 is added.  
55 
All countries of destination, importers, in this model are OIC members.  
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implementation of WTO CVA through imports on customs revenue.
56
 For both, 
coefficient would be negative if higher tariffs and the implementation of WTO CVA lead 
to less import.  
2.8.2 Data 
Annual imports and weighted average of applied tariffs rates is obtained from the World 
Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) for 40 WTO member OIC countries for the period of 
1995-2007.
57
 Annual customs revenues are derived from World Development Indicator 
(WDI). The most challenging part of data collection turns to be the identification of WTO 
CVA implementation year for 40 OIC countries which are also member of WTO. The 
Agreement allows developing member countries to delay the implementation for a 
transition period of five years from their entry to WTO. Furthermore, developing 
countries are opted to request a further extension from Committee on Customs Valuation 
for additional extension. Many OIC countries got this additional extension.
58
 Hence, the 
implementation year is identified by digging into the WTO Trade Policy Reviews for 
each WTO member OIC country accessed through WTO website.
59
  
2.9 LOCATING THE DETERMINANTS OF OIC CUSTOMS REVENUE: 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The correlation between imports and customs revenue is straightforward: more trade is 
associated with more customs revenue. However, this is not the case for the relationship 
between tariffs and customs revenue as tariffs would have both direct effect and indirect 
effect through imports on customs revenue. Increasing tariffs would enhance customs 
revenue if decrease in imports as a result of higher tariffs does not surpass the said direct 
effect. The relationships can be observed from Figure 2.6, scatter plot for the sample of 
this study.  
 
                                                 
56
 See Greene (2007) for the standard explanation. 
57 
Please refer to WITS for the formula of weighted applied tariff rate. http://wits.worldbank.org  
58
 Indeed, as Rege (2000) identified the lack of ownership as the main reason for delays in implementation. 
59 
World Trade Organization (WTO) 2009, “Trade Policy Reviews” viewed 15 July 2009, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm#chronologically.  
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Figure 6: Figure 2.6: Correlation of Imports and Tariffs with Customs Revenue
60
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Calculated by the author 
The effect of tariffs increase on customs revenue diminishes as the tariffs level soars. 
This can be seen more obviously from the result of regression analysis illustrated in Table 
2.10. As the results of fixed and random effect calculation suggests, both direct effect and 
indirect effect of tariffs are statistically significant and positive direct effect of tariffs on 
customs revenue is stronger than negative indirect effect of tariffs through decreased 
imports. Hence, overall effect of increased tariffs on customs revenue seems to be 
positive although this effect is curbed by decreased imports as result of higher tariffs.  
Although Huasman test fails to indicate model selection between fixed effect and random 
effect, the nature of explanatory variables would give rise to serious concern with ‘fixed 
effect calculation’. The important explanatory variables of VAT and other duties were 
excluded from data set as finding such data was not feasible. This might lead to a 
correlation between error term and the some explanatory variables, hence, distort the 
calculation. For instance, the expected positive correlation between imports and customs 
revenue does not hold with ‘fixed effect’ calculation, but does so with ‘random effect’. 
Hence, the result of ‘random effect’ calculation might suggest better interpretation of the 
relationship between independent variables and the dependent variable. 
                                                 
60 
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Table 14: Table 2.10: Regression Result for the Determinant of OIC Countries’ Customs 
Revenue 
  
OLS 
Fixed 
Effect 
Random 
Effect 
     
Log of Imports 
 1.205* 
(0.179) 
-0.090 
(0.250) 
0.427*    
(0.209)     
Direct Effect of Tariffs 
 -3.685* 
(1.375) 
12.673* 
(0.170) 
3.735*   
(1.800)      
Indirect Effect of Tariffs 
 0.188* 
(0.060) 
-0.526* 
(0.170) 
-0.150* 
(0.077) 
Direct Effect of WTO CVA 
 3.162 
(1.910) 
5.822* 
(0.980) 
5.565*  
(1.183)        
Indirect Effect of WTO CVA 
 -0.142** 
(0.084) 
-0.266* 
(0.043) 
-0.250* 
(0.052) 
Constant 
 -6.166 
(4.105) 
23.685* 
(5.922) 
11.092* 
(4.881)  
Number of Observations  64 64 64 
R2  0.87 0.70 0.75 
 
Notes: (i) Regressand: Log customs revenue of OIC Countries 
(ii) ‘*’; Values are significant at 5% level; ‘**’ Values are significant at 10% level 
(iii) Hausman test fails as model fitted on these data fails to meet the asymptotic assumptions 
of the Hausman Test. 
(iv) Standard Deviations are in the brackets 
Again going through Table 2.10, negative and significant indirect effect of WTO CVA 
may suggest that introduction of WTO CVA gives rise to undervalued declaration of 
imports which translate into lower imports level in statistics, hence, decrease customs 
revenue which is calculated as multiplication of ad valorem tax and imports. On the other 
hand, direct effect of implementation of WTO CVA agreement turns to be positive with 
fixed and random effect calculation. This might be interpreted as revenue increase from 
increased transparency in customs and less incentive for tax evasion. Importers might 
prefer to declare transaction value and pay customs tax accordingly rather than going 
through the hassle of avoiding taxation. Accordingly, one may not argue that the 
implementation of the agreement increase the customs revenue as the coefficient of direct 
positive effect of WTO CVA is bigger than that of indirect negative effect with this 
calculation.  
Nevertheless, the relationship between imports and customs revenue from Figure 2.6 give 
rise to a question of validity of those relationship explained with the model for all 
82 
 
countries. As one may observe, variance increases as the imports increase suggesting that 
the effect of explanatory variables might be in different degrees for small and big 
countries. Then it is worth to run the model for small and big countries separately. For 
this purpose, sample average is taken and an observation defined to be for big country if 
the GDP is greater than US$ 40 billion, small otherwise. Table 2.11 summarizes the 
result of the regression analysis for OLS, fixed effect and random effect calculations for 
small and big countries.    
Table 15: Table 2.11: Regression Result for the Determinant of OIC Countries’ Customs 
Revenue by Economic Size of the Subject Country61  
 OLS Fixed Effect Random Effect 
 Small 
Country 
Big 
Country 
Small 
Country 
Big 
Country 
Small 
Country 
Big 
Country 
       
Log of Imports 
1.343* 
(0.232) 
-0.636 
(0.426) 
-0.247 
(1.062) 
-0.906 
(0.233) 
1.129* 
(0.410) 
-0.232 
(0.230)  
Direct Effect of Tariffs 
-5.455* 
(1.660) 
11.437* 
(4.509) 
13.153 
(9.650) 
13.941* 
(3.040) 
-3.217 
(3.123) 
12.787* 
(3.849) 
Indirect Effect of Tariffs 
0.270* 
(0.076) 
-0.457* 
(0.188) 
-0.570 
(0.428) 
-0.576* 
(0.124) 
0.162 
(0.142) 
-0.524* 
(0.158) 
Direct Effect of WTO CVA 
6.644* 
(2.830) 
9.445* 
(4.294) 
9.071* 
(2.942) 
9.226* 
(1.999) 
5.562* 
(2.461) 
 8.808* 
(2.660) 
Indirect Effect of WTO CVA 
-0.303* 
(0.130) 
-0.396* 
(0.177) 
-0.419* 
(0.136) 
-0.404* 
(0.082) 
-0.252* 
(0.114) 
-0.385* 
(0.109) 
Constant 
-9.245** 
(5.090) 
37.041* 
(10.093) 
26.471 
(23.692) 
23.331* 
(5.622) 
-4.804 
(9.019) 
27.061* 
(7.231) 
Number of Observations 34 30 34 30 34 34 
R
2
 0.851 0.559 0.63 0.90 0.53 0.87 
 
Notes: (i) Regressand: Log customs revenue of OIC Countries 
(ii) ‘*’ Values are significant at 10% level; ‘**’ Values are significant at 5% level; 
(iii) Hausman test fails as model fitted on these data fails to meet the asymptotic assumptions of 
the Hausman Test.   
(iv) Standard Deviations are in the brackets 
 
The results of fixed-effect and random-effect calculations in Table 2.11 suggest that 
unlike big countries, both direct and indirect effect of tariffs on customs revenue is not 
significant for small countries. However, we were expecting that increase in tariffs would 
have positive direct effect on customs revenue. We were also expecting realization of 
                                                 
61 
Unexpectedly, coefficient of imports is turned to be, albeit insignificant, negative for some estimations. This might come from 
omitted variable, i.e. VAT and other customs duties, bias inter alia decreased number of observations due to split of the data set for 
separate calculation for small and big countries.     
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negative indirect effect of tariffs on customs revenue as any increase in tariffs would 
decrease imports and favour domestic substitute products.  
Going through Figure 2.7, one may not observe a statistically significant correlation 
between imports and tariffs for small countries. On the other hand, one may discern a 
slight uplift in customs revenue suggesting positive direct effect, albeit statistically 
insignificant according to regression calculations, of tariffs on customs revenue.   
Figure 7: Figure 2.7: Effect of Tariffs for Small Countries62 
Source: Calculated by the author 
As production capacity of small countries would very often be limited, traders may not 
have the option of domestic substitutes for their imports, hence, increasing tariff rates 
would not discourage them from imports. However, insignificant increase in customs 
revenue suggests the lack of capacity or ability of customs authorities to leverage this 
situation in favour of government in the case of small countries. This suggestion might be 
further consolidated as both direct and indirect effects of implementation of WTO 
Customs Valuation Agreement are the same for both small and big countries.  
Going through Figure 2.8, one would see the effect of tariffs on customs revenue and 
imports as expected in the case of big countries. Tariff has negative correlation with 
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imports and positive correlation with customs revenue. That is, direct effect of tariffs on 
customs revenue surpassed its indirect effect through decreased imports as a result of 
increase in tariffs. 
Figure 8: Figure 2.8: Effect of Tariffs for Big Countries
63
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Calculated by the author 
The results suggest that what matters for customs revenue, evidenced from significant 
effect of WTO CVA for both small and big countries, is ability of customs authorities to 
collect tax rather than tariffs rate. This would especially hold for small countries. Gatti 
(1999) refers to the discretionary power of customs officials to compel importers to 
bribery, which translates into government revenue loss, importer’s surplus loss and 
efficiency loss in the context of small open economy. 
The results of the estimation with this chapter show the importance of customs 
authorities’ capacity to collect tax rather than higher tax rates for improving customs 
revenue especially for relatively smaller countries. Although the implementation of WTO 
CVA cannot be argued to decrease customs revenue as its direct effect evidently boost 
customs revenue, the results suggest certain level of undervaluation with the 
implementation of the agreement for both big and relatively small countries. Hence, 
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capacity building in the customs of developing countries to ensure fair revenue for 
governments emerges as an important issue to make multilateral trade systems attractive 
for them. In this regard, more attention is needed to develop a system to impede 
undervaluation, sustain certain level of revenue for the governments of developing 
countries and hence make multilateral trade systems attractive for developing nations.     
As experience shows, many countries implement verification systems in compliance with 
WTO ‘Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection’ by which authorized inspection 
companies inspect the goods in the country of exportation for verification of customs 
classification, quality, quantity, and price including exchange rate and financial terms. 
This might be a useful tool to prevent undervaluation and fraud in the classification of the 
goods. However, the process itself creates additional burden on importers especially in 
developing countries, increase import cost and the integrity of inspection companies 
might also be of a question.    
Increasing the capacity of customs authorities in developing countries and developing a 
system for integration or at least efficient cooperation between customs across the globe 
might serve better to prevent undervaluation. This approach is also in compliance with 
the Doha Ministerial Conference decision to direct Committee on Customs Valuation to 
identify and assess practical means for the exchange of information among customs 
authorities for export values. In this regard, capacity-building activities to enhance ability 
of customs authorities to efficiently process transactions and collect duties by information 
and communications technology solutions are crucial. The establishment of single 
windows at national level, possibly to be integrated to other countries’ single windows as 
planned by ASEAN countries, for one-time submission and collection of trade 
documents, hence, computerization of trade procedures in the form of online customs 
declaration, imports licensing transactions, electronic payments, or any other cross-border 
transaction might more effectively address the undervaluation issue. This direction would 
also be in incompliance with WCO Safe Framework.       
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2.10 CONCLUSION 
The results on determinants of intra-OIC trade models in this chapter suggest inefficiency 
of OIC level policy efforts. It is argued that recent increase in intra-OIC trade percentage 
is likely to be product of opposite effects of oil price surge and Euro appreciation rather 
than trade diversion effect of OIC membership. The reference intra-OIC trade ratio would 
soar during high oil prices and a strong US dollar. Hence, the issue of increasing intra-
OIC trade should be addressed with effective policies rather than relying on externalities 
of other variables such as oil price. However, policies developed, particularly pertaining 
to market access such as custom valuation, should address the concerns of countries 
vulnerable to loss of valuable customs revenue. As the findings for determinants of OIC 
countries customs revenue models indicate, trade facilitation policies for customs does 
not necessarily give rise to decrease in customs tax collection. The results suggest that 
increasing tariffs might increase customs revenue for big countries but not for small 
countries. Besides, the implementation of WTO Customs Valuation Agreement does not 
decrease customs revenue as its indirect undervaluation effect would be surpassed by its 
direct effect of less incentive for tax evasion. In this regard, streamlining small countries 
in intra-OIC trade should be carried out in a way to protect their delicate balance to 
enhance their capacity for tax collection at customs, hence, would require tailor-made 
policies directed to trade facilitation, particularly, custom valuation issues. Nevertheless, 
other trade facilitation measures should be part of a holistic approach to address many 
aspect of market access. 
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Chapter 3 
ISLAMIC STRUCTURED TRADE FINANCE: A CASE FOR 
COTTON PRODUCTION IN WEST AFRICA 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The cotton sector as a main foreign exchange revenue earner and a major source of 
employment is crucial for sustainable development in West Africa. The sale of seed 
cotton is the main or only source of cash revenue for farmers in the rural areas. Hence, it 
is critical to support seed cotton production in the fight against poverty in the region. The 
basic component of assuring seed cotton production is to support post-harvest seed cotton 
processing activities till export so the cycle of production may prevail.  
Traditionally, banks involved in international trade finance rely on balance sheet analysis 
and look for government guarantees in the forms of letter of guarantee or comfort for 
assessing the creditworthiness of potential clients in developing countries. Security 
appears to be tangible assets. Very often real estates are asked as collateral. Traders in 
developing countries have large credit requirements compared to their equity. 
UN ESCAP’s, in cooperation with International Trade Centre (ITC), surveys show that in 
economies in transition banks require collateral physical assets at 150 per cent of the 
value of the trade finance facility.
64
 In many cases, potential traders are not eligible for 
clean financing due to their short track records, insufficient capital base and 
unsatisfactory access to government guarantees due to government obligation to IMF. As 
a common practice traders need to show three years uninterrupted profit in their balance 
sheet with bank guarantee, albeit local bank guarantees are not perceived to be solid 
enough, to be eligible for clean financing. As a result, only large creditworthy traders are 
actively involved in trade in developing countries. The main reason for credit providers to 
be hesitant to extend trade finance facility on an unsecured basis to traders in developing 
countries is their high default rate. 
                                                 
64 Trade Finance Infrastructure Development Handbook for Economies in Transition (2005), United Nations Publication 
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Globalization and privatization are other factors giving rise to need for more structured 
trade finance. With privatization, many trading activities have moved out of the hands of 
State-owned and government-controlled bodies and into the hands of private companies. 
Naturally sales to government entities are backed by State while sales to the private 
sector trade are backed by commercial bank guarantee which does not mean much to 
credit providers especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Given the unpredictable political and economic risks in Sub-Saharan Africa as well as 
financial security requirements, it turns to be very difficult to penetrate these markets 
with traditional devices and stimulate economic development. Structured Trade Finance 
(STF) models have been promising to tackle these difficulties. The main objective with 
STF is meeting the needs of the borrower in terms of maturity, repayment schedule as 
well as of the credit provider in terms of currency repatriation, default risk.  
Accordingly, there are no standardized structured trade finance deals due to its objectives 
to meet tailor-made dress requirements for parties. Hence, the evolution of a range of 
innovative, structured trade financing techniques to mitigate the risk of losses and assess 
the potential losses associated with financing commercial transactions turns to be an 
important aspect of development agenda. There are some efforts by multilateral 
development agencies including the World Bank, Islamic Development Bank, etc. for 
initiating more structured trade finance deals. For example, the World Bank Institute and 
the African Region’s Financial and Private Sector have initiated and launched the Trade 
Finance Clinics in Dar-es-Salaam with an objective of replicating similar entities in other 
COMESA countries.
65
 International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation of Islamic 
Development Bank Group established structured trade finance unit for Sub-Saharan 
African countries.  
It should be noted that there are some works on conventional structured trade finance for 
supply chain financing but little has done on an Islamic version.  Considering that Islamic 
finance is developing in trade finance areas in Sub-Saharan Africa it is essential that this 
should be considered and modelled. 
                                                 
65
 Operations implemented within the framework of the Africa Trade Facilitation Project (ATFP) targeting Africa Trade Insurance 
(ATI), Exporters and Importers in COMESA region. 
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In this chapter, after introducing aims, objectives and methodology, section four 
elaborates on literature. Section five briefly elaborates on some definitions for structured 
trade finance. While section six provides some highlights on global and West African 
cotton trade in the context of the Five-Year OIC Cotton Plan of Action, section seven 
introduces the cotton sector in Burkina Faso and SOFITEX. The eighth section explains 
the existing Islamic structured trade finance for SOFITEX. Section nine evaluates the 
existing structure, introduces salam for upgrading the structure for complete supply chain 
financing. Section ten analyses the risks factors with the proposed new structure. Final 
section concludes. 
3.2 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
The main aim of this chapter, as identified in Chapter 1, is to explore and structure 
Islamic finance instruments in a structured trade finance deal as an alternative to 
conventional financing.  
As part of the structuring, the Islamic finance product developed in this chapter aim at 
addressing this specific non-payment risk by structuring the transaction in such a way 
that a payment is made upfront at the ginning level to the producers contributing, while 
involved in a commercial transaction, to alleviate poverty in OIC member countries. 
It should also be mentioned that in the structuring, the study aims to employ two main 
Islamic financial contracts and in the end identify the most effective one. 
Before delving into the technicalities after defining the aims and objectives of the study, 
it should be noted that prior to the development of Islamic instruments through 
mudarabah/murabahah, conventional financing had no alternative in the region, and the 
financing used to start only after arrival of cotton fibre in warehouse of export ports. With 
the assumption of ownership of the products, Islamic finance enabled the beneficiary to 
obtain financing at the very beginning of the post-harvest phase. However, this chapter 
goes beyond the existing structure and proposes salam contract for complete supply chain 
financing starting from input financing with the hope to pioneer literature in the area. As 
highlighted in Chapter 1, the Third Expert Group Meeting on Enhancing Production 
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Efficiency and International Competitiveness in OIC Cotton-Producing Countries, held in 
Antalya, Turkey, in October 2006, adopted the Five-Year OIC Cotton Plan of Action 
(2007-2011). The meeting adopted the following recommendation as stated in Chapter 1: 
Focus should be given to supply chain financing, start from providing input to 
post-harvest seed cotton purchase from farmers. To accommodate this supply 
chain financing existing, structural trade finance designs need to be expanded to 
some more OIC countries. 
 
Thus, an attempt is given in this chapter to explore and model Islamic structured trade 
finance in the case of cotton in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
3.3 METHODOLOGY 
This chapter shows a creative case study to fulfil financing needs of entities involved in 
post-harvest seed cotton processing activities while mitigating inherent risks by Islamic 
Structured Trade Finance design from the case of SOFITEX (a state-controlled agro-
industrial and commercial entity in Burkina Faso) for an amount of Euro 60 million to 
facilitate production, ginning, transportation and warehousing at seaports, and shipping 
processes with the hope to pioneer literature in the area.  
In the real-life case presented herein, there are two contracts: First contract is the 
mudarabah contract between mudarab and rabb al mal to delegate authority for 
undertakings of this financing operation. Second contract is a murabahah contract 
between mudarab and the Beneficiary/SOFITEX by which the mudarab purchase cotton 
fibre from cotton producers and sell it to the Beneficiary by a predetermined mark-up. 
Unlike many murabahah transactions, selling to the Beneficiary does not happen 
immediately but it happens at the time of exports.  
The existing Islamic Structured Finance design for SOFITEX was analyzed, akin to the 
credit control process of financial institutions, in detail so as to provide clear 
understanding of the subject matter. This structure was evaluated and a new design to 
incorporate pre-harvest financing is proposed to better accommodate financing needs of 
the cotton sector in the form of supply chain financing. Before introduction of the Islamic 
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finance structure, however, some insight on the cotton sector and its place in the 
development agenda is also provided to justify worth of the subject matter in order to 
introduce main issues with the sector.  
It should be noted that most of the material, empirically or otherwise, discussed in this 
chapter, is drawn from researcher’s own experience in directly involving with such cases.  
Since for such material there is no literature available, individually created knowledge in 
handling such cases has been the main source in conducting the research for this chapter.  
This also helps to theorise the social reality in the form of trade financing by directly 
engaging with every aspect whereby the advantages of ethnomethodology can be 
observed. 
3.4  ISLAMIC FINANCE AND AGRICULTURAL FINANCE: AN 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapra (2008) states that the ultimate goal of Islam is a blessing for mankind through 
promotion of falah or real well-being of humanity, which can be attained by ensuring the 
enrichment of the following ingredients, as defined by Ghazali, a major Islamic scholar 
of the 11
th
 century:  
(i) Nafs (The human self) 
(ii) Din (Faith) 
(iii)Aql (Intellect) 
(iv) Nasl (Posterity) 
(v) Mal (Wealth) 
As indicated, wealth and faith are perceived as extremely complementary in Islam which 
would not promote unscrupulousness and accentuate inequalities, imbalances and 
excesses that would ultimately reduce the well-being of most members of both the 
present and future generations. However, as Chapra (2008) perceives, placing primary 
reliance on the redistributive method of zakat, would be a mistake because minimizing 
poverty is possible through development of wealth. In this regard, developing a 
mechanism for savings and investment is crucial through maqasid al-Shari’ah. These 
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notions are well observed in the OIC Ten-Year Programme of Action as the programme 
proposes actions for poverty alleviation, as evidenced by the subsequent OIC Five-Year 
Cotton Action Plan, and resource mobilization for enhancing trade of OIC countries as a 
crucial supplement.  
Before going into product development and case study details of Islamic finance in the 
essays as per the OIC Ten-Year Programme of Action and OIC Five-Year Cotton Action 
Plan mandate, main aspects of Islamic Finance, in the context, are explained herein 
within the relevant literature.  
As indicated by Loqman (1999) the Islamic finance system is characterized by the 
absence of interest-based transactions, short-selling, manipulation, doubtful transactions 
which may include unlawful activities within the Islamic Jurisprudence.  As he defines, 
the objective of an Islamic financial system, based on Islamic Shari’ah, is to transfer 
funds from surplus to the deficit units. In this regard, Islamic finance as viewed by 
Muslims is an alternative healthy development tool to interest-based financial systems 
(Khan, 1992). Siddiqi (2008) highlighted various Islamic finance contracts which exclude 
interest (riba), avoiding major uncertainty (gharar) and does not include gambling 
features (maysir) as:  
(i) Murabahah (Cost plus sale): is the most popular short-term trade finance contract 
which is akin to working capital facilities of conventional finance. There would be three 
parties in murabahah transactions namely, the bank, the purchaser and the supplier. The 
bank would buy the needed commodity from the supplier and sell to the purchaser who in 
prior promised to purchase commodities from the bank with a predetermined mark-up. 
One can argue the similarity of interest and predetermined mark-up as a contradiction to 
Islamic finance but this practice is well accepted by Islamic jurists given that the bank 
cannot charge the same rate in case of late payment to be incurred by itself. In this regard, 
Islamic banks developed the waqf funds to transfer late payment charges for humanitarian 
purposes. Usmani (1998) provided legal explanation of bi-thaman ajil (Credit sale) with 
murabahah for increase in pricing due to deferment. 
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(ii) Musharakah (Partnership or joint venture): The contract by which the debtor 
does not seek hundred percent financing but contributes some equity capital of a project 
is referred as musharakah in Islamic finance. Even in such a partnership a murabahah 
contract is to be signed and by which the debtor would be exposed to capital loss in 
proportion to its contribution, while in standard murabahah contracts all financing will be 
provided by a bank which assumes all capital loss risk. In musharakah contract profit and 
loss are shared in proportion to the capital participation. Musharakah contracts are used 
when a bank asks for small participation of the debtor as it is the case with letter of credit.  
 
(iii) Mudarabah (Profit and loss sharing): As explained, in the case of mudarabah 
contracts one party, rab al-mal contributes all capital while mudarab provides its 
expertise to invest for predetermined profit/loss sharing. Islamic bank deposit accounts 
work based on the mudarabah contract in which the bank is mudarab and depositor is 
rab al-mal.  
 
(iv) Salam (Sales contract): is a contract by which the seller abides to deliver a 
specific commodity on a future date against cash received in advance. The price is paid 
immediately to the seller of the commodity while the commodity is to be provided in the 
future. In Islamic banking salam works as such: the bank pays the price in the sale 
contract to the seller of the commodity so the seller can use this fund to cover his costs to 
produce specific commodity to be delivered to buyer on a due date. The Islamic banks 
would have several options at the date of delivery: 
(a) It can sell the commodity for cash or on credit; 
(b) It can appoint a seller to sell the commodity on its behalf ; 
(c) It can instruct the seller to deliver the commodity to the third party which 
promised to purchase the commodity from the bank previously.  
In any case, at the delivery the commodity would be sold through a sale contract between 
the third party/buyer and the Islamic bank. The Islamic bank can sell the commodity for 
cash or on credit with a higher price than salam purchase price it paid to seller/producer. 
As the scheme implies, salam contract is employed to meet capital requirement and cost 
of operations in farming, industry, contracts and craftsmanship. As expected the bank 
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would benefit from lower price with salam purchase as compared to cash purchase. This 
price difference between salam purchase price and expected cash price would secure the 
bank against price fluctuation, as can be the case with price decrease from salam contract 
date to delivery date. Wilson (2004) describes salam as akin to forward contracts which 
are forbidden, if any uncertainty with the contract, gharar, not been eliminated, in 
Islamic Shari’ah. In order to eliminate gharar the buyer/bank should pay the amount in 
full without leaving any outstanding payments. In addition, salam can only be used for 
commodities of measurable quality and quantity standards. Kaleem and Wajid (2009) 
draw the attention to the need of farmers for financing and explore application of salam 
contract as an alternative financial instrument for farmers in Pakistan.  This chapter also 
draws the attention to the need for agricultural financing as per the OIC Five-Year Cotton 
Action Plan by proposing salam to avail funds to be used for procurement of agricultural 
inputs as an extension to the case study in which resource are mobilized by mudarabah.  
 
(v) Ijara (Leasing contract): This Islamic contract type is widely used for real estate, 
car and machinery financing by which one buys a required item, leases it for a specific 
time and sells it to the debtor at the end of the pre-specified time.   
 
(vi) Qard Al-Hasan (Interest free loan): As the name implies it is interest free and the 
use of this contract is limited. 
 
(vii)  Istisna is widely used by Islamic banks to finance the construction of buildings, 
ships, machines and equipment, etc. In Arabic the term istisna means ‘asking someone to 
manufacture’. In this contract, the buyer of the above- mentioned items would pay in 
advance for delivery with predetermined specifications by sellers in the future.  
3.4.1 Salam for Agricultural Financing: Special Focus 
This chapter proposes implementation of salam contract for agricultural financing, but 
the use of Islamic finance contract might not prevent embedded bottlenecks with 
agricultural financing. Hence, careful tailoring should be presented to issues with 
agricultural financing in order to implement salam contract effectively.  
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As observed by Adams and Fitchett (1992), the agricultural sector is constrained in cash, 
because financial institutions are reluctant to avail funds for small farmers who 
supposedly have high default rate, results in high transaction costs due to small amounts 
involved and may not be in a financial position to provide collateral. By using these 
reasons, however, consequent higher interest rates cannot be recommended as a solution 
as this would give rise to adverse selection (Coleman, 2006).  
Regardless of such financial micro problems, the agricultural sector should financially be 
supported.  For example, Binswanger and Khandker (1995) focused on formal credit of 
subsidized interest rate impact in India and found that formal credit increases rural 
productivity and income in a way that benefit exceeds the cost of the formal system by 
more than 13%. In addition, Diagne and Zeller (2001) highlight the fact that in Malawi 
interest rates are not considered to be an important determinant by households in 
choosing which financial institutions to apply from. It is rather non-price attributes of 
loans provided in the form of restriction on use and auxiliary financial services provided 
are considered as important determining factors. They found that local banks and 
cooperative societies in Malawi incline to provide funds to the households with 
diversified assets and income portfolio.  
Moreover, in search for the impact of interest rates, Kahndker and Faruqee (2003) also 
assessed the performance of Agricultural Development of Pakistan in formal credit, 
discounted interest rates. As they found, a 10% increase in formal credit enhances 
agricultural productivity and cost by 1%, while only 0.04% increase was observed in 
consumption. More importantly they observed the main purpose of formal credit as hiring 
labour and purchase of fertilizer as well as other inputs. In addition to formal credit, 
informal lending has an important role in credit markets for rural households of 
developing countries.  
It should be noted that, as highlighted by Van Zyl (1995), informal rural borrowings are 
mainly for consumption purposes and they place a heavy burden on farmers due to the 
high interest rate involved. Surprisingly, one third of informal credit transactions 
originated from resourced mobilized from formal credit sources (Aleem, 1990). Aleem 
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(1990) calculated an average of 25% interest rate for input financing, which is much 
higher than the average rural credit of 19% by the informal market. Average rural formal 
credit is 5% lower than informal credit, which implies possibility of unjustified arbitrage 
opportunity for informal credit providers. Another important aspect of rural credit is 
possible exploitation of farmers through borrowing for consumption items.  
In support of this, for example, in India, Bhalla (1976) found that farmers tend to borrow 
consumption items from shopkeepers to be paid through labour, below market wages, to 
landlords who would consolidate accounts with the shopkeepers for the grain purchased 
and sold.  In the case of Philippines, middlemen usually have some collateral assets in 
agricultural commodities in their lending deals to farmers and developed extensive 
relationships with big traders by frequent dealings (Floro and Yotopoulos, 1991). These 
brokers/middlemen possess extensive knowledge of harvest time, farmer reputation and 
yield. Besides, they are very effective in handling of post-harvest loan repayments and 
pre-harvest loan distribution. In evidencing this, Klinefelter and Penson (2005) draw the 
attention to the fact that local lenders are in a position to monitor the condition and 
performance physically as the farmers operate in a limited geographic area.  
The literature suggests that success of even informal lending in rural areas rely on 
effective monitoring systems in harvest, input and loan distribution akin to collateral 
management and monitoring and lending facility agent activities of formal lending. In 
Pakistan, for example, Mansuri (1998) found that informal credit suppliers do not have 
capacity to control and monitor borrowing farmers.  Again Mansuri (2007) indicates that 
farm households with some land borrow from middlemen exclusively while landless 
tenants borrow from their landlords in Pakistan. He found that in Northern Punjab, 16% 
of total rural debt is from landlords, while the remaining comes from middlemen. This 
strongly reflects more equally distributed lands in the region. On the other hand, 
landlords’ share in rural lending goes up to two thirds in southern Punjab and Sindh 
where landholding is more concentrated.  
As Dorward et al. (1998) highlighted purchase price paid to farmers is depressed in case 
of political inference at management level and lack of competition. Besides, they 
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observed that farmers tend to present collective wilful default when defaulters are not 
punished and there are some parties politically defending them in their default.  Bramvilla 
and Guido (2006) explored the case of cotton producers in Zambia, who take loans from 
one financial institution and sell their cotton during harvest season to another one. This 
structure gave rise to less profitable farming business and, hence, increased the farmers’ 
default.  
By referring to another aspect of agricultural financing, Khandker et al. (2006) found that 
government policies in the form of formal discounted credit can enhance household 
incomes for rural populations directly and indirectly through input subsidies and 
transportation facilities, which increase agricultural productivity in Bangladesh. They 
specifically emphasised the importance of not only input financing but also key 
infrastructure facilities to boost productivity. In the same lines, Renos et al. (2003) 
showed the importance of transaction cost of selling agricultural products in determining 
which market (distant market, local market of farm gate) to be used by farmers. They also 
measure the cost of access to alternative markets for farmers to sell their products.  
It should be mentioned that the literature review suggests the importance of availing 
formal credits to farmers so as to enhance agricultural productivity and efficiency. In case 
of non-existing formal credits, farmers end up with private brokers charging high interest 
rates and bind farmers to sell their crops in harvest at below the market price. While 
providing formal credit is important, the literature also suggests precautionary measures 
to avoid adverse selection in the form of wilful default, delay in payments etc. In 
addition, the literature highlights the importance of infrastructure development for 
increasing agricultural productivity and reducing cost of transaction in order to make 
farming in developing countries a sustainable business.    
With reference to the above-mentioned literature and discussion, it is obvious that 
availing more funds to rural areas in the form of discounted formal credit would help 
alleviating poverty subject to:  
(i) The discounted funds with formal credit should be assured to reach farmers but not 
informal credit providers which may include local banks, landlords, and unscrupulous 
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managers of agricultural cooperatives who may apply local market interest rates to 
poor farmers while enjoying discounted funds mobilized through formal credits.  
(ii) The funds should focus on procurement of inputs for agricultural production but 
not purchase of consumption items giving rise to impoverished farmers. In this 
regard, availed funds should be monitored to ensure that they are used for 
procurement of input to boost agricultural production. 
(iii) Formal discounted credit should be accompanied by several infrastructure 
development projects in the form of transportation, irrigation, etc. which targets to 
increase agricultural productivity to make agricultural input financing sustainable by 
assuring reasonable level of yield for harvest and market access for sale of yield.  
The experience in the field suggests that any formal credit targeted to rural development 
should observe these concerns. A successful discounted formal credit programme can be 
streamlined in structured trade finance to assure usage of credit in procurement of inputs 
but not consumption items. In addition, the same structure should ensure that formal 
discounted credit should not end up as opportunist informal credit to intermediaries.  A 
collateral management company can audit distribution of inputs to farmers against the 
possibility of usage for consumption items while a facility agent for discounted formal 
credit may assure concern on financial intermediaries and ensure discounted formal 
credits are enjoyed by farmers but not intermediaries. A structured trade finance scheme 
can be transformed into complete supply chain financing starting from input financing 
through a salam contract to ensure successful implementation of discounted formal 
credits for poverty alleviation. 
3.5 CONCEPTUAL DEFINITIONS 
3.5.1 Structured Trade Finance66 
Structured Trade Finance can be defined as “the means through which capital solutions 
(both funded and non-funded) are provided outside the traditional fall-back on securities 
                                                 
66 
Based on the book “Trade Finance Infrastructure Development Handbook for Economies in Transition (2005)”, United Nations 
Publication  
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– the focus shifts from the “strength” of the borrower to the underlying cash flow and 
structures that enhance safe financing”.67 In other words, structured trade finance is cross-
border trade finance in emerging markets where the financial strength of the beneficiary 
is not sufficient for traditional financing and repayment is devised as the liquidation of a 
flow of commodities. Accordingly, it turns to be an increasingly important area of 
emerging-markets lending. However, its potential pitfalls led to a poor image among the 
finance community. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the foregoing 
provisions, compared to any other form of lending or investing in the emerging markets, 
structured trade financing has demonstrated a solid track record of "survivability" under 
extreme testing.
68
 
Table 16: Table 3.1: Estimates of Net Incremental Earning from Maize with STF in Ghana 
Year Harvest 
Time 
Price/Bag 
 
Loan/Bag 
(75 % of 
A) 
 
Cost of Loan 
and 
Other Storage 
Costs (actual) 
 
Selling 
Price/ 
Bag (actual) 
 
% Increase 
from 
Harvest to Sales 
Price 
(D-A) /A*100 
 
% Net 
Incremental 
Benefit to 
Farmer 
(D-(A+C))/ 
A*100 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
199
4/9
5 
8,000 6,000 3,096 29,566 270 % 231 % 
199
5/9
6 
15,000 11,250 4,667 24,347 62 % 31 % 
 
* Inflation for Ghana over the same period should be taken into account in reviewing the true level of profits to the farmer. The 
inflation rate (GDP deflator, percent) was: 24 percent, 20 percent, 21.5 percent in 1994, 1995 and 1996 respectively.  
Inflation statistics taken from “World Bank Live On-line Database: Africa Summary Briefings. 
Source: Kwadzo (2000) 
As the definition reveals, STF focuses on mitigating or externalizing the identified risks 
associated with transactions to parties who have potential to bear these risks. Hence, 
identifying the role of different parties in terms of their potential to bear risk in the 
funding and reimbursement process in order to affect the transaction positively turns to 
be the main concern. It should be mentioned that there are many risks inherent in trade 
financing. Commodity price volatility, for example, is a major concern of the financiers 
to deal with enterprises involved in commodity production, processing or trade. However, 
                                                 
67 
World Bank Institute definition  
68 
John MacNamara (2008), “Structured trade and commodity finance: What can go wrong and how to avoid it”, Woodhead 
Publishing Limited. 
100 
 
evidences from the practice indicate that even under unfavourable price fluctuations STF 
can still turn to be mutually beneficial for both financiers and beneficiaries. 
Table 3.1 shows an example of the benefit of STF facility to the farmers under both 
favourable and unfavourable price fluctuation. Still, credit providers can obtain price 
hedging, insurance for country risk or guarantees/transition collateral as well as export 
receivables as the delay of payment would leave very little options for financiers to 
enforce their right in case of extreme circumstances. Let us briefly go through warehouse 
receipt financing and export receivable models for risk mitigation in STF for the sake of 
the case to be presented herein.  
3.5.2 Warehouse Receipt Financing 
The exporter’s promise to reimburse the credit provider with the cash generated through 
sale of existing products is not perceived to be solid by credit providers. However, the 
goods under the control of an independent third party, the warehouse operator, can be the 
base for secure collateral given that the goods have not been pledged previously and the 
credit provider has the first call on the goods if the necessity arises.  
In warehouse receipt financing, the warehouse operator issues a receipt upon the arrival 
of the goods from producers. This receipt guarantees the particular quality, quantity and 
grade as a basis of financing. The producer can use the receipt as collateral to request a 
loan from a financial institution and the credit providers can use the receipt as a fallback 
guarantee in case of non-payment. Given the nature of the transactions, the legal 
framework for warehouse receipts ought to be well established in a developing country to 
allow its producers to fully benefit from such line of financing.   
3.5.3 Export Receivable-Based Financing 
As the name suggests, financing is based on the payments to be made by the off-takers 
once the commodities are exported. In this way, exporters use their future trade flows to 
raise self-liquidating financing at better cost while credit providers externalize country 
risk by receiving payments in an offshore escrow account and credit risks by the 
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assignment of export contracts and receivables. It should be noted that the credit provider 
still keeps the security on the physical commodity under local law.  
3.6 FIVE-YEAR OIC COTTON PLAN OF ACTION 
Persistently, West African countries carry the issues of the cotton sector in the agenda of 
international organizations as evidenced in the Doha Development Round. By June 2003, 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali (very often referred to as the Cotton-4 group) 
proposed the Sectoral Initiative on Cotton, or in short ‘Cotton Initiative’. Cotton-4 
countries are all OIC members.  
As is defined in this chapter, West Africa would be confined to these four countries plus 
other neighbouring OIC member cotton-producing countries such as Togo. In these five 
countries, Cotton-4 plus Togo, cotton provides income to about 10 million people and 
cotton exports rank at the top of export items and the main foreign exchange earner as 
indicated by Baffes (2009).
69
  
In order to show the importance of the cotton sector for these countries, Baffes compiled 
data from the Food and Agricultural Organization, IMF and World Bank. As he 
indicated, for example, cotton’s export share in the region is as high as 76.6%in Burkina 
Faso. In the case of Benin, Mali, Chad and Togo cotton export shares are respectively, 
36.9%, 30%, 19.7% and 16.4%. Hence, the foreign exchange revenue from cotton export 
is very valuable for these countries to enable themselves to import necessary fertilizer so 
they can sustain reasonable staple production for food security, that is, peace in the 
region.  
There are several external challenges to the cotton sector in West Africa. These countries 
share the same currency of CFA Franc fixed against the Euro and their cotton sectors are 
affected from exchange rate fluctuations of the Euro. Indeed, fluctuation of cotton prices 
is already a serious problem for the West African Countries as it adds burden on ginners 
to resort financing for the bad years so the sector can survive until the price level returns 
                                                 
69 Available at: http://www.agecon.purdue.edu/staff/masters/Africa%20e-book%200309.pdf#page=519. Last accessed on 03 June 
2010.  
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to reasonable levels. Exchange rate fluctuation on top of price fluctuation can easily dry 
up fertilizer funds, and input financing is needed to revitalize the sector.    
As explained in detail throughout the International Trade Centre (ITC) Cotton Exporter’s 
guide, reference of the cotton price is based on Cotlook A-Index, Liverpool UK or latest 
future contract listed in USA’s International Commodity Exchange (ICE) in New York. 
Nevertheless, determination of the cotton price in transactions is determined by delivery 
schedule, quality, location and relationship among prices within the supply chain 
implying that it changes constantly.  Figure 3.1 provides evidence for such volatility. 
Figure 9: Figure 3.1: Price Volatility in the Cotlook-A Index  
 
Source: International Cotton Advisory Committee 
Cotlook A-Index is at the top of the list when it comes to identifying an indicator for 
international prices average. The index itself is compiled by a company called Cotlook 
Ltd. in Liverpool, United Kingdom, which receives cotton prices across the globe from 
buyers and sellers. Even prices reported to Cotlook from the same place would vary 
especially for those quotations with small volumes.  Hence, Cotlook determines the 
prevailing price from each origination based on its own judgement. In reality, Cotlook 
take the average of the cheapest five prices of middling grade cotton of 1-3/32 inches 
length delivered from nearby shipment to East Asia.   
In the same fashion, Cotlook post A-Index and B-Index for short-fibre cotton for North 
Europe. Hence, in many cases actual price of transaction would be different than Cotlook 
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indices yet Cotlook A-Index sustain its place as a primary indicator of average price 
levels prevailing in the market.  
As opposed to the Cotlook indices, future prices are specific prices for certain 
transactions with indicated description, delivery location and dates, hence, present actual 
prices. The price of each transaction with specific variety, delivery location and dates is 
determined based on public auctions through special computer systems. That is, unlike 
the Cotlook indices there is no judgement in determination of reference prices. However, 
as the quotations are in the USA, future prices may not be good indicators for price trend 
or cotton prices out of the USA.  
Another important aspect of cotton pricing is variation of mill-delivered (to ginners) 
prices, together with prices received by farmers, and reference international prices. Mill-
delivered cotton prices include various costs from farm to ginner’s warehouse. These 
costs include transportation, insurance, loading and storage. In developing countries 
farmer prices are usually based on seed cotton prices at the collection point. In some 
countries, on the other hand, farmers are paid based on cotton fibre out of the seed cotton 
they placed for the ginning process.  
As a main argument developed by Cotton-4 in the Doha Round, trade-distorting 
production and export subsidies of developed countries are the prime cause of low prices 
and declining exports revenue for West African countries. Although there are substantial 
literature on the price-depressing effect of subsides, there is another side of the coin, 
which is the decreasing share of cotton in textile fibre consumption due to competing 
synthetic alternatives.  Figure 3.2 depicts the trends in cotton’s share of world end-use 
textile fibre consumption. 
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Figure 10: Figure 3.2: Cotton’s Share of World End-Use Textile Fibre Consumption 
 
Source: International Cotton Advisory Committee 
There are two further externalities affecting the cotton prices. As defined by the 
International Cotton Advisory Committee, increasing concentration in the world market 
might have decreased the bargaining power of West African cotton producers. As 
indicated in Figure 3.3, share of Asian in world cotton trade has been increasing as the 
region imports more and more cotton fibre from the rest of the world. Given this fact, 
Cotlook adjusted its cotton price reporting to take this fact in to the consideration.  
Figure 11: Figure 3.3: Share of Asia in World Trade 
 
Source: International Cotton Advisory Committee 
It should be noted that traditionally, cotton is traded by a limited number of international 
cotto-trading companies, which was mentioned as an important impediment of fair trade 
for cotton farmers. However, one should note the importance of these companies to 
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facilitate cotton trade by providing export contracts at the beginning of the season. On the 
other hand, economic rationale advises to avoid such concentration which may create a 
monopsony at the expense of cotton farmers. However, recently, concentration of these 
cotton-trading companies has even increased as indicated in Figure 3.4.  
Figure 12: Figure 3.4: Largest Cotton Companies 
 
Source: International Cotton Advisory Committee 
Addressing these externalities such as subsidies, global market structure, decreasing the 
use of synthetic fibre might not be viable yet as it requires global joint effort from many 
parties and awareness of fair trade. Should we expect consumer to pay extra for cotton 
shirts than synthetic shirt? As Adam Smith stated centuries ago in his book the Wealth of 
Nations, perhaps “we are not ready to suspect any person of being defective in 
selfishness”. However, until we can suspect business community, politicians and 
consumers of being defective in selfishness, there are several issues which can be 
addressed within a territory of governments in West Africa.  
As indicated in Figure 3.5, since the 1950s there has been a substantial increase in world 
cotton production though cotton cultivation areas remain almost as they were. Obviously, 
this substantial cotton production growth is to be attributed to yield per hectare, which is 
efficiency gain. Many countries across the globe enjoyed the increased efficiency coming 
from mechanization, application of fertilizer, increased agronomy know-how, etc.  
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Figure 13: Figure 3.5: Trend in World Cotton Yield and Area of Cultivation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: International Cotton Advisory Committee 
Since then yield per hectare more than doubled as indicated in Figure 3.6. However, 
Africa has not showed the similar performance to keep up with world.  
Figure 14: Figure 3.6: Increase in Yield per Hectare for Cotton Production  
 
Source: International Cotton Advisory Committee 
This reality alone would show the major bottle-neck for development of the cotton sector 
for West African OIC member countries. The income generated out of cotton production 
can be determined by three factors: price, quality and quantity. As explained above, it 
might not be viable to address externalities to sustain fair international prices. However, 
observed efficiency increase in the rest of the world in higher yield per hectare can be 
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replicated for West African countries. Besides, higher quality cotton in West Africa can 
also be subject of a regional initiative.   
Given the importance of the sector and outstanding issues to be addressed, West African 
countries continue to succeed in sustaining the case for the development of the cotton 
sector at the top of OIC agenda. As a crucial crop for public finance and major exports 
item to stimulate employment and economic growth in many OIC countries, special 
emphasis is given to the development of the cotton sector under the OIC Ten-Year 
Programme of Action. The brief background of this issue is explained in Figure 3.7.  
Figure 15: Figure 3.7: Cotton Initiative in OIC Ten-Year Programme of Action 
 
Source: Ministry of Industry and Trade, Turkey as the Steering Committee Chairman for OIC 
Cotton Action Plan  
OIC General Secretariat in cooperation with IDB and ICDT has organized a series of 
Expert Group Meetings on Cotton. Then, SESRIC prepared a study to justify the 
inclusion of cotton sector development into the OIC Ten-Year Program of Action agenda 
as:  
 
(i) Among the top 40 cotton-producing countries in the world, 22 were OIC 
members and their production of cotton accounted for 26% of world 
production, as per data provided by SESRIC in Table 3.2:  
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Table 17: Table 3.2: OIC Cotton Prodution in Million Tonnes, 2006 
  Production  Share in 
World (%) 
  Production  Share in 
World (%) 
Pakistan 2.145 8.6 Cameroon 0.09 0.4 
Uzbekistan 1.208 4.9 Nigeria 0.087 0.4 
Turkey 0.773 3.1 Benin 0.082 0.3 
Syria 0.327 1.3 Sudan 0.081 0.3 
Burkina Faso 0.294 1.2 Azerbaijan 0.071 0.3 
Mali 0.223 0.9 Chad 0.071 0.3 
Turkmenistan 0.212 0.9 Kyrgyz Rep. 0.046 0.2 
Egypt 0.201 0.8 Mozambique 0.036 0.1 
Kazakhstan 0.147 0.6 Togo 0.03 0.1 
Tajikistan 0.136 0.5 Senegal 0.02 0.1 
Iran 0.115 0.5 Total 6.504 26.2 
Cote d’Ivoire 0.109 0.4       
Source: SESRIC 
 
(ii) As a group, the OIC countries were considered as the second largest 
exporter of cotton in the world after the USA. 
(iii) The share of OIC members in Sub-Saharan Africa in world cotton exports 
was 11.3% and the share of cotton in total merchandise exports of West 
African OIC countries was substantial. 
(iv) Going through Table 3.3, ,  11 OIC countries were among the top 40 
cotton-importing countries in the world, namely, Turkey (number 2), 
Bangladesh (number 3), Indonesia (number 4) and Pakistan (number 7). 
Their share in world total imports of cotton accounted for 24.3%. 
Table 18: Table 3.3: OIC Cotton Imports in Million Tonnes, 2006 
  Imports  Share in 
World (%) 
  Imports  Share in 
World (%) 
Turkey 0.737 7.7 Morocco 0.037 0.4 
Bangladesh 0.482 5 Tunisia 0.022 0.2 
Indonesia 0.479 5 Bahrain 0.016 0.2 
Pakistan 0.361 3.8 Iraq 0.015 0.2 
Egypt 0.114 1.2 Nigeria 0.015 0.2 
Malaysia 0.042 0.4 Total 2.32 24.3 
Source: SESRIC 
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The world cotton production for the harvest season 2009/10 is reported at 22.38 million 
tonnes by the International Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC). This represents a 
decrease of 5% compared to 2008/09 production. Table 3.4 summarizes the progression 
of world cotton production from the 2003/04 harvest to the 2009/2010 harvest season: 
Table 19: Table 3.4: World Cotton Production in Millions Tonnes 
 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 
 
2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 
China 6.32 5.82 6.73 8.08 7.91 6.86 
USA 5,062 4.2 4.70 4.18 3.09 2.72 
India 4.080 3.81 4.59 5.36 5.46 5.28 
Pakistan 2.482 2.31 2.09 1.85 1.92 2.05 
Brazil 1.318 1.27 1.43 1.56 1.39 1.18 
Uzbekistan 1.134 1.1 1.15 1.22 1.15 958 
Others (Inc. 
Africa) 
5.808 5.3 4.64 4.03 3.78 3.33 
Total 26.204 24.40 25.33 26.28 24.70 22.38 
Source: International Cotton Advisory Committee 
It should be noted that low yields, subsidies of developed countries, volatility of cotton 
price, shift to synthetic fibres, lack of capacity for implementation of 
testing/classification procedures for cotton, lack of a spinning industry and contamination 
of cotton during harvest leading to a decrease in cotton collected were cited among the 
major problems faced by the cotton sector in OIC countries.  
Figure 16: Figure 3.8: OIC Cotton Cotton Yield (Kg/Hec), 2006 
 
Source: SESRIC 
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The OIC countries show strong potential for cooperation to enhance trade and production 
capacity in the cotton sector. For example, Syria, Turkey, Uzbekistan and Egypt yield per 
hectar is higher than the world average while in West Africa cotton yield per hectare is 
less than world average. These four countries can transfer their skills to contribute 
increasing efficiency in Sub-Saharan African countries. OIC activities on cotton, as 
indicated by SESRIC, should be focused on these types of reverse linkages.   
Providing trade finance would be another remedy for the sector. The third EGM on 
Enhancing Production Efficiency and International Competitiveness in OIC Cotton- 
Producing Countries, held in Antalya, Turkey, in October 2006, adopted the Five-Year 
OIC Cotton Plan of Action (2007-2011).
70
  It was again the resolution of this meeting 
which states: 
Focus should be given to supply chain financing, start from providing input to 
post-harvest seed cotton purchase from farmers. To accommodate this supply 
chain financing, existing structural trade finance designs need to be expanded to 
some more OIC countries. 
Figure 17: Figure 3.9: OIC Cotton Action Plan 
 
Source: Ministry of Industry and Trade, Turkey as the Steering Committee Chairman for OIC 
Cotton Action Plan  
                                                 
70 This plan of action available on line at http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/comcec/Cotton%20Action%20Plan-En.pdf,  last access 
on 29 April 2010.  
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The 22
nd
 Session of the COMCEC also endorsed the action plan. The plan aims at 
strengthening trade, investment and technology transfer in cotton-producing member 
states, particularly to West African countries. As indicated in Figure 3.9, the OIC Cotton 
Initiative developed an Action Plan to address major challenges. Based on identified 
obstacles and challenges, the action plan as compiled in Figure 3.9 is developed. The five 
cooperation areas are identified as  
(i) Enhancing productivity and developing production techniques; 
(ii) Strengthening the structural capacity and organisations of member countries; 
(iii) Developing the field of processing; 
(iv) Enhancing marketing, trade and international competitiveness;  
(v) Arranging financing for the activities.  
 
Details of these cooperation areas, particularly in enhancing productivity and developing 
production techniques, are provided in Appendix II.  
3.6.1 Cotton Sector in West Africa 
Selling cotton at a fair price directly contributes to increase in quality of life, health and 
expansion of opportunities and hope for West African farmers, and hence facilitate the 
process of reducing poverty in West Africa. Thus, being a productive base helps to 
develop the capacity of the societies of these countries. 
The fact is that farmers in West Africa are able to produce higher quality cotton at a 
lower cost than their counterparts in North America or Europe. Hence, they can 
command a higher price as compared to the average Cotlook A-Index price on the 
market. The national cotton sectors in West African countries are, hence, profitable at an 
international market price exceeding US$ 0.60/pound as highlighted by ITFC.  
3.6.1.1 Contracts and cotton-pricing system in West Africa 
International cotton prices are expressed in US dollars, but West African cotton ginners 
and exporters pay their production expenses in CFA francs. Exchange rates are volatile 
and unpredictable. However, cotton prices converted in CFA francs have been less 
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volatile than those expressed in US dollars, because commodity prices in dollars tend to 
be negatively correlated with the weighted exchange rate of the U.S. currency. 
Exchange movements are an additional risk that needs to be managed and add additional 
pressure to cotton producers and exporters. Exchange rate volatility affects revenues and 
costs.  
The cotton marketing calendar (and therefore, the financial cycle) of one specific season 
(t/t+1) extends over 30 months, from the middle of the year (t), when the ginning 
companies open L/C to order inputs, shipment of fertilizer, storage and distribution of 
fertilizer to farmers, to the end of the year (t+1), when export sales are completed, 
proceeds received and farmers are get fully repaid. In the countries where a bonus is 
distributed to producers based on the profit of the previous season, the calendar may 
extend five more months.  
Most contracts between ginners and international traders are private contracts concluded 
during visits or on the phone. Written contracts incorporate all the major terms of sales. 
Quantity is specified in metric tons; usually 500 to 10,000 tons per contract in one to 
three monthly shipments, and smaller quantities for prompt shipment at the end of the 
season. In addition, quality is stipulated ‘on type’, meaning that cotton is sold on the basis 
of exporter’s private type or sample for grade and colour. Staple length, micronaire, and 
strength (if applicable) are separately guaranteed.  
It should be noted that payment is mainly against usual shipping documents. Le Havre 
rules and arbitration (Association Française Cotonnière or AFCOT) apply to most 
contracts between ginners and off-takers. Most contracts are concluded FOB (free on 
board). In other words, the seller (ginning company) pays the cost of transportation of 
cotton from the gin to the shipping port and loading the cotton on board the ocean vessel. 
The most common method used in the CFA countries by the cotton ginner is to sell lint 
through a forward contract with an international trader. These sales can be in advance of 
planting the crop, during the season or after ginning. About 50% of expected production 
is generally sold forward before ginning, more when traders are bullish. Most cotton is 
sold prior to being actually ginned, except the remaining balance at the end of the season. 
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Sale and pricing are generally simultaneous, at a fixed price, in Euro per kilogram. Some 
basic pricing is done on call the Cotlook A-Index, African Franc zone quote in Cotton 
Outlook or on call New York future. Minimum guaranteed price is not frequent. 
It should also be noted that the terms and conditions of contracts between international 
traders and spinning mills differ from those of the contracts between traders and ginners. 
Cotton is generally sold forward at fixed prices in US cents per pound CFR port of 
destination. Spinners usually start covering their needs around March, and buying 
pressure is stronger when prices are rising. Some mills buy on call New York futures, and 
sales on call Cotlook A-Index are exceptional. LCA (Liverpool Cotton Association) rules 
and arbitration apply to most contracts between traders and spinners, except for sales to 
China (Mainland), where Chinese terms apply. Payment is generally by irrevocable L/C 
at sight (up to 150 days in certain markets); however, cash payment against documents or 
upon arrival is less common. 
The mechanism for the establishing seed cotton price paid to growers is essentially a two-
stage process. In the first stage, the official minimum procurement price for seed cotton is 
announced before planting, generally in March or April, taking into account the estimated 
cost of production (including an opportunity cost for the family labour) and anticipated 
world prices less ginning and transportation costs, or according to a multi-year agreement 
between the ginning companies and the producers. Pan-seasonal and pan-territorial 
pricing is the rule. Discounts apply to lower qualities (one and two only). The price of 
inputs to be deducted from the sales of seed cotton is announced at the same time. In 
some countries, notably in Burkina Faso and Cameroon, the floor price is eventually 
supplemented by a bonus (ristourne), corresponding to a partial distribution of profits of 
the ginning company during the previous season.  
Ginners usually base their prices on the Cotlook A-Index, valued at the prevalent 
exchange rate for the shipping period considered. Ginners are always reluctant to start 
selling new crop below their provisional cost of production. New York cotton futures are 
not a reasonable base for pricing African franc-zone cotton. Export prices follow the 
114 
 
Cotlook A-Index since the West African zone quote in Cotton Cotlook is most of the time 
among the cheapest five quotations taken into account in the calculation. 
3.6.1.2 Allocation of risk in West Africa 
With the current system, producers face essentially two risks namely, production 
(volume) risk and late payment risk. The biggest risk for producers is the risk of late 
payment for their crop, (and even of non–payment in some seasons), which is correlated 
with the storage risk. As mentioned before, the Islamic finance product developed in this 
chapter aims at addressing this specific non-payment risk by structuring the transaction in 
such a way that a payment is made upfront at the ginning level to the producers 
contributing, while involved in a commercial transaction, to alleviate poverty in OIC 
member countries.  
Most of the risks for the ginners lie on the buying side of the seed cotton from the 
producers. The financial risk is high since inputs and crop financing extend over two and 
a half years. Cotton companies are de facto credit guarantors during the period starting 
with the opening of the letter of credit for importing inputs to the end of payments by 
cotton importers. The input recovery risk is low thanks to the linkage between input 
supply and seed cotton marketing and to the producers’ joint liability. Recovery rates 
exceed 95% but tend to decline in the countries where ginning has been liberalized. 
On the selling side of the cotton fibre to the merchants, ginners offset the exchange risk 
by pricing their cotton in Euros. The counterpart risk is low and the contract performance 
risk is moderate to low because buyers are selected long-standing established players. 
However, defaults of buyers and, more frequently, delayed shipments, increase when 
prices drop between the contract date and shipment. Nevertheless, ginners seldom apply 
carrying charges to late shipments, and storage cost is not factored into the contract for 
late shipment. 
On the buying side from ginners, the financial risk for merchants is low, except in the 
case of pre-financing or pre-payment. In contrast, the price risk is high, because the 
purchase price is generally fixed before cotton is delivered. The exchange risk is high 
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because cotton is purchased in Euros and sold in dollars. Delivery risk is moderate, as 
ginners are reliable established players, with a few exceptions among the private 
newcomers. Volume risk increases with competition among ginners, particularly when 
there is a ginning overcapacity (the case in Benin). Quality risk is significant as 
contracted quantities and qualities may not be available for shipment. 
Financial risk for input suppliers and banks is high. Governments are also exposed to 
price risk with the fixed-price system, due to the economic and social importance of 
cotton in the West African countries. The fixed-price system offers the best protection to 
cotton producers in West Africa. The systems of minimum guarantee prices appear to 
generally satisfy producers.  
Volume of production is not a problem for ginning in West Africa, which enables them to 
sell forward. Forward sale fixed-price contracts have been used extensively for decades, 
primarily as a way to secure input and crop financing. Sales are contracted in Euros, 
offsetting the exchange risk. About half of each anticipated crop is generally sold before 
ginning starts. 
Ginning uses ‘caution collective’ (joint liability) from producers to guarantee input credit 
recovery and select buyers to guarantee contract performance. When they are unable to 
ship the contracted volume, ginners are generally able to renegotiate contracts (rolled to 
the next crop, at a discount price or not) in order to avoid invoicing back. When unable to 
ship the contracted quality, ginners usually apply higher quality at the same price or 
apply lower quality at a discount with buyer’s approval. However, shipping a quality 
above the contract does not allow the seller to request a premium from the buyer. 
3.7 COTTON IN BURKINA FASO 
Burkina Faso is one of the largest producers of cotton in Africa. Cotton plays a major role 
in Burkina Faso, as in most West African countries such as Mali, Benin, Chad, Ivory 
Coast, Cameroon etc.  
Cotton production in Burkina Faso is a major source of income-generation in the country. 
Like most of the other cotton-producing countries, the economy of Burkina Faso is driven 
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primarily by the cotton sector. At the macro-economic level, cotton represents around 8 
% of the GDP formation but 50-60 % of the total export revenues for Burkina Faso 
(ahead of livestock and gold). It is a main foreign exchange revenue earner and a major 
source of employment. The sale of seed cotton is the main or only source of cash revenue 
for farmers in rural areas. Hence, it is critical to support seed cotton production in the 
fight against poverty.  
As mentioned, seed cotton cultivation is the major source of income in the rural areas; as 
a result, it can be an important instrument for the fight against poverty in Burkina Faso 
and an engine of technical progress for rural development. The major players in the 
cotton industry in Burkina Faso are the producers, the cotton ginners, the cotton research 
institute, the banks, the ancillary private sector service providers (transporters, the input 
suppliers and the cotton oil refiners) and lastly, but not least, the government of Burkina 
Faso. In this respect, the government has been instrumental in redefining the national 
policy on cotton since 1996, shaping the new landscape for the industry and the 
regulatory and control framework for the memorandum of understanding between the 
producers and the ginners. Hence, 1996 was a turning point in the history of the Burkina 
Faso cotton industry. Since the inception of a restructuring policy in 1996, SOFITEX has 
been working with the government, the farmers and local financial institutions. With the 
introduction of a number of initiatives including new monitoring and follow-up 
procedures and the close working relationship with the farmers (and direct involvement) 
and the government (acting as regulatory authority), the sector has recorded 
unprecedented growth and performance. Cotton production has grown 19% a year from 
1996 to 2006.  This achievement definitely positioned Burkina Faso as the largest cotton 
producer in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Total surface area under cotton cultivation has grown considerably since 1993 from 
152,000 Ha to reach 410,000 Ha for the 2008/09 harvest season. At the same time, 
the average yield of seed cotton has improved to 469 kg per hectare. As explained 
earlier, this is the result of the combination of many factors, including better seed 
variety sowed, use of 'delinting' seed, effective use of pesticide, and training provided 
in innovative planting techniques. 
117 
 
As indicated in Table 3.5, the ginning out-turn has been consistently high in Burkina 
Faso at around 42% with a peak of 42.8%. As regards to quality, significant progress 
has been made and today nearly 80% of the total current production of the up market 
bola/boby super varieties, which are equivalent to the standard Good Middling & 
Middling in the US market. Moreover, 95% of the fibre are 11/8' (28,58 mm) in 
length. 
Table 20: Table 3.5:    Trend in the Cotton Sector from 2001 to 2009                                                                        
Source: SOFITEX   
On the export market, the major market outlets are today, predominantly South East 
Asia (China, Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia) while it was Europe earlier. 
Most if not all of the sales are marketed through international traders such as 
Reinhart, Devcot, Olam, Copaco, Louis Dreyfus, etc. 90% of exports are executed 
under documentary collection and the balance 10% of export sales are paid against 
payments through L/Cs. The main transit routes for loading and export of Burkina 
Faso cotton fibres are Abidjan (Cote d'Ivoire), Lomé (Togo) and Tema in Ghana. The 
bulk of the shipment was done via Tema in Ghana whereas the shortest and most cost 
efficient route is undoubtedly Abidjan. 
Harvest Season 01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09  
Area (ha), 
thousands 
342  407  460  480  546  615  365  410 
Production 
(tons), 
thousands 
360  409.8 483.4 514 601.5 557.6  310.6 450  
Yield (kg/ha) 444 423 444 465 469 388 359 469 
Cotton fibre 
Ginned (tons), 
thousands 
151.9 172.5 203.7 215  253  238  130.8 192.2 
Ginning Outturn 
(%) 
42.18 42.09 42.28 42.0 42.17 42.83 42,14 42,72 
Av Exp Price 
(Fob) 
(FCFA/kg) 
630 709 780 584 635 590 688 736 
Producer Price 
(FCFA/kg) 
175+5 
 
175+ 
10 
 
175+ 
35 
175 175 
 
165 
 
145+ 
10 
 
165 
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3.7.1 Organizational Structure of the Cotton Sector 
Going through the presentation of Leonce Kone, Minister of Commerce Burkina Faso, 
during the ‘13th Round of Consultation on Cotton Development Assistance’ in WTO 
headquarters on 7
th
 June 2010, there are 320,000 cotton producers in the form of small 
family businesses. The size of a cotton farming unit varies from 2.4 Ha to 65 Ha for the 
large ones, with an average size of 8.4 Ha per unit. The average number of people 
working in a unit is 11 (usually the whole members of the family). The cotton plantations 
consist of small producers, producing an average of 2 tons of seed cotton as cash crop and 
keeping a portion of their land for subsistence farming such as producing cereals and 
vegetables as follows: 
(i) 50%of the land for cotton; 
(ii) 40%for cereals (corn, millet, sorghum); 
(iii) 10% for others (mostly vegetable). 
It should be noted that the level of agricultural mechanization is very low: 35% of the 
producers work totally manually. 40% have a pair of cows pulling a rudimentary plough; 
and 24% have a fairly good range of agricultural tools and equipment, while only 1% 
have tractors and mechanized equipment. 
To better manage and supervise the production of seed cotton, the 320,000 producers are 
organized into associations, known as Groupement des Producteurs de Coton (GPC). 
These are operationally organized structures adapted to the cotton sector with following 
mandate: 
(i) Supervising the distribution of inputs, such as fertilizer, to their members; 
(ii) Managing short-term and medium-term credit facilities for farmers; 
(iii) Planning cotton harvest, collection of seed cotton and selling of seed cotton to 
ginners ( including weighing, and sales collection); 
(iv) Organizing other activities of socio-economic nature for the benefit of their 
members. 
There are a total of 9,000 GPCs in Burkina Faso (6,000 alone in SOFITEX zone). The 
GPCs are themselves regrouped at regional level (248), at provincial level (36) and 
finally all of them are full members of the national cotton producers' union of Burkina 
Faso (Union Nationale des Producteurs de Coton du Burkina) UNPCB. The organized 
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structure, set up since 1996, has considerably improved the parameters of the cotton 
sector in Burkina Faso, particularly following the entry of the UNPCB into the capital of 
SOFITEX with a 30%shareholding as a part of two-pronged strategy to manage the 
cotton sector by government.
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In 2010, there were three cotton ginning companies in Burkina Faso, namely SOFITEX, 
SOCOMA and FASOCOTON. Prior to September 2004, the cotton activity was solely 
dominated by SOFITEX with 12 ginning mills located in the west, south west of the 
country. As a result of a policy towards liberalization of the sector, formulated by the 
Government and the IMF/World Bank, SOFITEX sold its two units in the east and centre 
of Burkina Faso to SOCOMA and FASOCOTON (one each). This limited liberalization 
process was successfully implemented and SOFITEX kept the control of the west/south- 
west region which accounts for over 80% of the national cotton production capacity. 
Since then, SOFITEX has expanded its operation by installing three additional ginning 
units (in Banfaro, Kouroma and the new cotton zone of Diebougou on the Ghana border).  
Similar to other West African countries, ginning companies in Burkina Faso are 
experiencing serious difficulties due to low world cotton prices and the appreciation of 
the Euro. The pricing mechanism was inflexible so the ginning companies had no means 
to timely pass through the lower world cotton prices to farmers. As a result, the ginning 
companies incurred tremendous financial losses due to the price difference between 
world market and minimum price guaranteed to the farmers. SOFITEX, the largest 
ginning company in Burkina Faso, incurred losses equal to more than one per cent of 
GDP.  This trend urged development agencies to explore a way to finance the cotton 
sector in the country through ginning companies in a sustainable way. One crucial step 
toward ensuring the sector's viability was the adoption of a market-based producer price-
setting mechanism, which was implemented for the 2007/08 harvest. The new mechanism 
aligns domestic producer prices with world market prices and thus makes producers share 
the part of the risk.  
                                                 
71
 B.Essama-nssah, I. Samakéand, and J.Walliser, Burkina Faso: A Macroeconomic Approach to Analyze Cotton Sector Reform. 
Accessed from World Bank website: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPSIA/Resources/490023-
1120841262639/ch3_burkinafaso.pdf on 29/12/2008.  
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3.7.2 Sofitex 
SOFITEX is a state-controlled agro-industrial and commercial entity, involved in the 
whole cycle of production, processing of seed cotton to the export of cotton fibre. It was 
set up in 1979 as a public sector limited liability company by the major two shareholders, 
namely the Government of Burkina Faso and the formerly Compagnie Francaise pour le 
Developpement du Textiles (CFDT). SOFITEX is one of the largest cotton companies in 
West Africa along with the Compagnie Malienne pour le Developpement des Textiles 
(CMDT) in Mali. Until September 2004, SOFITEX had the monopoly over cotton 
processing in Burkina Faso. It was undertaking the full industrial and commercial 
activities relating to cotton export and ensuring the social development of the rural 
population. Presently, under its supervision it has 3 million farmers, representing 
approximately 25% of the total population of Burkina Faso. SOFITEX is the only 
company in the region to have seed production facility (delinting units) in order to 
improve quality of seed cotton, for better yield and more resistant varieties. Today 
SOFITEX is considered as a parastatal entity run on a purely commercial basis, though it 
is meant to perform a social developmental role in rural areas. SOFITEX has a strong 
management team with expertise from different fields and a general manager appointed 
by the Government for the last ten years. Its technical team consists of a large pool of 
agronomists (297) trained both locally and abroad, which has proved to be the major 
asset behind the reputation of the company for its high-quality cotton worldwide. 
Recently, SOFITEX increased its paid-up capital in the amount of FCFA 34.22 billion (or 
Euro 52 million), which reflect in its ownership structure as depicted in Table 3.6: 
Table 21: Table 3.6:    Shareholding Percentage of SOFITEX 
 
Percentage (%) 
State of Burkina Faso 35.16 
Developpement des Agro-Industries du Sud (DAGRIS 
Group) 
3.87 
Cotton Farmers Producers' Union (Union Nationale des 
Producteurs de Coton du Burkina) 
30.14 
Domestic Banks (BIB & BICIA-B) 0.05 
FBDES 30.28 
Total 100 
Source: SOFITEX   
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This diversified shareholding structure has proved to be the strength of SOFITEX as it 
incorporates the major players in the cotton sector, including the farmers and the government. 
The government has been instrumental for its active role in shaping the agricultural policy, 
development of rural infrastructures, in the implementation of regulatory framework.
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3.7.2.1 Business activities 
SOFITEX has a number of functions, both economic and social, to fulfil. Its mandates are 
various, but primarily cover the following: 
(i) Acquisition and distribution of fertilizers and other agricultural inputs; 
(ii) Support/advisory services to cotton producers on sowing, harvesting,  use of 
seeds, insecticides, pesticides, etc.; 
(iii) Purchase, supervision and transport of cotton seed; 
(iv) Cotton ginning, packing, storing and classification; 
(v) Marketing and sale of cotton fibre, seed cotton and lint cleaner; 
(vi) Value addition to by-products (seed cotton 'delinting' to produce quality seed for 
next-year planting season). 
 
The supply of fertilizers, as one of the most crucial task of SOFITEX, to the cotton producers 
consist of two components: 
(i) Acquisition of the fertilizers imported by SOFITEX through competitive 
bidding; 
(ii) The adequate and timely delivery/distribution to the producers. 
Every year SOFITEX prepares tender documents and invites best offers from international 
suppliers through bidding procedures and order the required volume on the basis of cotton 
growing forecast made by the GPCs channelled to the UNPCB. For the payment to the fertilizer 
suppliers, request for financing is generally made by SOFITEX to the local pool of bankers, 
and foreign banks. The physical distribution to the producers is actually undertaken through the 
organized structure of the GPCs (provincial, district, regional levels), under the close 
monitoring of UNPCB. It is delivered to them on a deferred payment basis (known as input 
credit). This activity also involves a local commercial bank which is a major player in the 
sector. It acts as an important intermediary between SOFITEX and the farmers for the 
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 In addition to the monitoring of the cotton sector through its mediation on the MOU signed between the producers and the 
ginners, for fixing of the minimum guaranteed price of see cotton.  
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management of the input credit, and ensures a smooth repayment of the fertilizers through 
direct deduction from the sales proceeds of cotton seed to SOFITEX. The local bank works 
with the GPCs as the latter provides joint and several guarantees on behalf of all its members, 
as information provided by ITFC.  
3.7.2.2 Sofitex production capacity 
SOFITEX is Burkina’s largest ginning company, by the size of its industrial set-up, the 
equipment and the workforce (1,660 permanent staff and 2,400 seasonal workers). 
Compared to 1995, SOFITEX ginning capacity has nearly doubled from 2,500 to 4,500 
tons of seed cotton daily in 2008. During that same period, the number of units increased 
from nine in 1996 to 15 in 2005 (including the two delinting facilities), despite that two 
ginning units have been sold to the private sector in September 2004. The acquisition of 
these two ‘delinting’ units (the first one set up in March 1996) enabled the company to be 
the first highly integrated cotton company in all West Africa. These two units allow the 
company to sort, process part of the seed cotton, in such a way to remove all residual 
fibres and add a chemical coating that gives germination success exceeding 90%. The 
seed may be more expensive but a subsidy is received from the government and, without 
this process, it may take up to five cotton seeds for one to germinate and produce a plant.   
The SOFITEX is equipped with a state-of–the-art post-harvest quality control laboratory 
and grading centre.
73
 Its laboratory undertakes detailed analysis on 40 per cent of all 
sample cotton from each cotton bale produced. The SOFITEX laboratory works in close 
coordination with the national research institute for sharing data and other information, 
towards production of higher productivity seed varieties, improving the planting 
techniques and better protection of the cotton plants against parasitic attacks. The 
findings are then channelled to the farmers through training and workshops organized at 
GPC levels jointly by SOFITEX and the Research Institute. SOFITEX agronomists and 
agents are also well present in the fields to provide the necessary technical advice. Lastly, 
the Laboratory is currently under process to be certified at the highest level for the ISO 
17025 norms. This is a strong recognition of SOFITEX ability to produce quality cotton 
                                                 
73 This facility is considered to be the 3rd best in the world, behind the US and Greece. 
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consistently and improving the seed varieties that have the properties of having a higher 
yield ratio, producing longer fibre and being further resistant to parasites. 
3.7.2.3 Financial analysis of Sofitex 
SOFITEX is currently the only company in Burkina Faso which places the reporting of its 
activities and financial positions at a higher level of transparency. Management annually 
reports two (2) sets of statements of its operating and financial activities to its 
shareholders. The first set of audited financials at the end of December of every year is 
mandatory as required by the Organization for the Harmonization of Commercial Laws in 
member countries of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (ODAHA). The 
following set of audited financial reports as of the end of December of each year, relates 
to the cotton campaign cycle over a twelve- (12) month period. The review provided 
below analyses the company’s financial performance over a period spanning from 2005 
to 2008. The financial statements provided by the company were audited by the Abidjan 
(Cote d’Ivoire) office of Price Waterhouse Coopers SA (PWC SA). The auditors have 
given an unqualified/clean opinion for each fiscal year presented, in strict compliance 
with International Accounting Standards and ODAHA’s principles. The key indicators of 
financial performance are outlined and summarized below from detailed reports audited 
by PWC SA. SOFITEX has also been evaluated and granted a rating of BB+ base for its 
central role in the country economy and the strategic and continuous support of the 
Government of Burkina Faso. 
Table 22: Table 3.7: Sales & profitability Indicators 
  12/31/2005 12/31/2006 12/31/2007 12/31/2008 
Net Sales (US $ 000s) 354.03 339.72 356.38 301.61 
GP Margin % 10.99 15.7 11.32 14.88 
SG & A (% of Sales) 21.9 21.19 21.88 21.93 
Financial Charges( % of Sales) 5.08 6.48 4.73 6.38 
Net Profits ($ Mn) -54.84 -39.4 -51.31 -24.58 
Net Margin % -15.49 -11.6 -14.4 -8.15 
Source: SOFITEX 
As can be seen in Table 3.7, SOFITEX may not appear as success, but its significant role 
as organizer of the important cotton sector for the country and as provider of agricultural 
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input to farmers cannot be ignored. Besides, cotton ginning investment has no alternative 
use and abandoning would cost the loss of invested resources. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) 
indicate that when investment expenditures are firm and industry specific, they are sunk 
cost and irreversible. That is, once infrastructure built, ginning facility in case of 
SOFITEX, it would have little salvage value. One of the main reasons for unfavourable 
financials of the SOFITEX is unfavourable prices. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) also note the 
concept of ‘economic hysteresis’ whereby investment decision would not reverse itself 
even if with fully reversed underlying causes. Accordingly, the firms would not exit 
immediately upon prices falling under long-run average cost, but there would be an area 
of probability for the lower threshold to be exceeded for exit. They also argue that such 
advance thinking undermines the standard neoclassical investment models’ theoretical 
foundations.      
The sales have decreased steadily over the period, with a major drop in 2008 from US 
$356.38 million in 2007 to 302.61 in 2008. This negative trend is the impact of two major 
drawbacks:  
(i) falling US dollar exchange rate against the Euro and ultimately to the CFA Franc as 
the commodity currency; and  
(ii) the severe drop of world cotton prices. The effects of the falling US dollar have 
increased the costs of exporting goods from landlocked countries such as Burkina Faso 
relatively. Exchange rates fluctuations affect not only the price of cotton ready for export, 
but also the cost of shipping and related charges. Cotton prices have been decreasing 
since 2004 due to many reasons, topped by cotton subsidies programs of developed 
countries, and China’s stock policy, which had the effect of boosting world prices from 
1992 to 1998 through massive purchases to build up its stockpiles; and to subsequently 
depress them from 1998 via release of surpluses. Gross profit margins increased by 
approximately 3.5 percentage points from 2007 to 2008 as direct improvement in cotton 
prices in 2008.  The company’s Net Losses reduced from US ($51.31) million in 2007 to 
US ($24.58) million in 2008, corresponding to an increase in Net Margin from -0.14% in 
2007 to -0.08% in 2008. The change in these figures comes primarily from increase in 
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cotton prices. This improvement is also a result of better productivity at ginning level 
through production of higher fibre quality fetching a better premium on sales and 
improvements in productivity are highlighted by the decrease in SG&A charges. The 
company has made some improvements in cost reduction, as evidenced by lower 
financial charges in proportion to Net Sales in 2008. 
Table 23: Table 3.8: Liquidity and Working Capital indicators  
  31/12/05 31/12/06 31/12/07 31/12/08 
Current Ratio 0.89 0.79 0.93 0.74 
Quick Ratio 0.19 0.27 0.3 0.21 
Days Receivable 41 88 56 52 
Days Inventory 176 212 142 126 
Days Payable 164 217 162 139 
Cash Conversion Cycle 53 83 36 39 
Source: SOFITEX 
 
As briefed in Table 3.8, during the period under review, the liquidity position of 
SOFITEX is considered satisfactory for the industry standards. It is a reflection of the 
seasonal nature of its activity. Inventory is built up towards the end of the fiscal year, 
as seed cotton is being purchased and delivered to the ginning mills. At year end 
2008, inventories represent 30% of the company’s current assets (raw materials and 
finished products). Considering this seasonal aspect of the industry, and noting that 
the company’s inventory is readily saleable, a current ratio of 0.74 in 2008 provides 
confidence in SOFITEX’s ability to meet its short-term financial obligations. The 
company's day receivables decreased from 88 days in 2006 to 52 days in 2008.  This 
drop is an indication of the company’s commitment to recovery of the payments due 
from buyers. In general, SOFITEX terms of sale do not exceed 45 days as 
benchmark. The length in the collection of accounts receivables is due to delays in 
loading instructions from off-takers given the changes in the cotton market. The day’s 
inventory is high, but in line with the market benchmarks, as would be the case in a 
similar industry with a long business cycle. In 2008, this ratio has significantly 
improved at 126 days, compared to 142 days in 2007. This fact again, highlights 
improvement in the SOFITEX management system in achieving efficiencies in the 
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cotton production cycle. SOFITEX’s Days Payable ratio decreased from 162 in 2007 
to 139 days in 2008. Even though the improvement is relatively a long period for 
settling current obligations, this is attributable to an increase in stocks of seeds 
purchased on credit from suppliers, but not used due to late absence of rainfall, which 
inevitably limits cultivable areas. The cash conversion cycle has been satisfactory ad 
has improved from 83 days in 2006 to 39 days in 2008, reflecting management’s 
improved practices of achieving efficiencies. 
Table 24: Table 3.9: Cash Flow Analysis 
  31/12/05 31/12/06 31/12/07 31/12/08 
Gross Operational 
Cash Generated ($41.11) Mn ($27.04) Mn ($39.01) Mn ($11.27) Mn 
Net Cash Flow ($129.14) Mn $2.04 Mn $1.25 Mn ($8.30) Mn 
Fin. Charges Coverage 
(x) -1.95 -0.71 -1.94 -0.2 
Source: SOFITEX 
The Cash flow performance has been erratic over the period under review as shown in Table 
3.9, but has shown little improvement in 2008, with Net Operating Cash Flow decreasing 
from US $1.25 million in 2007 to US ($ 8.30) million in 2008. Gross Operating Cash 
Generated has been decreasing over the period with signs of recovery from US ($39.01) 
million in 2007 to US ($ 11.27) million in 2008. These figures are offset by a positive 
change in both Net Receivables and Inventories from 2007 to 2008, reflecting a delay in 
loading instructions from off-takers.  
SOFITEX long-term debt drops from US$ 106.06 million in 2007 to US$89.90 million in 
2008 as a direct consequence of retirement majors to Banks in 2008. The company’s long- 
term debt comprises mainly consolidated short-term debt over five years, and a bond loan for 
the building of two new ginning mills (Leo and Bondoukuy), which has been operational 
now since the 2008/2009 season. These weak results out of financial analysis clearly make 
SOFITEX out of regular lending client for any banks. Obviously, there needs to be a creative 
way, through tight control of business transactions, to sustain this important business for the 
country. It is obvious that with the above-mentioned financial highlights and paid-up capital 
of about Euro 50 million, there is not way of extending Euro 60 million financing to 
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SOFITEX with clean lending. That is, introduction of structured trade finance is much 
needed in order for financiers to engage.  
3.7.2.4 Strengths 
The success of the Burkina Faso cotton industry in recent years is a combination of strong 
willingness of SOFITEX and the cotton producers to work together and the 
implementation of solid mechanisms of follow-up and transparency at every stage of 
activity in the cotton industry. The strengths of SOFITEX and the sector are mainly 
characterized by: 
(i) As information provided by SOFITEX, Strong donor supports to SOFITEX, the 
cotton sector and the country as materialized through: 
a) EU grant of Euro 10 million to the Union National des Producteurs de Coton 
Burkinabè, which owns 30% of SOFITEX, to help recapitalize the company, 
b) The African Development Bank (AfDB) grant in the amount of US $ 60 
million over a five–year period to build up the textile industries in Burkina 
Faso, Benin, Chad and Mali, 
c) A credit line in favour of SOFITEX, worth Euro 65 million ($ 95 million) 
from a consortium of French and German Banks to finance cotton ginning and 
the purchase of inputs was approved for the 2007/08 season.   
(ii) A strong shareholding structure (including the state and the producers); 
(iii) A common involvement of the company and the producers towards achieving the 
same objectives. The producers feel wholeheartedly to be part of the SOFITEX; 
(iv) A unique network and well-organized structure of producers at every level; 
(v) A better mechanism for mitigating the world cotton price volatility through the 
creation of an indemnity fund; 
(vi) A world-class quality control and grading centre, that give a consistent high quality 
of cotton; 
(vii) Availability of 'delinting facilities ' to improve the productivity of seed cotton used 
for planting purpose; 
(viii) The close collaboration of the company with the cotton research institute, which is 
itself partly sponsored by the former, is a unique example in West Africa. 
128 
 
(ix) Modern and up-to-date ginning equipment that enables a high ginning out-turn 
exceeding 42.8% in 2008/09. 
(x) SOFITEX robust management procedures and production control parameters 
enable it to be the most competitive in the region with the lowest production cost 
per tons of fibre exported. 
3.7.2.5 Weaknesses 
Despite the numerous satisfactions of the Burkina Faso cotton sector improvements and 
the good performance recorded in recent years, there are still obstacles that may constrain 
the productivity and the return of the industry. These are: 
(i) The volatility of the world cotton prices, currently at a low level is characterized 
by the strong subsidies given by the US Federal Government to its cotton farmers. 
These annual subsidies amount to US$ 3.6 billion. Under the WTO ministerial 
decision in Hong Kong (December 2005), all forms of export subsidies for cotton 
were to be eliminated by developed countries by 2006. In addition, it is agreed 
that trade-distorting domestic subsidies for cotton production will be more quickly 
and ambitiously reduced than the general formula to be agreed. Unfortunately, the 
recent Geneva talks between WTO cotton-trading countries failed to deliver the 
expected results on the matter;  
(ii) The increasing price of inputs imported; 
(iii) The high price of energy; 
(iv) The low level of mechanization among the cotton farmers; 
(v) Insufficient storage infrastructures at the village level; 
(vi) High cost of maintenance of rural roads to pick up cotton seed; 
(vii) The isolation of Burkina Faso as a landlocked country, making it costly to export; 
(viii) Its dependency on the neighbouring countries such as Ivory Coast, for transit 
passage of its cotton to seaports, making it vulnerable to external political 
instability and security concern. The present situation in Ivory Coast for the last 
five years had led SOFITEX to divert traffic away from the port of Abidjan. 
3.8 STRUCTURING OF THE FACILITY 
Given the high risk in post-harvest activities, conventional financiers are not willing to 
provide financing until cotton fibre reaches a safe port. As for Islamic finance, there is a 
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room to mitigate risks of farmers and ginners, SOFITEX, as well as financiers while 
stimulating cotton production in the country.    
Without any financing facility, farmers face essentially two risks namely, production 
(crop) risk and late payment risk. The biggest risk for producers is the risk of late 
payment for their crop, which also gives rise to the storage cost risk. Proposed cotton 
financing facility aims to address this specific non-payment risk by structuring the 
transaction in such a way that a payment is made upfront at the ginning level to the 
farmers. Hence, they are assured the reward of their efforts.   
SOFITEX, in the present structure of the cotton sector in Burkina Faso, is de facto credit 
guarantor during the period of production starting with the opening of the letter of credit 
for importing inputs, such as fertilizers, to the end of payments by off-takers. That is, its 
involvement extends from pre-harvest to post-harvest period. The financial risk is high, 
since inputs financing during pre-harvest period and crop financing during post-harvest 
period extend over two and a half years. The input recovery risk is low thanks to the 
linkage between input supply and seed cotton marketing and to the farmers’ joint liability 
through agricultural cooperatives in Burkina Faso. However, most of the risks for the 
ginners, SOFITEX, lie on the buying of the seed cotton from the farmers as post-harvest 
activity.   
On the selling side of the fibre bales to the off-takers, ginners offset the exchange rate 
risk by pricing their cotton in Euros. The counterpart risk is low and the contract 
performance risk is moderate to low because off-takers are selected among longstanding 
established players. Defaults of off-takers and delayed shipments increase when prices 
drop from the contract date to the shipment date. Ginners seldom apply carrying charges 
to late shipments, and storage costs are not factored into the contract for late shipment.  
As intimated, this section aims to show a creative way to fulfil financing needs of entities 
involved in post-harvest seed cotton processing activities while mitigating inherent risks 
by Islamic Structured Trade Finance design from the case of SOFITEX to facilitate 
production, ginning, transportation and warehousing at seaports, and shipping processes 
with the hope to pioneer literature in the area. In the real-life case presented herein, there 
130 
 
are two contracts: First contract is the mudarabah contract between mudarab and rabb al 
mal to delegate authority for undertakings of this financing operation. Second contract is 
a murabahah contract between mudarab and the beneficiary by which mudarab purchase 
cotton fibre from cotton producers and sell it to the beneficiary by a predetermined mark-
up.  
3.8.1 Security Structure for Financiers 
Though the financing profession requires financiers to assume some risk, in order to 
decrease financial stress on their beneficiary, they also need to mitigate their risk. Below 
are some remedies for mitigating the risk of financiers in this specific structure.  
 
(i) Letter of Comfort from the Government of Burkina Faso, as per model provided by 
mudarab, to be provided. 
(ii) Pledge to mudarab of the export contracts with pre-approved off-takers from the 
financed cotton campaign, for a global amount equivalent to 110 per cent of the 
financing to be provided. 
(iii) Pledge of the nominated Debt Service Account (Escrow account) opened with an 
acceptable bank, whereby all amounts from the pledged exports will be credited and 
used exclusively for the repayment of the facility to be provided. 
(iv) A pledge of the physical cotton for a value equivalent to 115% of the facility 
amount produced from the financed cotton campaign, by way of warehouse Receipt 
issued by a Collateral Management Company acceptable to financiers, on a volume 
of cotton fibre equivalent to the financing remaining to be repaid.  
(v) The primary source of repayment is to be the assignment of the part of the export 
receivables arising from the financed cotton harvest, to be credited to the nominated 
debt service account (Escrow account) opened with a bank acceptable to mudarab 
out of Burkina Faso. This assignment will be made on the basis of a mechanism to 
be agreed between the mudarab and the Beneficiary, following the export calendar 
of cotton fibre to be communicated by the Beneficiary. 
 
It should be noted that in this structuring Escrow Account would mitigate the foreign 
exchange and county risk for financiers. Warehouse receipt would guarantee the 
physical control of the commodity to financiers while the export contract would assure 
timely repayment of the financing facility. In the following section, implementation 
schedule is provided with more comprehensive understanding of the security package 
for financiers.  
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3.8.2 Security Package and Schedule for Implementation 
Prior to the declaration of effectiveness, a collection account (Escrow Account) 
denominated in Euro/US$ in the name of the mudarab or its agent is opened with a bank 
acceptable to mudarab. This account will be pledged to the mudarab (if not in the 
mudarab name) and through which part of the export receivables will be channelled, to 
be used as a source of repayment to participating financial entities. Table 3.10 shows the 
time of activities and their owners, spanning from Quarter 2 of the “Year (t)” to Quarter 3 
of “Year (t+1)”. 
Table 25: Table 3.10:  Schedule of Cotton-Financing Cycle     
Operation Q 2–(t) Q 3–(t) Q 4–(t) Q 1–(t+1) Q 2– (t+1) Q 3– (t+1) 
Distribution of inputs to farmers 
(SOFITEX) 
   
 
    
Sowing of seeds (FARMERS)          
Rainy season        
Harvest (FARMERS)        
Collection (Cooperatives)        
Disbursement of facility  
(FINANCIERS) 
       
Ginning (SOFITEX)       
Export (SOFITEX)         
Export proceed (OFF-TAKERS)       
Source: International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation of Islamic Development Bank Group 
In coordination with the Beneficiary, SOFITEX, a bank/agent will be nominated by the 
mudarab as Facility Agent to perform the tasks, on behalf of the mudarab and all 
participants to receive and perform reasonable checks on the following documents for 
authenticity, accuracy, relevancy, etc. as submitted to them, for verification of:  
(i)  The list of pre-approved off-takers; 
(ii)  Sales contracts amounting to at least 110% of financing amount; 
(iii)  Takaful policies (loss payee clause);  
(iv) The Pledge duly notified to all off-takers; 
(v)  Off-takers confirmation for receipt and duly acceptance of the written notification to 
pay in Escrow Account. 
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A pre-approved list of off-takers is agreed with the mudarab. These are selected 
according to their reputation and longstanding business relationship with SOFITEX and 
the other ginners (in terms of size of turnover, consistency and mode of payment). As 
early as September of year (t), export contracts will be signed with the selected off-takers. 
These export contracts will be assigned to the mudarab for an aggregate value 
representing 110% of the disbursement amount. Off-takers acknowledge assignments of 
sales contracts and accepts to domicile payment to the nominated Escrow Account or 
commonly known also as the Collection A/C (Through the Notice of Assignment 
forwarded by the Facility Agent). 
A CMMC (Collateral Management & Monitoring Contract) shall be signed in September 
but not later than October of year (t) between SOFITEX and the mudarab of rabb al mal 
and a reputable Collateral and Monitoring Manager. SOFITEX arranges and renews an 
all-risk comprehensive storage and transport takaful with a first class takaful company (or 
consortium of insurers) with specific clause for the mudarab as loss-payee before the 
disbursement of the facility. 
After collection of cotton by GPCs from farmers, the mudarab enters into a murabahah 
agreement with SOFITEX by which the mudarab buys cotton fibre from GPCs upfront 
and sells it to SOFITEX on a deferred base with a mark-up at the time of exports.
74
 The 
facility is disbursed to the Beneficiary according to tranches based on a call option as 
follows:   
 
(i) Tranche 1 – At the ginning level 
  Price   Average*Cotton    Seed of Quantity  *Outturn    Ginning *%75 . 
(ii) Tranche 2 – Upon shipment of cotton fiber 
85%    1  Tranche Disb. - FibreCotton  ofQuantity   * Price Effective          
or 
85%    1  Tranche Disb. - FibreCotton  ofQuantity   * Price Average  
                                                 
74
 SOFITEX act as agent of the Mudarab in Murabaha Agreement 
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where : 
Ginning Outturn stands for Ginning average rate of 0.42 (42%) into fibre; 
Quantity of Seed Cotton stands for Quantity of Seed Cotton delivered at the ginning 
mills; 
Average cotton price stands for the lowest average price of the cotton market prices or 
the average cotton market of the export contracts; 
Effective Price stands for the price stated on sales contracts pledged to the mudarab 
signed between SOFITEX and pre-approved off-takers; 
Quantity of Cotton Fibre stands for Quantity of Cotton Fibre delivered after the ginning 
process; 
The basic idea with the tranches is that the financing amount shall remain less then the 
market value of the commodity at hand in Ginning Warehouse (Seed Cotton) and Port 
Warehouse (Cotton Fibre Bale). That is, the mudarab disburses the financing facility 
based on the market value of seed cotton and cotton fibre bale in the warehouses.  
SOFITEX will get seed cotton from GPCs as an agent of the mudarab to its ginning mills 
under the supervision of Collateral Monitoring Manager (CMM), as designated. 
SOFITEX gins the seed cotton, packed into bales, graded and stored, placed under the 
custody of the nominated CMM at the premises of SOFITEX and/or ready to be sent by 
trucks to the terminal warehouse at the ports of export. Every time that the CM 
acknowledge receipt of cotton bales, the latter issues a Warehouse Receipt (WR). Control 
over the physical cotton is maintained through the WRs. When the time for executing 
corresponding exports (as per the list of contracts pledged to the mudarab) approaches, 
the cotton fibre bales are stuffed in containers. The Freight Forwarder under the 
supervision of the CMM prepares the export documentation as per the normal business 
practice. The necessary application is submitted to the Facility Agent, which undertakes 
the due diligence, as per security package.  
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After each shipment, Freight Forwarder hands over the shipping documents to the 
Facility Agent for checking and verification purposes, before submission, alongside the 
collection order to the collecting banks for negotiation and payment by the off-takers.  
Payment shall be received in the nominated Escrow Account. The amount in the Escrow 
Account and/or the utility proceeds assigned to the mudarab in the Escrow Account shall 
be kept committed as long as there remains any due amount.  Any excess funds thereafter 
held in the Escrow Account may be drawn by the Beneficiary. In the event that the 
mudarab does not receive on the due maturity date any sum due under the Facility, then 
the Beneficiary shall pay (on first demand) the sum (or any shortfall therein) due to the 
mudarab (including any costs or expenses) together with further penalty to be levied on 
behalf of rabb al mal. The details of export cash flow are schematically provided as in 
Appendix III. 
3.8.3 Collateral Management 
The Collateral Management Company has a pivotal role in all this transaction process. 
Hence, the following Collateral Management System is again explained for the 
clarification on its role in the structure.  
A reputable CMM capable of field warehousing at the ginning mills and shipping 
services in every West Africa ports and experience in cotton collateral activities needs to 
be appointed. A CMMC (Collateral Management and Monitoring Contract) is signed 
immediately between SOFITEX, the mudarab, and the CMM, which will be in charge, 
amongst others, mainly of the following tasks: 
(i) Monitoring of truck arrival with seed cotton at ginning mills; 
(ii) Oversee the weighting of the truck at the weighbridge of the factory; 
(iii) Oversee the issuance of the weighting ticket for each truck load at each ginning 
mill for seed cotton; 
(iv) Oversee the ginning process; 
(v) Review of documents prior to submission to Facility Agent for disbursement; 
135 
 
(vi) Provision of a storage certificate for  fibre production indicating the quality, the 
quantity and the weight of the cotton bales produced (to be converted to 
warehouse receipt); 
(vii) Reconciliation of the quantities exit from the factories to those received in the 
harbour warehouse stores. 
The nominated CMM will start monitoring the ginning process and cotton production and 
packaging into bales, on arrival of seed cotton at the mills. The cotton bales are to be 
placed under the custody of the nominated CMM at the premises of SOFITEX, the 
ginner, and in the CMM-leased warehouses at the ports of export. The mudarab is to be 
ranked first as far as pledge of the cotton stock is concerned.  The CMM will provide a 
‘Professional Indemnity Takaful’ that will cover against the risk associated with 
losses/deterioration or decrease in value of the collateral, in its custody or expenses 
incurred, arising out of negligence, default and wilful misconduct, etc. by itself and its 
employees in the performance of the CMMA. 
Every time that the CMM acknowledges receipt of cotton bales, it issues WR. Control 
over the physical cotton is maintained by way of the WRs. These WRs are pledged to the 
mudarab on account of all participants, issued in the name of SOFITEX, acting for and 
on behalf of the mudarab. The mudarab is to be entitled to receive WR for a quantity of 
cotton equivalent in value to the tonnage at the average price, stipulated in the export 
contracts signed with pre-approved off-takers. At any point in time, the value of the WRs 
should be higher than the outstanding amount due. CMM should also determine the 
number of good and damaged bales prior to issuance of WRs. 
Cotton bales are stored at the premises of SOFITEX at different locations and 
progressively sent to the nominated ports by trucks or for transit storage prior to 
shipment. Each time there is transfer, CMM should issue bales transfer and delivery 
notice statements. Upon arrival at port, CMM will reconcile quantities shipped from the 
factories to those received in the harbour (terminal) warehouse stores. 
SOFITEX may request authorization from the Facility Agent of the mudarab to release 
for shipment, upon either: 
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(i) Remittance of the appropriately worded L/Cs from the pre-approved off-
takers, checked by the mudarab’s nominated Facility Agent for conformity;   
or 
(ii) Against formal instructions (with copy to the Facility Agent) giving details on 
quantity, price, loading, shipping line and destination, from the pre-approved 
off-takers to ship the good to final destination, under Documentary Collection. 
Under this arrangement, the Facility Agent will be acting as Remitting Bank 
for presentation of shipping documents along with Collection Order to the 
Collecting Bank to receive payment and release of documents. 
After each shipment, the CMM presents the documents to the Facility Agent for checking 
and verification purposes, before submission to the banks of the off-takers for negotiation 
and payment. 
As mentioned earlier, payment will be received in the nominated Escrow Account. 
Besides, any WRs remained in the custody of the Facility Agent, after full repayment will 
be surrendered to SOFITEX/other ginners, after endorsement. Any balance remaining in 
the nominated Escrow Account, after full repayment of all amount due, shall be 
transferred to the account designated by SOFITEX. 
3.9 EVALUATION OF THE STRUCTURE 
Much of the benefit from the perspective of the Beneficiary, SOFITEX, is lost through 
having to pay money up front into an Escrow Account. The whole amount of export 
receivables remains in an account, albeit SOFITEX may receive interest revenue, until 
full repayment of the facility. The current structure may be revised as follows: when the 
farmers bring their seed cotton for ginning, ginners process this seed cotton to cotton 
fibre and the mudarab, on behalf of rabb al mal, purchases the cotton fibre. Let’s assume 
the mudarab on behalf of rabb al mal purchased 70,000,000 kg of cotton fibre, it will 
only buy for 85% of the prevailing cotton fibre value, and the prevailing market price for 
cotton fibre is 1 Euro. The mudarab on behalf of rabb al mal purchases 70,000,000 kg of 
cotton fibre for 70,000,000*1*0.85= Euro 59,500,000. After processing of seed cotton, 
the mudarab on behalf of rabb al mal, has the ownership of 70,000,000 kg of cotton 
fibre. Let’s assume three months after the purchase of seed cotton, the Beneficiary of the 
financing wants to sell 20,000,000 kg of cotton fibre. The mudarab on behalf of rabb al 
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mall sells this amount for 20,000,000*0.85 (purchase price for 3 month back)*(1+0.07/4) 
= Euro 17,297,500 to the Beneficiary. Note that 0.07 is assumed to be predetermined 
mark-up per annum for illustration purposes. Each time of the sale, only this part of the 
export receivable shall be asked to be transferred to the escrow account. And, any profit 
of the Beneficiary, from increased cotton fibre prices and profit margin of export sales, 
remains in its account.   
 As a matter of fact, the existing murabahah structure is not a perfect fit. Salam would be 
much more suitable for this kind of operation. If we divide the cotton production as pre-
harvest and post-harvest, the structure designed herein is targeted to finance post-harvest 
activities through a straightforward murabahah financing. However, there is a huge 
potential of poverty alleviation through pre-harvest financing. Accordingly, to be more 
effective, the financing ought to be provided at the beginning of the cycle in the pre-
harvest period during the procurement of fertilizer, pesticides, urea, seed, etc. as input 
financing. This would assure the timely delivery of input to farmers and the start of the 
production cycle. A mudarab could get into a salam contract with the cooperative, GPCs, 
or the ginner as per the mechanism as follows. The necessary inputs are pre-ordered with 
input providers, and distributed according to the cotton crop agenda. Distribution shall be 
through cooperatives, GPCs, which have the responsibility for distributing them to 
farmers. CMM (under a collateral management agreement) oversees the stocks of inputs 
at the level of the gins and the cooperatives, and monitors the whole process of 
distribution, tallying and weighing the actual movements of inputs from the input 
providers to the farmers. The principle is that individual farmers have to pay, through 
deduction from the proceeds of their seed cotton sales after harvest, for the inputs that 
they have received. Farmers deliver their seed cotton to their cooperative, and receive a 
delivery ticket acknowledging delivery. This delivery ticket is matched with the earlier 
input deliveries, enabling a correct deduction of input costs. The cooperatives deliver the 
seed cotton to the cotton gins, where it enters into warehouses controlled by CMM, 
which, at this stage, issues warehouse receipts for the seed cotton in cotton fibre 
equivalent terms, based on each gin’s processing ratio. Based on this, the mudarab gets 
the ownership of seed cotton.  
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At the next step the mudarab can choose between istisna, Islamic manufacturing contract, 
and musharakah, Islamic joint-venture, finance. Istisna may not fit this kind of short-term 
transaction. In any case, pre-harvest financing would decrease the financing burden of 2.5 
year on the ginning company, SOFITEX, and the public sector while assuring valuable 
foreign exchange earnings for the country. For illustration purposes, simplified price 
calculation for salam agreement is provided as below in Table 3.11.  
Table 26: Table 3.11: Salam Price Calculation 
 
Question: How to define price in Salam contract for Structured Cotton Trade Financing?  
 
Assumption: Pre-determined mark-up is 7 % per annum. 
 
Time March 1, 2010 December 1, 2010 February 1, 2011 March 1, 2011 
Point for 
Scenarios 
Time-1 Time-2 Time-3 Time-4 
Cotton Fiber 
price per Kg 
1 Euro 0.9 Euro 1.2 Euro 1.3 Euro 
Cotton Fiber 
price per tons 
1000 Euro 900 Euro 1200 Euro 1300 Euro 
 
First Scenario:  
 
Time-1   
MUDARAB disburses Euro 10 million, by which MUDARAB can buy 10,000 tons of cotton fibre at current 
price of 1 Euro/Kg from the market. The cooperative or ginner agrees to provide 30,000 tons of cotton fibre 
in December 1, 2010 under salam contract for the disbursement amount. 
 
Time-2  
MUDARAB assumes pledge of 30,000 tons of cotton fibre in warehouses monitored by CMMC.  
 
 
Time-3 
The ginner asks for the release of 20,000 tons of cotton fibre. MUDARAB receives only the following 
amount in an escrow account to release the cotton fibre (MUDARAB sales the cotton fiber of 20,000 tons 
for):  
 
(10,000/30,000)*20,000*1,000 Euro*(1+(0.07*(11/12)))= 
6666.667*1,000 Euro*1.064167= 7,094,444 Euro 
 
Mark-up= 7,094,444-6,666,667 
Mark-up= 427,777 Euro 
 
Time-4  
The ginner asks for the release of 10,000 tons of cotton fiber. MUDARAB receives only the following 
amount in an escrow account to release the cotton fibre (MUDARAB sales the cotton fibre of 10,000 tons 
for):  
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(10,000/30,000)*10,000*1,000 Euro*(1.07)= 
3333.333*1,000 Euro*1.07= 7,094,444 Euro= 3,566,667 Euro 
 
Mark-up= 3,566,667 - 3,333,333 
Mark-up= 233,333 Euro 
 
Total mark-up for the first scenario= 427,777 + 233,333 = 661,111 Euro  
 
 
Second Scenario:  
 
Time-4  
The ginner asks for the release of 30,000 tons of cotton fibre. MUDARAB receives the following amount in 
an escrow account to release the cotton fibre (MUDARAB sales the cotton fibre of 30,000 tons for):  
 
(10,000/30,000)*30,000*1,000 Euro*(1.07)= 
10,000*1,000 Euro*1.07= 10,700,000 Euro 
 
 
On March 1, 2010 Euro 10,000,000 disbursed and a year later amount repaid back with Euro 700,000 
mark-up 
 
Total mark-up for the second scenario= 700,000 Euro 
 
Source: The author 
While evaluating the post-harvest murabahah financing alone or extended salam pre-
harvest financing followed by musharakah post-harvest financing, the single most 
important issue remains as ensuring the full control of quality commodity. Hence, takaful 
during storage from a reputable takaful company is essential. However, CMM’s role as 
quality and quantity assurer turns out to be as important as takaful of commodity in 
warehouses. Any misconduct or default by CMM would destroy all this structure. Hence, 
the mudarab needs to mitigate the risk transferred to CMM by requiring CMM to provide 
Professional Indemnity takaful, again, from a reputable takaful company. Under 
necessary takaful coverage and structure designed herein, by which most of the risk 
transferred to the parties able to handle those risks, some other ‘Islamic Structured Trade 
Finance’ deals can be successfully conducted as a tool to alleviate poverty and make this 
sustainable through the assurance of timely repayment of financing amount back to credit 
providers.       
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3.10 RISK ANALYSIS 
After explanation of the facility structure and extended structure for supply chain 
financing it is imperative to have a comprehensive risk analysis to identify possible risk, 
their causes, preventive actions and contingencies. In the process, 11 risk areas are 
identified for risk management. Throughout this section, the exporter or the beneficiary 
refers to SOFITEX Risk and their likely causes are summarized in Table 3.12 for 
commodity risk area.  
Table 27: Table 3.12:  Addressing the Commodity Risk Area     
Risk Areas Risks Likely Causes 
1.Commodity 
Inferior Quality and/or 
Quantity 
1. Inability of Farmers to procure 
fertilizer and insecticides 
2. Low quality seeds planted by 
farmers 
3. Drought, Floods 
Defective title / 
counterfeited titled 
documents 
1. Fraud by Exporter 
2. Cotton stolen 
3. Dispute over ownership of Cotton 
Cotton encumbered 
1. Exporter has lien over Cotton in 
respect of storage/processing 
expenses. 
Source: Designed by the author 
 
Inferior quality risk and its likely causes would be addressed by securing input financing 
through salam contract and SOFITEX supervision on inputs used by farmers. As per 
contingencies:  
- SOFITEX reconciles the Price from the Export Contract price (reverse 
downward) to the intake offered for purchase by the Cooperative; 
- SOFITEX rejects inferior quality; 
- Export Contract makes provision for Force Majeure. 
In the same fashion defective title and counterfeited titled documents would be addressed 
by warranty from Exporter as to his good title, no defects, etc., use of a collateral 
manager to oversee warehouse storage and movements of cotton, and Collateral 
Manager’ request for confirmation of payment from the Exporter to producer or original 
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seller of the Cotton. As a contingency measure the Facility Agent may visit stocks in any 
time. Besides, ‘Professional Indemnity Takaful’ from CMC might be resorted to. As for 
the possible lien by exporter on cotton for storage and processing expenses, following 
mitigants/contingency measures should be put in place:  
(i) Costs are paid by Facility Agent directly for storage and  Processing (No lien of 
Exporter); 
(ii) Warranty from Exporter as to his good title, no defects, etc.; 
(iii) CMMC requests confirmation of payment from SOFITEX to producer or 
original seller of the cotton; 
(iv) Waiver and Consent from Exporter lifting all their rights on the cotton delivered 
against payment. 
 
Second risk area in the proposed structure is associated with storage and transportation as 
outlined in Table 3.13: 
 Table 28: Table 3.13:  Addressing the Cotton Storage and Transport Risk Area  
Risk Areas Risks Likely Causes 
2. Cotton 
Storage& 
Transport 
Loss of Cotton 
1.Lack of controls at Processor/ 
 Cooperative 
2.Incompetent personnel 
3.Collusion between Parties and 
Exporter 
4.Force Majeure 
5.Weight recording incorrect 
6.Quality recording incorrect 
7.CMMC supervision during 
transport Inadequate 
Damage to Cotton so 
Exporter cannot supply it 
to Off-takers 
1.Storage facilities sub standard 
2.Manpower requirements 
inadequate 
3.Theft or Misappropriation 
4.Force Majeure 
Stored Cotton infected/ 
contaminated with 
disease and Facility Agent 
still collects document 
proceeds from 
Off-takers with potential 
subsequent claim for 
damages 
1. Insect infestation. 
2.Negligence of Processor 
/Cooperative 
3.Willful default by Exporter 
Source: Designed by the author 
There are substantial risks associated with loss, damage and contamination in the process 
of storage and transportation of seed cotton. To address the likely cause of these risks 
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reputable transporters and stores would be used. Storage agreements would define 
responsibility of collateral managers, who hold liability takaful, to ensure adequate 
system for document title of ownership in the form of warehouse receipt. Also, the 
facility agent utilizes exclusively approved Processors/Warehouse/Forwarder to minimize 
collateral management and monitoring risk.  As a contingency measure, claim can be 
placed against professional indemnity takaful for misappropriation by collateral 
management company. 
Third risk area is associated with the Beneficiary/Exporter (SOFITEX in the case 
presented herein). There might be closure of ginning miles of the beneficiary due to 
breakdown or repair of machines.   These are identified in Table 3.14. 
Table 29: Table 3.14:  Addressing the Beneficiary/Exporter Risk Area   
Risk Areas Risks Likely Causes 
3.Beneficicary/ 
Exporter 
Non-performance of the 
beneficiary  
Closure of ginning mills due to  
breakdown of machines and repair 
Source: Designed by the author 
As a result, the beneficiary should be long-established as ginner with extensive technical 
expertise. The track record on international markets should be checked. In the case 
specific to this facility, SOFITEX as a beneficieary/exporter has many ginning machines 
in different regions of the of the country so in case of breakdown in one location the 
capacity of ginning machines in other locations can be employed. Still, a letter of comfort 
on capacity of the beneficiary to operate from the government should be arranged.   
There can emerge risk with warehouse/processor not maintaining, storing or processing 
cotton due to change in statutory status, management and standards of storage.  
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Table 30: Table 3.15:  Addressing the Warehouse and Processor Risk Area   
Risk Areas Preventive Action Contingency 
4. 
Warehouse 
&Processor 
a)Due diligence assesses Exporter’s 
abilities and competency 
b)Storage agreement with ‘licensed’ 
Processors/Warehouse/Forwarder states 
that CMMC is holding the pledge (the 
Cotton) in favour of its legal owner 
(Facility Agent) 
c)CMMC of behalf  of Facility Agent 
utilizes exclusively Processors/Warehouse / 
Forwarder to minimize risk that are 
“licensed” and fully controlled by  them 
Claim against 
Professional Indemnity 
Takaful from CMMC 
 
Utilize alternate 
Processor / Storer 
(Facility Agent owns the 
Cotton through 
warehouse receipt) to 
complete transaction 
Source: Designed by the author 
For this risk preventive action and contingency actions are outlined as in Table 3.15. In 
the same fashion, substantial risk of non-payment due to insolvency, economic downturn 
and financial distress by Off-takers exist. In Table 3.16, corresponding preventive and 
contingency actions are outlined for reference.  
Table 31: Table 3.16:  Addressing the Off-takers Risk Area   
Risk Areas Preventive Action Contingency 
5. Credit on 
Off-takers 
a)Facility Agent still owns the cotton and 
can resell it in the trade or tender it on 
commodity exchange 
b)If not satisfying, non-rated Off-takers 
will have to open LCs. 
c)On FOB basis, Bill of Lading and other 
export docs to the order of Facility Agent. 
d)Off-takers cannot lift docs unless paid 
e)Off-takers are pre-approved by 
mudarab 
f)Of-takers are long-established with 
proven records and working relationship 
with the Beneficiary, SOFITEX in this 
case 
Sell balance of cotton in 
open market, as there is a 
very liquid international 
cotton  market 
Source: Designed by the author 
In case preventive actions do not prevent failure of the structure, the mudarab can sell the 
cotton on the open market as the cotton market is liquid and ownership stays with the 
mudarab in this structure.  
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There is a substantial risk associated with sale value of the cotton to be pledged for 
financiers due to drop in demand for cotton in the world market due to oversupply and 
economic downturn. Besides, low quality of cotton pledged would decrease the sale value 
of the cotton pledged.  
Table 32: Table 3.17:  Addressing the Cotton Value (Sales) Risk Area   
Risk Areas Preventive Action Contingency 
6. Cotton 
Value (Sale) 
a)Rights in Forward Sale Agreement 
ceded to Facility Agent. 
b)Facility Agent reconciles price at intake 
from Exporter with Export Contract fixed 
price and quality/quantity congruence 
with export  Contract terms. 
c)Analysis of the Supply/Demand on both 
local and international level at  
commencement of the season. 
 
Export Contract is fixed 
price-based with only 
approved Offtakers. 
Source: Designed by the author 
For this reason as shown in Table 3.17, analysis of Supply/Demand in both local and 
international markets need to be done at the beginning of the season to define safety 
margins on amounts of cotton to be pledged. In case of expected low global demand, 
cotton pledge of up to 150% of the financing facility might be sought. In any case, fixed 
price-based export sale contracts, as they need to be provided to the mudarab before the 
financing, would create enough contingency to sustain certain levels of value for cotton 
to be pledged.  
However, the nature of export sale contracts necessitates supply of certain quality cotton. 
Any bottleneck in providing so would create a serious risk of export transaction as Off-
takers may refuse to honour their obligation due to unfit cotton quality described in 
export sale contracts. This may happen in case of incompetence or fraud by the collateral 
management monitoring company in the process of issuing warehouse receipts by 
overstating the quality of the cotton.     
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Table 33: Table 3.18:  Addressing the Cotton Value (Purchase) Risk Area   
Risk Areas Preventive Action Contingency 
7. Cotton 
Value 
(Purchase) 
a)CMA states duties of CMMC 
b)Facility Agent and CMMC are 
informed of the Export Contract’s Quality 
and Quantity requirement 
c)CMMC involved from intake at factory 
gates – substandard cotton will not be 
taken in on warehouse receipts (WHR i.e. 
“LTD”) by CMMC 
 
Claim against 
Professional Indemnity 
Takaful from CMMC 
Source: Designed by the author 
In case preventive action does not work, a claim can be placed at any time on the 
professional indemnity takaful of the collateral management monitoring company to 
cover possible loss out of substandard cotton admitted to warehouses. As indicated in the 
above preventive action in many risk areas, the role of the facility agent is detrimental in 
this structure. Incompetency of the facility agent in the form of items highlighted in Table 
3.19 may give rise to serious operational risk.  
Table 34: Table 3.19:  Addressing the Facility Agent Risk Area   
Risk Areas Risks Likely Causes 
8. Operational 
(Facility 
Agent) 
1.Fraud/ Misappropriation 
2.Inadequate controls 
3.Statutory 
4.Documentation 
5.Administration 
6.Information Technology 
1.Inadequate internal controls 
2.Breakdown in basic controls 
3.Changes to Act and Regulations 
4.Documentation not legally binding 
5.Administrative burden too big for 
administrative department 
Source: Designed by the author 
It should be noted that serious preventive action in the form of internal and external audit 
of the facility agent, hence, would be crucial after background checks for the internal 
capacity of the facility agent to carry out these serious tasks during the selection process. 
The same process of selection needs to be carried out on the collateral management and 
monitoring company. The capacity of the facility agent and collateral management and 
monitoring company is also an important preventive measure to address risk areas for 
grading, transportation, processing and storage. The components of these risks are 
highlighted in Table 3.20 below.  
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Table 35: Table 3.20:  Addressing the Grading, Transport, Processing and Storage Risk Area  
Risk Areas Risks Likely Causes 
9. Grading, 
Transport, 
Processing, 
Storage 
1.CMMC's graders not 
properly trained 
2.Grading not 100% 
accurate 
3.Loss (Quantity) due to 
Perils 
1.Insufficient training and experience 
2. Spillage 
3. Theft 
4. Accident 
5. Weighbridge errors 
6. Fire and others 
7. Errors and omissions by CMMC 
 
Source: Designed by the author 
Again, professional indemnity takaful of the collateral management and monitoring 
company constitutes a valuable contingency measure.  As a result, takaful risk caused by 
inability of the takaful company to honour its obligations, inadequacy of takaful coverage 
or unidentified risk under takaful policy should be addressed by the preventive actions as 
outlined in Table 3.21. 
Table 36: Table 3.21:  Addressing the Takaful Risk Area   
Risk Areas Preventive Action Contingency 
10. Takaful 
(CMMC  Prof. 
Indemnity and  
cover against 
perils) 
a)CMMC uses exclusively rated 
underwriters 
b)Complete takaful policy for “All Risk” 
plus  misappropriation - with Facility 
Agent as loss payee – within maximum 
warranted value per location and 
occurrence 
c)CMMC Professional Indemnity Cover 
limit within maximum warranted value 
per occurrence 
d)Mudarab’s Legal involvement in 
takaful policy inclusions 
e)Detailed report from Insurer on 
exposure on claims deriving from 
massive events (terrorist attacks, natural 
disasters, etc.) 
Takaful Industry Risk 
Source: Designed by the author 
Regardless of due diligence on takaful policies, industry risk for the takaful sector would 
persist as it is not within the means of financiers to address industry risk of the takaful 
sector. Therefore the risk areas outlined in Table 3.22 should also be addressed.  
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Table 37: Table 3.22:  Addressing the Industry Risk Area   
Risk Areas Risks Likely Causes 
11. Industry 
1 .Production exceeds 
international demand 
2.Statutory taxes increased 
3.World prices decreases 
4.SOFITEX cotton not the 
'preferred choice' product in 
the industry 
5.Protective measures or 
legislation removed by 
Government 
1.Bad marketing of the cotton 
production and change in 
international market lifestyles 
2.Government decision to increase 
its revenue 
3.World population reduces 
consumption 
4.Cheaper landed prices from other 
sources, quality issues on SOFITEX 
cotton 
5.Influence of International traders 
leads Government to leave the 
industry to them 
Source: Designed by the author 
The fixed export contracts (in which quality, quantity, price/premium and delivery terms 
spelled out, with licensed off-takers or secured/approved off-takers’ payment terms 
approved by the facility agent) can prevent any possible losses from industry risk. Fixed 
export contracts assure certain levels of certainty for the future against industry risk.  
3.11 CONCLUSION 
This chapter aimed to show that Islamic finance instruments provide enough room to 
fulfil financing needs in extreme cases as a better alternative to conventional financing 
tools and extend the existing Islamic-structured trade finance structure into a supply chain 
financing. Different Islamic finance instruments need to be evaluated for different cases. 
The real-life case presented here, for example, shows the superiority of salam over 
murabahah for complete supply chain financing starting from the phase of input 
financing for the cotton sector.  
In doing so, we can create benefits to different parties. From the case presented here, 
rabb al mal has excess liquidity but does not have expertise in neither the cotton sector 
nor structured trade finance. With this structure it can place its money into a secure 
financing transaction with a higher yield than regular financing transaction. Mudarab 
exercises its intellectual expertise to structure a safe transaction and attain a mudarab fee. 
The beneficiary gets a partner financing upstream production processes and reduces its 
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financial stress even under unfavourable financial situations as in the case of SOFITEX. 
Farmers get input on time through salam for pre-harvest activities. They immediately 
collect monetary reward for their effort in growing the crop as soon as they distribute 
their crops to the ginner’s warehouse. They would not, hence, wait for 6-8 months to 
receive their money from exports receivables to purchase their basic necessities.  
To conclude, this case study shows how to employ Islamic finance instruments in a 
structured trade finance deal as an alternative to conventional financing. The concept of 
Islamic supply chain financing starting from input financing to post-harvest pre-export 
finance is explained with real-life examples. This goes beyond explaining the existing 
case and proposes salam contract for complete supply chain financing starting from input 
financing and extend to post-harvest financing in order to pioneer literature in the area.  
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Chapter 4 
TWO-STEP MURABAHAH AS AN ALTERNATIVE 
RESOURCE MOBILIZATION TOOL FOR ISLAMIC 
BANKS IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE  
4.1 INRODUCTION 
The question for the Islamic finance industry is now whether to replicate entire 
conventional systems by creating instruments identical in substance through “combining 
a redundant succession of trade and label with an Arabic name” (Moddy, 2008) with the 
objective of form-related compliancy or innovate and streamline new products compliant 
to Shari’ah. As highlighted by Siddiqi (2007), the Islamic finance industry today tends to 
replicate conventional instruments by making it more complicated, while it stands 
vulnerable to the flaws of the conventional system.  
After recent experience with the financial crisis, Islamic finance with focus on tangible 
assets and Shari’ah principles is perceived to have potential to prevent similar sufferings 
caused by the conventional system. However, the perception that Islamic finance is 
‘immune to the excesses of the financial crisis’ is challenged by recent defaults of sukuk, 
which resulted in loss of confidence by investors (Islamic Finance, 2010). 
In a nutshell, Islamic principles cannot buffer bad investment and it should be directed to 
support sustainable economic activities to create more wealth for a human-centred 
economic development. Hence, the recent sukuk defaults urge for alternative resource 
mobilization and liquidity management tools to be harnessed for economic growth while 
serving the needs of Islamic financial institutions.  
Islamic financial institutions very often avoid borrowing from other banks so as to avoid 
any interest transactions which is prohibited in Islam. As it is obvious from its basic 
principles, Islamic law introduces many restrictions on commercial contracts in order to 
ensure justice in the transaction, avoid possible prospective legal disputes, avoid gharar 
(highly risky and uncertain transactions), speculation, gambling and ultimately give rise 
to a stable economic and financial system for society. Traditionally, Islamic banks 
recourse to sukuk and commodity murabahah instruments to mobilize resources. 
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However, recent failures in the sukuk market and common dissatisfaction with tawarruq -
based commodity murabahah urge for development of alternative Islamic resource 
mobilization tools.  
The commodity murabahah, inter-bank deposit/placement instrument, is perceived as 
rather a liquidity management tool as treasurers of Islamic banks to place excess money 
for a return through commodity murabahah. It is resource mobilization for the bank 
raising funds through tawarruq and liquidity management for the bank placing money 
through murabahah sale. The transaction involves buying and selling of metal 
commodities to supposedly provide conformity with Islamic principles. The market is 
dominant by the conventional banks which mobilize resources from Islamic banks 
through tawarruq.  
In the real-life, there are four parties to the transaction namely, an Islamic bank, a 
conventional bank as an agent, and two separate brokers to effect sales of metal 
commodities. The Islamic bank buys commodity from the first broker, through an agency 
of the commercial bank, and sell it to the second broker with a mark-up in deferred 
payment.
75
 This kind of circumventive initiation remind us first of serious challenges of 
usury within Western Christianity, when Hispanus introduced the notion that “although 
usury was prohibited, a lender could charge a fee if his borrower was late in making 
repayment”.76 The result of this verdict gave rise to the legal ploy of Contractum Trinius. 
As the name reveals it is a three party contract by which a lender would engage in a 
profit/loss sharing deal with a merchant, get insurance against any loss and return any 
profit above pre-specified amount back to the merchant. After this first hole in the wall, 
interest-bearing loans had become legal in many countries within the Christian world. 
The experience of Western Christianity might urge Islamic bankers to curb their greed 
and vigilantly present responsible attitudes in this regard. Besides, an organized tawarruq 
arrangement somehow recalls recent financial scams. Case Box I related to Enron is 
provided to show resemblance in circumventing regulatory frameworks with a hidden 
agenda. 
                                                 
75 Bahrain Monetary Agency, Islamic Banking and Finance in the Kingdom of Bahrain, Bahrain Monetary Agency, 2002, p.30. 
76 Information on Vincentius Hispanus, http://faculty.cua/edu/Pennington/1440i-p.htm 
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Case Box I: Enron, J. P. Morgan, and Offshore Special Purpose Vehicle 
When Enron declared bankruptcy on December 2, 2001, J.P. Morgan Chase Bank had $965 million in 
losses from payments due on oil and gas contracts with Enron. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank thought the 
contracts were hedged with surety bonds. The surety bonds were advance payment bonds that guaranteed 
Enron’s credit risk on pre-paid oil and gas forward delivery contracts. 
Surety bonds are a form of insurance, and protect against losses on specific assets. The insurance 
companies or sureties included Citigroup’s Travelers Property Casualty, Liberty Mutual Insurance, and St. 
Paul companies among others. The insurers claimed J.P. Morgan Chase Bank and Enron used fraudulent 
inducement to cause them to enter into the contracts. They used this as a defense against not making 
immediate payments under the terms of the surety bonds. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank (“J.P. Morgan) sued in 
an attempt to recover payments. 
J.P. Morgan lost a pre-trial bid in the Southern District of New York to get immediate payment from the 
insurance companies. As reported by Bloomberg news, in an affidavit filed in New York District Court, 
David Wilson outlined the gist of Enron’s transactions, and the following is a possible reconstruction of 
one of the transactions based on my interpretation of that account. 
J.P. Morgan lent $330 million to Mahonia, an offshore special purpose vehicle also known as a special 
purpose entity, a corporation set up by J.P. Morgan in Jersey, one of the U.K.’s Channel Islands. In 
December 28, 2000, Enron sold gas forward to Mahonia, and agreed to make a series of deliveries from 
April 2001 to November 2005. J.P. Morgan bought protection in the form of surety bonds on Enron’s 
obligation to deliver the gas, but the insurers are challenging the contracts with Mahonia Ltd., which were 
“guaranteed” with surety bonds. Mahonia Ltd. got a 7% discount from Enron for the gas, and prepaid $330 
million to Enron. Enron booked the upfront payment of $330 million from Mahonia for the forward sales as 
revenue. At the same time, Enron bought gas forward from Stoneville Aegean Ltd., another offshore 
special purpose entity, a corporation set up by J.P. Morgan in Jersey. In fact, Stoneville and Mahonia had 
the same address and the same board of directors, and it appears Stoneville was under the control of 
Mahonia. In exchange for a series of forward deliveries from Stoneville, Enron agreed to make a series of 
ongoing payments to Stoneville totaling $394 million. 
The following diagram shows the cash flows of the transactions involving J.P. Morgan, Enron, Mahonia, 
and Stoneville: 
 
It appears as if the $330 million J.P. Morgan lent Mahonia ended up at Enron. It further appears that the 
loan payments due from Mahonia to J.P. Morgan are originating from Enron. Furthermore, it appears that 
Enron is booking what could be a $330 million loan as upfront revenue instead of booking it as a liability. 
 
 
 
Monthly payments 
Totaling $394 million 
Wash Trades 
 
$330 million upfront 
Monthly payments 
Totaling $394 million 
$330 million loan 
Wash Trades-Sureties 
Guarantee let to JPM 
J.P. 
Morgan 
Loan 
Enron 
Payments 
Mahonia 
and 
Stoneville 
(same 
board, 
same 
address) 
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Mahonia prepaid the amount owed for the forward delivery of natural gas. Mahonia Ltd. and Stoneville 
Aegean Ltd. had the same address in Jersey and the same board of directors. The proposed deliveries of 
natural gas Enron owed Mahonia matched the proposed deliveries Stoneville owed to Enron. It appears the 
contracts would be matched off, and there was never any intention to make delivery in the first place. 
The surety bonds cover obligations by Enron on the series of forward deliveries to Mahonia, which are 
similar in value to the series of cash flows Enron owed to Stoneville. The upfront payment of $330 million 
Mahonia made to Enron appears to match the amount of the $330 million loan J.P. Morgan made to 
Mahonia. The series of monthly payments owed by Enron to Stoneville seems identical to the series of 
monthly payments owed to J.P. Morgan by Mahonia. The cash flows Enron owed to Stoneville seem to be 
the present value of cash flows on a series of loan payments at 7% interest, which would equal the amount 
lent to Mahonia by J.P. Morgan. Although ownership of the offshore vehicles isn’t disclosed, it is possible 
that Stoneville is 100% owned by Mahonia. 
The insurers claimed the loan and the forward contracts were linked, and they were victims of a fraudulent 
scheme between J.P. Morgan and Enron. They claimed J.P. Morgan and Enron tried to disguise a loan from 
J.P. Morgan to Enron by using offshore vehicles and sham forward contracts. Surety providers cannot 
insure loans under applicable New York law, so they claimed that by entering into these transactions, J.P. 
Morgan and Mahonia could induce the surety providers to insure the loans. 
The insurers argued that since they provided the surety bonds based on fraudulent inducement and 
fraudulent concealment, they had a valid defense against having to perform under the surety bonds. J.P. 
Morgan denies the forward contracts were a de facto loan and that the transactions were linked. J.P. 
Morgan also denies knowing that Enron employed creative accounting and booked the forward sales as 
upfront revenue. 
Source: Tavakoli (2004) 
The main motivation behind this hustle of transaction is to fit liquidity management 
needs of Islamic banks into Islamic principles. Obviously this mechanism has some 
shortcomings as evidenced by different Shari’ah interpretations and there is no universal 
acceptance of commodity murabahah. Indeed, organized tawarruq was disallowed by 
Islamic Fiqh Academia as explained in the literature review section of this chapter. 
The murabahah sale in these transactions has no purpose of facilitating trade for 
economic development. These transactions would rather dry funds for real-life trade 
financing, hence, undermine economic development. The mobilized resources from 
Islamic banks would be availed in developed countries but not developing countries. 
Besides, allocating of metals for commodity murabahah transaction would deprive 
industry, as needed materials would huddle in these kinds of transaction. Many 
proponents of commodity murabahah argue that this is not the case as the transaction of 
buying and selling of metals with commodity murabahah is not real. Then, Shari’ah 
issues rise as fake buying and selling of commodities is not enough to comply with 
Islamic finance principles.  
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Chapra
77
 proposed that Islamic finance should be focused on equity share and profit-and-
loss sharing. However, as he stated, greater reliance on equity does not necessarily mean 
ruling out debt financing, because all financial needs cannot be satisfied by equity and 
profit-and-loss sharing. Hence, debt financing in the modern economy due to the 
particular and prevailing modes of production being capitalism is indispensable given 
that it does not promote nonessential and wasteful consumption as well as unproductive 
speculation. It should, however, be noted that Islamic finance would differ from 
conventional ones in creating debt through sale or lease of real assets by modes of 
financing such as murabahah. The primary condition would be genuine trade transactions 
related to real economy activity with full intention of giving and taking delivery which is 
obviously missing with commodity murabahah.  
As a matter of fact, one of the most widely used transactions in Islamic banking is 
murabahah. In the basic form of this sale, the buyer would know the price at which the 
bank and seller purchased the subject goods to be financed, and the buyer again accepts 
the repayment with a mark-up over the purchase price of the seller.
78
 The main reason 
behind the widespread usage of the murabahah contract is low processing cost compared 
to other tools. There is a straight disbursement to the exporter at the initial stage and 
collection of profit, very often referenced from the corresponding disbursement day 
LIBOR, at the time of repayment. The financier takes the risk of beneficiary against 
balance sheet strength, collateral in the form of bank guarantee, mortgage, warehouse 
receipt, etc. This nature paves the way for successful resource mobilization and makes it 
very popular for Islamic Finance Entities.  
This chapter, thus, proposes introduction of ‘two-Step murabahah’ to replace commodity 
murabahah for good. Islamic banks can place their excess funds to refinance letters of 
credit under murabahah agreements between a bank and an importer. To contextualise, 
let’s assume an importer in the Gambia needs to import yarn from Egypt by opening a 
letter of credit through its local bank as per the request of the Egyptian exporter. After 
                                                 
77 In his lecture in Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance, London on 10th November 2008 
78 Going through the literature one may come across the narration on ’Ibn Mas‘ud ruling that there is no harm in declaring percentage 
profit margins. Technically, one may approach an Islamic financial institution and say “purchase these goods on my behalf at this 
price, and I shall give you a profit margin of 7%”. The statement may be perceived to make explicit reference to a percentage payment 
should not be of concern, since it is not Riba if the sale satisfies the conditions of Murabahah contract. 
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receiving financing request from the importer, the local Gambian bank can mobilize 
resources through the Islamic bank. The Islamic bank would buy yarn and sell it to the 
local Gambian bank with a mark-up in a deferred payment and the Gambian bank would 
sell it to the importer. As opposed to commodity murabahah, in this scheme the Islamic 
bank manages its liquidity by supporting trade and, hence, contributing to the economic 
development of a least developed country.  
As stated above, the objective of this chapter is to show how to mobilize resources to 
make them available for SMEs, particularly in LDMC OIC countries, under Direct 
murabahah Sale transformed into a 2-Step murabahah scheme. The detailed structure of 
2-Step murabahah is explained throughout the chapter.  
Throughout the chapter there would be five entities namely, Bank-A, Bank-B, Bank-C, 
Importer and Exporter for illustration purposes. Bank-A and Bank-B are recognized 
financial institutions and they operate internationally while the operations of Bank-C are 
limited to the domestic market. The examples revolve around Bank-B’s business 
processes. It is Bank-B, which provides imported input to the importer under Direct 
murabahah Sale. Again, it is Bank-B which mobilizes resources from Bank-A through 
mudarabah and alternative Reverse 2-Step murabahah agreements in favour of the 
importer. The details of disbursement for line of financing provided by Bank-B to Local 
Bank-C to be utilized by the importer through 2-Step murabahah Agreement are also 
provided for Letter of Credit and Documentary Collection settlements.  
In the next section, aims and objectives are elaborated. In the third section methodology 
is explained. In the fourth section literature review is provided. In section five some 
definitions are explained. Sixth section explains Direct murabahah Sale in the context of 
international trade. Seventh section shows the mudarabah as a tool for resource 
mobilization for Direct murabahah Sale. Section Eight explains Reverse 2-Step 
murabahah agreement for Bank-B’s resource mobilization from Bank-A as well as 2-Step 
murabahah agreement by which Bank-B provides line of financing to Bank-C to facilitate 
international trade in favour of the importer.
79
 Ninth section explains the details of the 
                                                 
79 What makes 2-Step Murabaha Agreement reverse or not is Bank-B’s point of view. From Bank-B’s point of view, the agreement is 
155 
 
disbursement mechanism for line of financing provided to Bank-C from Bank-B through 
2-Step murabahah Financing. Chapter ten goes through the 2-Step murabahah 
Agreement between Bank-C and Bank-B for the disbursement process explained in the 
previous section. The final section evaluates the proposed structure and concludes.   
4.2 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
This chapter aims to show how to mobilize resources through Islamic financial 
instruments to be utilized by importers in the context of international trade. It presents 
another real-life case study to avail more funds for trade finance accessible to SMEs in 
LDMC OIC countries. The aim, thus, is to propose 2-Step murabahah as a strong 
alternative to traditional Islamic resource mobilization/liquidity management tools, 
namely sukuk and commodity murabahah. It is aimed to indicate that Islamic financial 
industry can rise on 2-Step murabahah as an alternative to sukuk or commodity 
murabahah. This structure is to be evaluated to suggest 2-Step murabahah to be 
embedded in stock exchanges in order to transform real-trade transaction in service of the 
Islamic finance industry for liquidity management in the last chapter. 
The model proposed in this chapter is, thus, based on a real-life case study, which 
provides the strength to the proposed model, as it demonstrates how the proposed model 
can also be applied in real life. 
4.3 METHODOLOGY 
This chapter aims to introduce the concept through a case study. As stated, throughout the 
chapter there would be five entities namely, Bank-A, Bank-B, Bank-C, Importer and 
Exporter. Bank-A and Bank-B are recognized financial institutions and they operate 
internationally while the operations of Bank-C are limited to the domestic market. The 
examples revolve around Bank-B’s business processes. It is Bank-B which provides 
imported input to the importer under Direct murabahah Sale. Again, it is Bank-B which 
mobilizes resources from Bank-A through mudarabah and alternative Reverse 2-Step 
murabahah agreements in favour of the importer. The details of disbursement for line of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Reverse 2-Step Murabaha if Bank-B raises funds from other financial institutions for its own Direct Murabaha Sale to the beneficiary. 
The agreement would be called 2-Step Murabaha if Bank-B provides line of financing to another financial institution. 
156 
 
financing provided by Bank-B to Local Bank-C to be utilized by the importer through 2-
Step murabahah Agreement are also provided for Letter of Credit and Documentary 
Collection settlements. The disbursement procedures are fully explained for 2-Step 
murabahah transactions in the case of the Gambian importer and Egyptian exporter of 
yarn. 
As in the previous chapter, it should be noted that the information provided here is based 
on the researcher’s work experience, which he gained through involvement in such cases. 
However, generic information is provided from ICC and ITFC/IDB, which have been 
referenced.  Considering the nature of the information, the originality of the research 
presented here should be acknowledged. 
 
4.4 RESOURCE MOBILIZATION AND LIQUIDTY MANAGEMENT IN 
THE CONTEXT OF ISLAMIC FINANCE: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Based on the Islamic finance contracts, which were explained in the literature part of the 
previous chapter, Islamic banks have developed products for resource mobilization. 
Traditional Islamic finance resource mobilization tools have been sukuk and tawarruq- 
based Commodity murabahah. Both instruments give rise to serious debates on their 
economic impact and suitability to Islamic principles. In this section some insight on first 
Commodity murabahah and then sukuk is provided from the literature.   
Chapra and Ahmad (2002) addressed the liquidity management difficulties with Islamic 
Banks in their work ‘Corporate Governance in Islamic Financial Institutions’. As they 
state “two of the primary reasons for this are: the non-availability of adequate Shari’ah- 
compatible investment opportunities and the difficulty of raising liquidity in a Shari’ah- 
compatible manner”. As Dusuki (2007: 2) states:  
“Liquidity is an important characteristic of banks. By their very nature, banks 
transform the term of their liabilities to have different maturities on the asset side of 
the balance sheet. At the same time, banks must be able to meet their commitments 
such as deposits at the point at which they become due. Thus, liquidity management 
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lies at the heart of confidence in the banking operation”.  
Dusuki (2007) counts liquidity risk as a significant one for Islamic banks due to limited 
availability of Shari’ah-compatible money-market tools. Accordingly, he counts 
introduction of the commodity murabahah tool on tawarruq as an innovative liquidity 
management tool.    
In his position paper presented at the workshop on “Tawarruq: A Methodological Issue 
in Shari’ah-compliant Finance”, Siddiqi (2007) examined the impact of tawarruq on the 
economy. As he mentions, every tawarruq-based transaction for resource mobilizing 
party (mutawarriq) would create debt which is larger than cash transferred to the liquidity 
managing party (Islamic banks in present practice). In both Islamic tawarruq and 
conventional forms debt paper resulted subject to repeated financial speculative 
transactions. Though tawarruq transactions are based on real assets at the start, as a 
consequence the link with real assets would be severed without creating any wealth but 
debt. This process, as it implies, gives rise to an inverted pyramid of financial instruments 
underpinned by a small asset base. Tawarruq moves transaction from real economy to the 
money (debt) market where equilibrating mechanism is no longer linked to the real 
economy. Then, he scrutinized the consequences of this very creation of debt which is 
larger than cash generated and counts the harms and benefits of tawarruq as:  
(i) It gives rise to creation of debt which tends to accelerate; 
(ii) It emerges as exchange of money with money which is deemed to be unfair in 
the context of risk and uncertainty involved;   
(iii) It leads to speculation from gambling through debt proliferation;  
(iv) As it is debt financing, the practice seeds instability in economy. In a debt-based 
economy money supply is linked to debt which gives rise to inflationary 
expansion; 
(v) This practice is likely to deteriorate income distribution and inefficiently allocate 
resources;  
(vi)  As a debt-financing practice this contributes to anxiety in society and 
destruction of the environment.  
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As he suggests, the harmful consequences of tawarruq are much greater than the benefits. 
He concludes that a financial tool whose harm is greater than its benefit shall not be 
deemed as Shari’ah-compliant.  
Indeed, the issue of debt and instability was, very prominently, brought to the attention 
by Minsky (1977), who saw increasing fragility of financial system by debt inflation. He, 
therefore, embarked with insight of Keynes concerning the investment volatility, as he 
pointed out underlying uncertainty of cash flow from any investment would have 
repercussions for the balance sheet of businesses. Hence, governments would intervene 
with expansionary monetary policies to impede debt deflation so as to decrease risk in the 
process. As Minsky (1986) argued, such intervention by the government would not lead 
to long period of equilibrium but give rise to another investment boom through new debt. 
Consequently, such vicious circle created by government intervention lead to progressive 
build-up of debt, prevent debt contraction and, hence, economy would end up financially 
being much more fragile.    
Shalhoob (2010), studied organized tawarruq in Islamic Law and suggested that 
organized tawarruq, as is the case with commodity murabahah, does not seem to be 
acceptable in Islamic Law.  On the other hand, he counts organized tawarruq less 
unacceptable than usury, which is obviously prohibited in Islamic law. He further states 
that in case the money needed for an unimportant need, Islamic jurisprudence does not 
recommend involvement in organized tawarruq.    
Iqbal and Molyneux (2005), with reference to the Islamic doctrine of universal 
permissibility in business practices which revolve around: “everything is permissible 
unless it is clearly prohibited”, explain the causes for rejection of conventional banking in 
Islamic Law and establishment of Islamic Banks operating under a profit-and-loss 
sharing principle. They introduced the principles and theoretical underpinning for Islamic 
banking and its instruments as musharakah, mudarabah, murabahah, ijarah, salam and 
istisna. On the other hand, they did not mention tawarruq, one of the most controversial 
instruments which has been practiced by Islamic banks regardless of declaration of 
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Majma' al Fiqh al-Islami’s proceedings which counts tawarruq as non-compatible with 
Islamic Law.      
Again, Dusuki (2007) highlights the importance of liquidity management for banks and 
provided some insight for the mechanism of commodity murabahah as a liquidity 
management tool for Islamic financial institutions. He also reviewed the Shari’ah issues 
related to the underlying contract of commodity murabahah namely, tawarruq. He 
identified tawarruq-based commodity murabahah as a value-added product which can 
meet investment interests of Islamic financial institutions which are uncomfortable with 
inah-based instruments. As Al-Zuhayli (1989) explained bay al-inah is an arrangement in 
which one party sells an asset to another party with deferred payment. Unlike 
murabahah, there is no third party and the selling party buys back the asset from the 
buying party before the payment of the deferred price and for cash of a lesser amount 
than the deferred price. As Ali (2007) states, the majority of Muslim jurists nullified bay 
al-inah as it is a red herring to circumvent riba transactions. Ahmad (2007) highlighted 
the purpose with tawarruq-based commodity murabahah as attaining liquidity for the 
buyer and resource mobilization for the other party in the transaction in which the buyer 
purchases an asset from the other party with deferred payment and subsequently sells the 
asset to a third party on cash of a lesser amount than the purchase price.      
 Although the forms of bay al-inah and alternative tawarruq-based commodity 
murabahah have different forms, both instruments serve the same economic substance. In 
both cases, the transaction is liquidity management for one party and resource 
mobilization for the other. There is no touch to the economy in the form of trade finance, 
infrastructure development or financing industry. In this form both instruments are akin 
to disguised loans in conventional financing. Accordingly, as once happened to bay al-
inah, the underlying contract for commodity murabahah, tawarruq, has been tackled by 
Islamic jurists. Two rulings have been issued by the Islamic Fiqh Academy. In its 15
th
 
session, September 1998, the Academy permitted tawarruq given that the buyer of the 
asset, the customer of Islamic banks, does not sell the asset to its original seller in order 
to eschew inah which has been disallowed as it is perceived to be a legal trick for 
circumventing prohibition of riba. Nevertheless, the Islamic Fiqh Academy in its 17
th
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session, held in December 2003, classified tawarruq as real tawarruq (tawarruq haqiqi) 
and organized tawarruq (tawarruq  munazzam).The real tawarruq has been allowed but 
the organized tawarruq, practiced by Islamic financial institutions, is disallowed as it is 
perceived to be synthetic and fictitious like bay al-inah. 
Among other instruments, sukuk or Islamic bonds have been the main resource 
mobilization tools for Islamic banks for some time. However, recent failures of sukuk, 
particularly murabahah sukuks and real estate sukuk, and dissatisfaction with commodity 
murabahah increased the importance of alternative Islamic resource mobilization tools. 
This research, hence, dwells on alternative Islamic resource mobilization tools.  
Sukuk,the plural of the word sakk, are certificates of equal value representing undivided 
shares in ownership of tangible assets, usufruct and services or (in the ownership of) the 
assets of particular projects or special investment activities, however, this is true after the 
receipt of the value of the Sukuk the closing of the subscription and employment of funds 
received for the purpose for which the Sukuk is issued (AAOIFI Definition).
80
 It is also 
known as an Islamic equivalent of a bond. As fixed income or riba (interest-bearing) 
bonds are not permissible in Islam, sukuk are securities that comply with Islamic Law. 
Although sukuk were extensively used in medieval Islam for transferring obligations 
originating from commercial activities including trade, in modern times sukuk relate to 
asset securitization. In its simplest form, sukuk transform future cash flow of an asset, 
existing or to be available in future, to present cash flow. It is a certificate of usufruct or 
ownership of an asset which entitles the owner to have return generated by the asset. This 
certificate is issued through a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) which acquires the asset 
and declares a trust in favour of the holder of the certificate. The certificate might present 
ownership of the asset or entitlement of rental income (Sukuk.me, 2010b). Therefore, this 
certificate provides return to the holder from either profit from rental, profit of sales or 
combination of both. In return the certificate owner takes the credit risk of the underlying 
asset (Sukuk.me, 2010c).  
                                                 
80 Available at www.aaoifi.com/aaoifi_sb_sukuk_Feb2008_Eng.pdf last accessed on 11 May 2012. 
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Like commodity murabahah, sukuk is also based on mainstream Islamic contracts as 
musharakah, mudarabah, salam, murabahah, ijara, istisna or a hybrid of these contracts. 
That is both resource mobilization and liquidity management instruments of commodity 
murabahah and sukuk are based on standard Islamic contracts. Valente (2009) accounts 
sukuk as a major driver for the Islamic finance industry.  
With reference to the Zawya sukuk Monitor, from December 1996 to September 2009, 
747 sukuks, valued at USD 106.6 billion, have been issued. By September 2009, USD 
12.6 billion has matured and USD 94 billion is still outstanding to mature. About 74 per 
cent of sukuk is under USD 100 million. With the global financial crisis, there has been a 
slowdown in sukuk issuance as evidenced from USD 564 million issuance in the first two 
months of 2010 compared to USD 2.5 billion issuance in the first two months of 2009 
(Cochrane, 2010). As Duyn (2009) highlights, 2007 was a peak with USD 25 billion 
sukuk issuance. He counts the financing arm of General Electric as the first western 
industrial company issuing sukuk in 2009 for USD 500 million. The sukuk market is 
rather dominated by construction and real estate followed by governments and the 
financial sector. Another characteristic of the market is fixed return rather than floating 
return. Besides, almost half of the sukuk have been rated.
 81
 Some sukuk have also been 
listed on stock exchanges.
82
 
Since the first issuance in late 1996, there have been several sukuk failures of defaults 
thought there is no clear definition of sukuk default of failure in Shari’ah. However, in a 
technical perspective it is basically the inability of the obligor with sukuk to make 
payments on the due date. The sukuk itself implies the presence of underlying assets 
owned by the certificate owner so entire failure is not perceived to be possible. In case of 
sukuk default, the obligor seeks rollover on payments or restructuring, otherwise 
embarking on litigation. Recent defaults in the market indicate two main causes: 
(i) Global Financial Crisis: in post-September 2008, gave rise to loss of liquidity and 
investors’ confidence, imprinted Islamic financial industry due to debt 
                                                 
81 The majority of rated issues originated from Malaysia where rating is mandatory. 
82 Only 108 (14%) of total Sukuk issues were listed on stock exchanges. The Indonesian Stock exchange has the highest number of 
listed Sukuk (25), while Nasdaq Dubai has the highest value of Sukuk listings (USD 16.5 billion) (Zawya, 2009). 
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restructuring, originator insolvency and defaults (Murdoch, 2010a). 
(j) Real Estate Sector Concentration: In connection with the global financial crisis, 
both real estate companies and financial institutions with heavy exposure to the 
real estate sector have adversely been affected. The sukuk market in the Gulf is 
mainly dominated by real estate developer as these assets are easy to structure and 
there has been an appetite for this sector after the collapse of the Gulf stock 
exchange in 2006 which directed excess liquidity to the real estate sector. In 
consequence, the asset quality of those Islamic banks in the Middle East 
deteriorated (Azzam, 2010). As Kaslowsky (2010) highlights, when the sector 
took the hit, underlying assets for these were sukuk, hence sukuk certificates 
backed or based on real estate, suffered. Even in the case of asset-backed sukuk, 
investors do not have confidence in legal claim for ownership rights on 
underlying assets in the Middle East due to undeveloped property law in the 
region. This fact is evidenced from the rating agencies evaluation of Middle East 
sukuk based on the credit rating of obligors rather than referencing to underlying 
asset (Valente and Richter, 2009). This implies the instability of real estate for 
underlying sukuk for some time though ease of structuring with real estate is 
likely to appeal to the industry again. In this period, the sukuk market might focus 
on production activities in the form of ship and aircraft lease, ship construction 
financing, energy and transportation (Kasolowsky, 2010; Uppal, 2010). 
As studies in this research, mudarabah is introduced as an alternative resource 
mobilization tool. Chapra and Khan (2000) defined mudarabah as an agreement between 
two or more persons whereby one or more of them provide finance, while the others 
provide entrepreneurship and management to carry on any business venture whether 
trade, industry or service, with the objective of earning profit. The loss is borne only by 
the financiers in proportion to their share in total capital and the entrepreneur’s loss lie in 
not getting any reward for his/her service. Those who provide funds in mudarabah are 
called rab al-mal and the entrepreneurship provider is called mudarab. Given the non 
liability of mudarab towards rab al-mal and lack of knowledge of rab al-mal on the 
financing details, potential of resource mobilization with mudarabah is limited. Hence, in 
this chapter 2-Step murabahah,(by which the entrepreneur is liable to the fund provider 
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(rab al-mal)) is introduced as opposed to mudarabah for resource mobilization. 2-Step 
murabahah is also proposed as a liquidity management tool for Islamic Banks as an 
alternative to commodity murabahah operating on the controversial tawarruq scheme 
and sukuk.  
Here above, main components of Islamic Finance in the context of resource mobilization 
is explained for ease of reference for case study and product development is introduced in 
this chapter, on 2-Step murabahah in the context of international trade, in pursuit of 
proposing Islamic finance means needed for implementation the OIC Ten-Year 
Programme of Action. 2-Step murabahah is a relatively new concept and not much, if not 
at all, is addressed in the literature. This research aims to pioneer in both subjects further 
academic endeavours in Islamic finance.    
4.5 OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS: BUILDING THE MODEL 
International trade transactions usually involve many parties and instruments due to the 
cross-bordering nature of these transactions. As legal frameworks would change from 
one country to another, the international trade community developed special instruments 
to address different jurisprudence while mitigating risks for importers and exporters. In 
order to address these issues some instruments were developed by the trading community 
throughout history.   
4.5.1 Letter of Credit 
Letter of Credit (L/C), also known as Documentary Credit, is an undertaking by the 
issuing bank to pay a sum of money to a beneficiary (normally exporter) against 
presentation of documents stipulated in the credit on sight or deferred payment. In an L/C 
transaction importer would mitigate the risk of non-delivery by exporter and exporter 
would mitigate the risk of non-payment by importer. Based on the relationship between 
two parties several additional documents such as pre-shipment inspection certificate from 
a Collateral Management and Monitoring Company (CMMC) can be a part of L/C 
processing. Common documents used in Letter of Credit and Documentary Collection are 
as follows: 
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‘Financial Documents’ are: bills of exchange, promissory note or other 
similar instruments used for obtaining payment. 
"Commercial Documents" are: invoices, packing list, certificate of 
inspection or any other documents which are not financial documents. 
"Shipping Documents" are:  bill of lading (B/L), air way bill, charter bill 
of lading or other similar documents used for obtaining goods. 
"Official Documents" are:  consular invoice, black list certificate, and 
certificate of origin or other related documents issued by a specific 
authority. 
"Takaful/Insurance Documents" are:  certificate of Takaful/Insurance 
and Takaful/Insurance policy used to insure the goods during shipment. 
Parties to a Letter of Credit transaction would be:  
Issuing Bank: The bank that issues the L/C upon request by its customer 
(applicant) 
  Applicant: The bank’s customer who requests to open the L/C (normally 
importer) 
  Advising Bank: A bank who will receive, authenticate and advise L/C to a 
beneficiary. Normally this bank is the correspondent of the issuing bank and 
located in the beneficiary’s country. 
  Beneficiary: A customer who will receive the L/C from the advising bank 
(normally exporter). 
  Negotiating Bank: A bank appointed by the issuing bank to receive and 
check the shipping documents before making payment to the beneficiary. 
  Reimbursing Bank: A bank nominated by the issuing bank to honour all 
claims from the negotiating bank. 
 Confirming Bank:  A bank who adds confirmation to the L/C and carries the 
same responsibilities and liabilities like the issuing bank. 
Letter of Credit can be irrevocable or revocable. In case of irrevocable L/C, a credit 
cannot be cancelled or amended unless the beneficiary, issuing bank and confirming bank 
agree. While in case of revocable L/C, a credit can be cancelled or amended by the 
issuing bank without consensus from the beneficiary or confirming bank (if any). 
In outline, Letter of Credit works as follows: 
(i)  The importer (applicant) and exporter (beneficiary) sign a contract. 
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(ii)  The importer fills in a standard application form requesting his bank to issue 
its irrevocable letter of credit in favour of the foreign exporter. 
(iii) The importer’s bank issues its irrevocable letter of credit in accordance with 
the applicant’s instructions and sends it to the advising bank.  
 
(iv) The advising bank notifies the credit to the exporter. 
(v) The exporter ships his goods based on the L/C terms and conditions and 
presents his documents to the bank for payment.   
(vi) The exporter presents the shipping documents to the negotiating bank for 
payment. 
(vii) The negotiating bank checks the documents and if everything is in order, 
pays to the exporter. 
(viii) The negotiating bank sends the documents to the issuing bank and obtains 
reimbursement. 
(ix) The issuing bank checks the documents and, if they comply with the L/C 
terms and conditions, reimburses the negotiating bank. 
(x) The importer collects the documents from the issuing bank and takes 
possessions of the goods. He may have been required to make a cash deposit 
in advance with the bank or may have to reimburse it before receiving the 
documents.  
4.5.2 Irrevocable Commitment to Reimburse 
Irrevocable Commitment to Reimburse (ICR) is an undertaking by the refinancer of an 
L/C to pay the negotiating bank for all negotiations under the L/C provided all terms and 
conditions of the credit are complied with. The ICR authorizes the negotiating bank to 
lodge its claim on the refinancer’s nominated paying agent by certifying to the 
refinancer’s paying agent that all terms and conditions of the L/C have been complied 
with. 
The text of an ICR would look like as follows:  
We hereby issue our Irrevocable Commitment for Reimbursement of claims under 
following L/C presented to our paying agent up to a maximum of USD….. provided the 
negotiating bank certifies to them by authenticated message that all terms and conditions 
of L/C have been complied with. We have sent a copy of this message to our paying 
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agent authorizing them to honour claims from the negotiating bank after receipt by them 
of the negotiating bank’s certificate as noted above. 
I.  L/C number  : 
II.  Issuing Bank  : 
III.  Applicant  : 
IV.  Beneficiary  : 
V.  Amount  : 
VI.  Expiry   : 
VII.  Latest shipment : 
VIII.  Advising Bank : 
IX.  Payment term  : 
X.  Bank charges  : 
 
In the event there are any discrepancies in or amendments to the above-mentioned L/C 
details or to (i) country of origin, (ii) description of goods,(iii) quantity of goods, (iv) 
Takaful/Insurance clause, prior approval of us must be obtained from the refinancer. Any 
other amendment issues by the L/C issuing bank do not require the approval of the 
refinancer. 
4.5.3 Documentary Collection 
Collection means the handling of international trade documents by banks on instructions 
received from customer or bank. There are two types of documentary collection.   
Deliver commercial documents against Payment (D/P) 
In D/P situation the presenting bank is authorized to release documents to the 
importer only against cash payment. 
Deliver documents against acceptance (D/A) 
In D/A situation the presenting bank releases the documents to the importer 
against his acceptance of a bill of exchange. 
There are some common terms used on bills for collection and their interpretation. 
  
  Clean Collection means: collection of financial documents not accompanied by 
commercial documents.  
  Documentary Collection means: collection of financial documents accompanied 
by commercial documents or collection of commercial documents not 
accompanied by financial documents. 
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  Sight Bill: A bill which is payable at sight i.e. upon first presentation to the 
drawee (the importer). 
Usance Bill (Tenor Bill): A bill which is payable on a specified future date. The 
bill to be presented for acceptance is done by the drawee (the importer) signing 
his name across the face of the bill. Once accepted, the acceptor i.e. drawee (the 
importer) agrees to pay the bill on its maturity date.  
In the simplest case there are four parties to a documentary collection operation. These 
are as follows: 
Drawer (Principal): In the context of a documentary collection operation, he is 
referred to as the principal, since he is the party on whose behalf the banks carry 
out the collection (exporter).  
The Remitting Bank: This is the bank instructed by the exporter to send the 
documents for collection to a bank in the importer's country. 
  Drawee: Normally importer who receives the documents. 
 The presenting bank (Collecting Bank): This is the collection bank in the 
importer's country which presents the documents to the importer i.e. Agent for 
the remitting bank to release documents and collect payment from drawee. 
In outline, Documentary Collection, as reference to ITFC guidelines, works as follows: 
(i)  The sale contract is concluded between importer and 
exporter.  
(ii) The exporter makes the shipment directly to the importer. 
(iii) The exporter sends the necessary documents such as invoice, 
bill of lading, takaful/insurance certificate, certificate of 
origin etc. to his own bank (remitting bank) together with the 
collection order. 
(iv) The remitting bank then sends the documents together with 
the necessary instruction to the collecting bank. 
(v) The collecting bank informs the importer of the arrival of the 
documents and notifies him of the terms on which these 
documents will be released.   
(vi) The importer makes the payment (D/P, or accept a bill of 
exchange, or signs a promissory note (D/A) and in return 
receives the document. 
(vii) The Collecting Bank makes payment to the remitting bank.  
(viii) The remitting bank pays the exporter. 
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4.5.4 SWIFT 
SWIFT stands for the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication. 
Found in 1973 in Belgium by 239 banks from 15 countries, it is a worldwide financial 
messaging exchange network operating between financial institutions. To give an idea 
about its dominance, as of November 2008, 8,700 financial institutions in 209 countries 
connected to the network.
83
 The system operates through software on the SWIFTNET 
Network and ISO 9362 bank identifier codes popularly known among bankers as SWIFT 
Codes specific to each financial institution.  
The vast majority of the financial institutions across the globe use SWIFT Network for 
secure communications in standard formats. That is, SWIFT does affect money 
transactions through secure communication between a financial institution and its 
corresponding bank. In brief SWIFT means:  
(i) Secure network between financial institutions for transmitting messages; 
(ii) Set of syntax standards for financial messages; 
(iii) Connection services and software enable financial institutions to transmit 
messages. 
The definitions for ease of reference in this chapter are provided in Table 4.1. The 
reference transaction for the definitions is disbursement procedure explained in section 
4.9 of this chapter where Bank-C mobilizes resources from Bank-B through 2-Step 
murabahah Agreement.  
Table 38: Table 4.1: Definitions for Two-Step Murabahah Islamic Trade Finance 
Word Meaning 
Agent Bank 
A bank responsible for administering a loan and acting as a conduit 
for all payments in a loan or syndicated loan. 
Bill of Exchange 
It is a written instrument which contains an unconditional order 
whereby the drawer (Seller/Exporter) directs the drawee 
(Buyer/Importer) to pay a definite sum of money to the payee or to 
his order. 
Bills of Lading 
It is a document of title to the goods and also an evidence of a 
contract between the seller/exporter and carrier. 
Certificate of Origin This document certifies the country of origin of goods described in 
                                                 
83 Based on information obtained through the official website of SWIFT at http://www.swift.com/ last accessed on May 6, 2010.  
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the document. 
Disbursement  
A payment made by Bank-B at the request of a beneficiary, as per the 
guidelines and terms and conditions under 2-Step murabahah 
agreement. 
Documentary 
Collection 
A method of settlements in international trade where payment to the 
seller  subject to the buyer's acceptance of the documents/draft 
presented to the buyer's bank (without L/C) as meaning given to it in 
URC.  
Documentary Credit Refers a method of settlement in international trade through LC 
Takaful/Insurance 
Policy 
It is issued by a takaful/insurance company to cover the risk involved 
in moving goods from one place to another. 
Invoice 
It is the accounting documents by which the seller claims payment 
from the buyer for the value of the goods being supplied. 
Irrevocable 
Commitment to 
Reimbursement 
(ICR) 
A mode of payment in which refinancer of L/C, Bank-B, at the 
request of the beneficiary, irrevocably agrees to reimburse a 
commercial bank for payment to be made to a supplier under a letter 
of credit. 
Letter of Credit (LC) 
An instrument to facilitate international trade in goods and 
equipments as meaning given to it in UCP. It is an undertaking by a 
commercial bank to pay the beneficiary (supplier) upon presentation 
of documentary proof that all the terms and conditions of the LC have 
been fully fulfilled.  
Modes of 
Disbursement 
Four major methods used for payment of funds under Bank-B 
financing: Letter of Credit, Documentary Collection, Open Account 
and Reimbursement. 
Mode of Financing 
A Shari’ah-compatible instrument which is used by Bank-B to extend 
financing depending on the nature of the underlying project or 
operation and the party to which the financing is extended e.g. 
murabahah, loan, leasing, instalment sale, equity participation etc.  
Mudarabah 
A form of partnership where one party provides the funds and the 
other provides the expertise and management. Any profits accruing 
are shared between the two parties on a pre-agreed ratio, while the 
capital loss shared by all participants. 
Mudarabah 
Agreement 
A set of legal agreements signed between the parties to a syndicated 
financing, usually includes a financing agreement 
Mudarab 
A contracting party in a mudarabah financing which acts in a 
fiduciary capacity as the agent or fund manager. 
Mudarab Fees Fees payable to a mudarab in its capacity as the fund manager. 
Murabahah  
A contract of sale between a buyer and a seller in which a seller 
purchases the goods needed by a buyer and sells the goods to the 
buyer on a cost-plus basis. Both the profit (mark-up) and the time of 
repayment (usually in installments) are specified in an initial contract. 
Proforma  Invoice It is the price quotation (a provisional invoice) given by the supplier. 
Promissory Note 
It is an unconditional promise in writing whereby the maker 
undertakes to pay a definite sum of money to the payee or to his order 
on demand or at a definite time. 
Purchase Price 
Means the price paid, or payable, by Bank-B to the Supplier/Exporter 
for each shipment of the Goods including takaful/insurance 
premiums, banking and other fees borne by Bank-B in connection 
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with the purchase and shipment of the Goods. 
Resource 
Mobilization 
A process of generating resources from the capital market. 
Sale Price 
Means the price at which Bank-B sells the Goods to Bank-C (or 
importer in the case of Direct murabahah Sale) as determined in 
accordance with spread. 
Shipping Documents 
All documents related to shipment. Examples include invoice, bill of 
lading, certificate of origin etc. 
Shipping guarantee A document used to clear goods in absence of bill of lading. 
Spread 
Agreed percentage added to benchmark to arrive at the total mark-up 
to be charged in financing operations. 
Supplier 
An individual or a firm selected to provide equipment, materials or 
commodities against a specific contract (The exporter in this case). 
SWIFT 
Worldwide financial messaging exchange network operating between 
financial institutions to communicate within standard syntax to carry 
out international banking services. 
Two-Step 
Murabahah 
Financing 
A financing mode used by Bank-B to provide funding to other banks/ 
financial institutions such as Bank-C for financing their trade 
financing operations and/or Bank-B mobilizes funds, through reverse 
2-Step murabahah, from the banks and financial institutions such as 
Bank-A for its trade financing operations. 
UCP 
Means the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits 
(1993 Revision), International Chamber of Commerce Publication 
No. 500 and its revision thereof. 
URC 
Means the Uniform Rules for Collections (522 Version), International 
Chamber of Commerce. 
Value Date 
The date on which disbursements are debited from or repayments are 
credited to a designated Bank-B bank account. 
Source: Compiled by the author 
4.6 DIRECT MURABAHAH SALE 
As an Arabic word standing for profit, murabahah is a type of cost-plus-profit sale trust 
trading. Presently, Direct murabahah sale is very popular among Islamic financial 
institutions as a mode of financing. As briefly explained earlier, a customer in need of 
purchasing specific goods requests a purchase of these goods from a financial institution 
with a certain amount of profit over purchase price as a repayment. For sure the seller is 
obliged to disclose the actual cost incurred in acquiring the goods, as a condition of an 
Islamic murabahah purchase orderer, before adding some profit thereon. As for the 
financial institutions, they buy the goods on behalf of the client and resell them at a mark-
up, but in the period up to the resale the bank has title to the goods, and hence a legal 
responsibility as it is the case in a regular murabahah transaction. 
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Transactions in the case of international trade, as presented in Figure 4.1, flow as:  
(i) The importer requests Bank-B to purchase a quantity of goods.  
(ii) A Direct murabahah financing agreement would be signed between Bank-B 
and the importer by which:  
 Bank-B authorizes the importer to purchase the goods for and on behalf. 
The importer covenants that, when acting as an agent, it shall act as an 
undisclosed agent of Bank-B and it shall not disclose that it is acting as an 
agent of Bank-B to the third party. 
 In acting as an agent of Bank-B, the importer shall endeavour to act as if 
acting for its account and shall take all necessary measures to protect 
Bank-B’s rights and interests.  
Figure 18: Figure 4.1:  Mechanism and Documentation for Direct Murabahah Sale 
Source: International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation of Islamic Development Bank Group 
 
(i)   The importer submits the terms and conditions of the draft purchase contract 
for the approval of Bank-B. After the approval, the importer concludes the 
contract with no material amendment to or waiver or cancelation in the 
contract without obtaining prior written consent of Bank-B.  
(ii)   Bank-B shall make the payment of “Purchase Price” directly to the exporter. 
(iii)  The importer can clear the goods from customs based on this payment and 
shall repay the “Sale Price” directly to Bank-B at the time of maturity.84   
As the transaction flow reveals, Bank-B takes the direct credit risk of the importer. 
                                                 
84 The importer makes the disbursement request through a standard “Form of Offer” which indicates the “Sale Price”. Upon the 
receipt of this form, Bank-B responds to the Importer with a standard “Form of Acceptance” indicating the “Purchase Price”. Drafts 
of these forms for disbursement under L/C settlement are provided in the Appendix IV and Appendix V.  
172 
 
It should be noted that, the validity of a murabahah sale, which has its own implications 
in form of a valid sale, necessitates specific conditions to make the transaction acceptable 
in Islamic law.
85
  
4.7 RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THROUGH MUDARABAH86 
Given the huge volume of international trade, as a usual practice financial institutions 
mobilize resources to meet the needs of their clients. Islamic banks often resort to a 
syndication process for their trade finance operations, which is expected to be used to 
cover large-volume financing amounts. Under this mechanism, banks invite commercial 
banks and financial institutions to participate in large-ticket operations, where the terms 
of financing are attractive and in line with the prevailing market rates. Each participant 
takes the direct risk of the beneficiary within its subscription.
87
 
 
Transactions in the case of international trade, as indicated in Figure 4.2, flow as: 
(i) According to Shari’ah, a mudarabah Agreement to be signed first between 
Bank-B, other participants and Bank-A: 
 Bank-B acts as a mudarab on behalf of participating banks such as Bank-A. 
 Bank-B is the Arranger/Manager and responsible for and distribution of the 
repayment (Sale Price) to participating banks including Bank-A. 
 
(ii) Then, a murabahah Agreement to be signed between Bank-B and the 
importer. 
 The importer shall submit any effectiveness documents to start the 
utilization of the fund. 
 Upon the notification by the exporter and the request of the importer, 
Bank-B advises participating banks and Bank-A to transfer money 
(according to their contributions) to its (Bank-B’s) bank account in the 
paying agent bank. Then Bank-B as mudarab orders the payment of 
‘Purchase Price’ directly to the exporter.  
                                                 
85 The details of these conditions can be referred from Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI)’s Sharia’s Standards No.8 as. These standards for “Murabaha to the Purchase Orderer” was previously issued by the title of 
”Sharia’s Rule for Investment and Financing Instruments No.(1)”. One may refer to those for more details on Murabaha Sale. 
86 Mudaraba is a special kind of partnership where one partner provides the capital (rabb-al-mal) to the other (mudarab) for 
investment in a commercial enterprise. 
87 Note that Syndication is called co-financing facility in case of only one participant. 
 
173 
 
Figure 19: Figure 4.2:  Mechanism and Documentation for Direct Murabahah Sale through 
Resources Mobilized by Mudarabah Agreement 
 
Source: International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation of Islamic Development Bank Group 
 The importer can clear the goods from customs based on this payment and 
shall repay the “Sale Price” directly to Bank-B, which in turns distribute the 
sale price to the participating banks such as Bank-A according to their 
contribution.  
In this design Bank-B, Bank-A and any other participant share the direct credit risk of the 
importer up to their contribution amount. That is, each participant has to make his investigation 
and evaluation of the creditworthiness of the importer before deciding to participate in the 
syndicated operation.
88
 
4.8 ADDRESSING THE ISSUE BY REVERSE 2-STEP MURABAHAH 
AGREEMENT89 
The most problematic part of mudarabah type of resource mobilization is the sharing of 
credit risk of the importer by all participants. Very often potential participants are not 
familiar with the importer, the country or the subject sector. Hence, the resource 
                                                 
88 Indeed, this is a very favorable structure for Bank-B as resources mobilized by Mudaraba would be off-balance sheet item, as the 
credit risk taken would be limited and as Bank-B would receive Mudarab fee out of profit realized by the participants.  
89 As pointed earlier, what makes 2-Step Murabaha Agreement reverse or not is Bank-B’s point of view. From Bank-B’s point of 
view, the agreement is Reverse 2-Step Murabaha if Bank-B raises funds from other financial institutions for its own Direct Murabaha 
Sale to the beneficiary. 
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mobilization may turn to be a hurdle. Addressing this issue by an Islamic mode of finance 
by which participants take the risk of another financial institution rather than unknown 
importer would create space for mobilizing more resources.  
Reverse 2-Step murabahah Financing Mechanism can be used to mobilize resources 
from other financial institutions and banks to meet the needs of Bank-B in this particular 
case. Under this mechanism, other financial institutions or banks provide the funds to 
Bank-B which the latter will then provide to its ultimate beneficiaries, the importer. The 
financial institutions or banks take the risk of Bank-B as such that Bank-A purchases the 
goods and sells it to Bank-B to be paid back with a mark-up on a predetermined maturity 
date. Then, Bank-B sells the goods to the importer based on the terms and conditions of 
the second murabahah agreement with the importer.  
Transactions in the case of international trade, referring to Figure 4.3, flow as: 
 A murabahah Agreement is signed first between Bank-A (as Fund Provider/1st 
seller) and Bank-B (as purchaser). 
 Then, another murabahah Agreement is signed Bank-B (as 2nd seller) and the 
importer (as purchaser). 
 The importer shall submit effectiveness documents. 
 
Figure 20:Figure 4.3:  Mechanism and Documentation for Direct Murabahah Sale through 
Resources Mobilized by Reverse 2-Step Murabahah Agreement  
 
Source: International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation of Islamic Development Bank Group 
 Upon notification by the exporter and the request from the importer, Bank-B 
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advises the fund provider, Bank-A, to make the payment of “Purchase Price” 
directly to the exporter.
90
 
 The importer can clear the goods from customs based on this payment. Then at 
the time of maturity, it shall repay the first “Sale Price” directly to Bank-B, which 
in turns will be repay the second “Sale Price” to Bank-A. 
This mechanism transfers the direct credit risk of the importer to Bank-B which will be the 
beneficiary of credit provided by Bank-A. Also note that this mechanism can be used in reverse 
by Bank-B to reach small and medium-size beneficiaries in different countries, by providing 
fund to the local financial institutions or banks for their ultimate beneficiaries. This kind of 
usage is ideal to penetrate Small and Medium Size Enterprises (SMEs) in high-risk countries.  
In this case, Bank-B assumes the credit risk of a local Bank-C rather than the importer and 
transfers cumbersome credit evaluation process to the party, local Bank-C, which can 
effectively manage it in a more efficient manner. In order to give a more clear idea on the 
structure, to be called 2-Step murabahah hereafter, in which Bank-B is fund provider 
disbursement mechanism under Letter of Credit (L/C) and Documentary Collection is 
explained in the next section. Also Bank-B’s business process map, keys are in Appendix VI, 
for the disbursement to Bank-C under 2-Step murabahah Sale is provided in Appendix VII. In 
Appendix VIII, Bank-B’s business process for repayment from Bank-C under 2-Step 
murabahah Sale through resources mobilized by a Reverse 2-Step murabahah from Bank-A or 
any other participants is provided.
91
  
4.9 DISBURSEMENT PROCEDURES FOR 2-STEP MURABAHAH 
AGREEMENT 
In international trade businesses, very often exporter would ask for Letter of Credit as a 
condition precedent to the shipment. A standard Letter of Credit transaction, with 
reference to ITFC guidelines, would follow as:  
(i) An export contract would be signed between the importer and the 
exporter; 
                                                 
90 In (4) Payment of Purchase Price, the payment would materialize at the date of maturity when the importer is supposed to honor 
the claim from the exporter as per the export contract. The details of disbursement procedures for 2-Step Murabaha under L/C and 
Documentary Collection are explained in Section-V.  
91 Going through the subject business process, since the resources mobilized through 2-Step Murabaha rather than Muaraba 
agreement Bank-B pays to participants or Bank-A first than separately lodge a claim on Bank-C. If the resources mobilized through 
Mudaraba agreement, participants or Bank-A would wait receipt of repayment from Bank-C to Bank-B first. Besides, they would be 
exposed to any default from Bank-C part.  
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(ii) The importer fills a standard application form requesting his bank (Bank-C 
in this particular case) to issue irrevocable Letter of Credit in favour of the 
exporter overseas; 
(iii) The importer’s bank (Bank-C) issues its irrevocable L/C in accordance 
with the importer’s instructions and sends to the advising bank (usually 
the exporter’s bank); 
(iv) The advising bank notifies the credit to the exporter; 
(v) Upon notification, the exporter ships the goods based on the L/C terms 
and conditions and presents the shipping documents, including Bill of 
Lading, to the negotiating bank; 
(vi) The negotiating bank checks the documents and if everything is in order, 
pays to the exporter. Then it refers to issuing bank for reimbursement. 
Issuing bank would reimburse to negotiating bank given the documents 
are in compliance with the L/C terms; 
(vii) The importer collects the document from the issuing bank (Bank-C in this 
particular case) and takes the possessions of the goods for custom 
clearance. 
Under 2-Step murabahah financing, the importer can open an L/C in the Bank-C and 
Bank-C transmits a copy to Bank-B.
92
 The main body of such an L/C would be indicated 
in Table 4.2. For the purpose of demonstration the importer from the Gambia applies to 
Bank-C for opening of L/C in favour of exporter in Egypt to import wool and polyester 
yarn under Two-Step murabahah Financing provided by international Bank-B.  
Table 39: Table 4.2: Content of L/C in Disbursement under 2-Step Murabahah 
40A: Form of Documentary Credit 
IRREVOABLE 
20: Documentary Credit Number 
CEN/92040198  
31C: Date of Issue 
Date: 100330 
40E: Applicable Rules 
UCPURR LATEST VERSION 
31D: Date and Place of Expiry 
Date: 100630 
Place: IN EGYPT 
50: Applicant 
THE IMPORTER, 
ADDRESS OF THE IMPORTER, 
ACCOUNT NUMBER OF IMPORTER WITH BANK-C 
59: Beneficiary 
Name &Address: THE EXPORTER 
ADDRESS OF THE EXPORTER 
                                                 
92 Unlike Direct Murabaha Sale, not the importer but Bank-C makes the disbursement request through a standard ‘Form of Offer’ 
which indicates the first ‘Sale Price’. Upon the receipt of this form, Bank-B responds to Bank-C with a standard ‘Form of 
Acceptance’ indicating the ‘Purchase Price’. Drafts of these forms under Direct Murabaha Sale for disbursement under L/C are 
provided in the Appendix IV and Appendix V. In the case of 2-Step Murabaha Sale, the importer shall be replaced with Bank-C in this 
forms.  
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TEL:XXXXX 
32B: Currency Code, Amount 
Currency Code: US Dollar 
Amount: US$ 312,500.00 
41A: Available With … By … 
Identifier Code: SWIFT CODE OF ADVISING/EXPORTER’S BANK 
                           ADDRESS OF ADVISING/EXPORTER’S BANK 
By: PAYMENT 
43P: Partial Shipments 
ALLOWD 
43T: Transhipment  
NOT ALLOWED 
44F: Port of Loading/Airport of Departure 
ANY PORT IN EGYPT 
44C: Port of Discharge/Airport of Destination 
BANJUL, THE GAMBIA 
45A: Description of Goods and/or Services 
45,000 KGS COUNT NM 60/2 PW 60/40 BLEND 21.5 MICRON WOOL AND 2.5 DEN POLYESTER-
YARN WORSTED COLOUR TBG. 
 
AS PER PROFORMA INVOICE NO.7196 DATED 01/02/2010. 
 
UP TO AGGREGATE AMOUN OF: US$ 312750.00 AS CFR VALUE (UPTO US$ 310500.00 AS FOB 
VALUE AND UPTO US$ 2250.00 AS FREIGHT CHARGES) 
46A: Documents Required 
A)FULL SET OF CLEAN ON BOARD OCEAN BILL OF LADING ISSUED OR ENDORSED TO THE 
ORDER OF BANK-C IN 3-ORIGINALS AND 3 NON-NEGOTIABLE COPIES INDICATING NAME 
AND ADDRESSES OF SHIPPING CO’S REPRESENTATIVE IN THE GAMBIA MARKED FREIGHT 
PREPAID DATED NOT LATER THAN 09.06.2010 NOR PRIOR TO THE DATE OF THIS SWIFT, 
INDICATING SHIPMENT BY CLASSIFIED VESSEL FROM ANY PORT IN EGYPT TO BANJUL, 
THE GAMBIA. 
 
B)SIGNED COMMERCIAL INVOICES IN 3 ORIGINALS, 1 OF WHICH CERTIFIED BY EGYPT 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND LEGALIZED BY GAMBIAN CONSULATE, 
PLUS 1 EXTRA COPY ALL INCLUDING BNF’S STATEMENT THAT GOODS HAVE BEEN 
SHIPPED IN STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS STIPULATED IN RELATED 
PROFORMA INVOICES AND THE SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENT THERETO IF ANY. 
 
C)SIGNED CERTIFICATE OF ORIGIN CERTIFIED BY EGYPT CHAMBER OF COMERCE AND 
INDUSTRY LEGALIZED BY GAMBIAN CONSULATE, IN 1 ORIGINAL CONFIRMING GOODS 
ORIGINATED IN EGYPT, PLUS 2 COPIES. 
 
D)SIGNED DETALED PACKING LIST IN 3 COPIES 
 
E)THE ORIGINAL INSPECTION CERTIFICATE ISSUED NOT PRIOR TO BILL OF LADING DATE 
BY APPOINTED COLLATERAL MANAGEMENT AND MONOTORING COMPANY(CMMC) OR 
ITS AGENT LETTERHEAD CERITFIYING THAT THE QUALITY, QUANTITY AND PACKING OF 
THE GOODS LOADED ARE STRICTLY COMPLYING WITH SPECIFICATION OF THE GOODS 
INDICATED IN THE RELATIVE PROFORMA INVOICE AND THE L/C AND ANY AMENDMENTS 
MADE THERETO AS PRESENTED TO THE CMMC BY THE APPLICANT/EXPORTER IN 1 
ORIGINAL AND 1 COPY. SUCH PRESHIPMENT INSPECTION CERTIFICATE SHALL VERIFY 
THAT THE GOODS ARE IN CONFORMITY WITH GAMBIAN STANDARDS AS MENTIONED IN 
PROFORMA INVOICE AND CERTIFEID BY EGYPT CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY 
(INSPECTION CHARGES SHALL BE PAID BY THE APPLICANT/EXPORTER).  
. 
F)A DECLARATION SIGNED BY THE SHIPPING CO. OR ITS AUTHORIZED AGENT STATING 
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THAT THE CARRYING VESSEL IS A CLASSIFIED ONE PLYING ON REGULAR LINER 
SERVICES IN 1 ORIGINAL AND 2 COPIES.  
. 
G)SIGNED FREIGHT INVOICES ISSUED BY THE SHIPPING CO., THE CARRIER OR ITS 
AUTHORIZED AGENT IN 1 ORIGINAL WHICH TO BE CERTIFIED BY EGYPT CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY PLUS 1 COPY.  
 
47A: Additional Conditions 
1)NEGOTIATION RESTRICTED TO THE ADVISING BANK 
2)ALL DOCUMENTS SHOULD INDICATE: 
A)APPLICANT’S NAME AND FULL ADDRESS AS THE NOTIFY PARTY 
B)L/C NO. CEN/92040198 AND REG.NO. OF60801341 
C)TAKAFUL CO’S NAME OF: ISLAMIC TAKAFUL COMPANY (for illustration purpose), POLICY 
NO.4/0106/109971/9999/016000/1388 
D)CUSTOMS TARIFF NO OF: 55095200 
3) TAKAFUL EFFECTED IN GAMBIA 
4)THIRD PARTY SHIPPING DOCUMENTS NOT ACCEPTABLE 
5)THE ISSUANCE DATE OF ALL DOCUMENTS SHOULD BE WITHIN THE VALIDTY DATE OF 
THIS CREDIT. 
6)THE REQUIRED DOCS. SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO BANK-C, CENTRAL BRANCH NO.1701, 
BANJUL, THE GAMBIA BY DHL IN TWO SEPARATE SETS. 
7)NEGOTIATION DATE OF DOCUMENTS SHOULD BE INFORMED TO BANK-C BY SWIFT. 
8)A HANDLING CHARGES OF US$50 WILL BE DEDUCTED FROM PROCEEDS FOR EACH 
DISCREPANT PRESENTATION (DISCREPANCY FEE). 
9)ALL DOCUMENTS MUST BE ISSUED IN ENGLISH. 
10)CHARTER PARTY BILL OF LADING NOT ACCEPTABLE. 
11)PLEASE SEND ALL YOUR SWIFT MESSAGES TO BANK-C SWIFT AS ‘BANKCGMBCEN’ (for 
illustration purpose) 
 
71B: Charges 
ALL BANKING CHARGES OUTSIDE THE GAMBIA ARE FOR ACCOUNT OF THE 
BENEFICIERY/EXPORTER 
48:Period for Presentation: 
21 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF BILL OF LADING WITHIN THE L/C VALIDITY 
49: Confirmation Instructions 
WITHOUT 
53A: Reimbursing Bank 
SWIFT CODE FOR THE PAYING AGENT OF BANK-B 
ADDRESS FOR THE PAYING AGENT OF BANK-B 
 
78: Instructions to the Paying/Accepting/Negotiating Bank 
THIS L/C IS SUBJECT TO THE ICC UNIFORMED CUSTOMS PRACTICES 2007 REVISION 
(BROUCHURE 600) AND URR LATEST VERSION AND THIS L/C IS TO BE REFINANCED 
UNDER REFININCING 2-STEP MURABAHAH AGREEMENT DATED 07/11/2009 WITH REF 
BANK-B/2009/TF3/GAM/0001 BETWEEN BANK-C AND BANK-B FOR A PERIOD OF 360 
DAYS. UPON RECEIVING THE DOCS. AND CERTIFYING TO US THAT THE TERMS AND 
CONDITIONS AF THE CREDIT HAVE BEEN COMPLIED WITH, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED 
HEREBY TO REIMBURSE YOURSELVES FOR YOUR PAYMENT UNDER THIS L/C ON 
BANK-B US DOLLAR ACCOUNT WITH BANK-B’S PAYING AGENT ON DUE DATE. 
 
72: Sender to Receiver Information 
THIS IS A CC MESSAGE FOR YOUR NOTIFICATION AND THE ORIGINAL ONE SENT TO 
ADVISING/EXPORTER’S BANK, ADDRESS OF ADVISING/EXPORTER’S BANK, SWIFT 
CODE OF ADVISING/EXPORTER’S BANK. 
BEST REGARDS,. 
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CENTRAL BRANCH 
                            
Source: Specimen prepared by the author based on draft provided by International Islamic Trade 
Finance Corporation of IDB Group 
After receiving above copy of the L/C, Bank-B issues an ICR (Irrevocable Commitment 
for Reimbursement) and sends the ICR to: 
A. The negotiating bank 
B. The issuing bank (Bank-C) 
C. Its Paying Agent Bank 
Figure 21: Figure 4.4:  Disbursement Procedure under L/C  
 
 
Source: International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation of Islamic Development Bank Group 
 
With ICR, where Bank-B agrees to reimburse the negotiating bank the amount under the 
L/C opened by the importer from Bank-C. After the shipment by the exporter, Bank-B’s 
paying agent bank honours the claim from the negotiating bank based on satisfactory 
shipment documentation, such as Bill of Lading, invoice, etc., identified in the L/C. 
Details of the transaction can be found in the Figure 4.4.
93
  
In many cases, L/C issued by a bank in LDMCs is not perceived to be solid by exporters 
in other countries as these exports are not well convinced about capacity of banks in 
                                                 
93 In (8.A), Paying Agent would reimburse at the date of maturity (i.e. 90 days from the date of Bill of Lading) if the L/C is not at 
Sight. 
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some LDMCs to honour their obligations with L/C issued, as indicated in Table 4.2, to 
affect payment upon fulfilment of shipping requirements highlighted. Very often, 
exporters ask L/C confirmation from another bank outside the country, which generates 
additional L/C confirmation cost for importers in LDMCs.
94 
Hence, there is a potential 
trade facilitation opportunities in this area by reducing additional confirmation costs. The 
European Bank for reconstruction with its Regional Trade Facilitation Programme, which 
is a network of banks enjoying EBRD’s guarantee, addressed this issue since 1998. 
EBRD provide guarantee to confirming banks and undertakes the political and 
commercial payment risk of issuing banks in developing countries.
95
    
As the content of ICR indicates in Table 4.3, it acts as a replacement to L/C confirmation. 
Hence, this 2-Step murabahah structure, in addition to availing trade finance, can be 
remedy for cost associated with L/C confirmation for many OIC LDMCs. 
Table 40: Table 4.3: Content of ICR in Disbursement under 2-Step Murabahah 
ATTN: TRADE FINANCE SERVICES 
WE HAVE ADVISED ADVISING/EXPORTER’S BANK, ADDRESS OF ADVISING/EXPORTER’S 
BANK, SWIFT CODE, AS FOLLOWS:- 
 
QUOTE 
ATTN: DOCUMENTARY CREDITS DEPT. 
OUR REF: DS/BANK-B/GAM 0001 (PLS QUOTE IN ALL 
CORRESP.) WE HEREBY ISSUE OUR IRREVOCABLE 
COMMITMENT FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF CLAIMS UNDER 
FOLLOWING L/C PRESENTED TO OUR PAYING AGENT BANK,UPTO A MAXIMUM OF US$ 
312,500 (UNITED STATES DOLLAR THREE HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED 
ONLY) 
PROVIDED THE NEGOTIATING BANK CERTIFIES TO THEM BY AUTHENTICATED MESSAGE 
THAT ALL TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF L/C HAVE BEEN COMPLIED WITH. WE HAVE SENT 
A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE TO OUR PAYING AGENT BANK  AUTHORIZING THEM TO 
HONOUR CLAIMS FROM THE NEGOTIATING BANK AFTER 3 (THREE) WORKING DAYS OF 
RECEIPT BY THEM OF THE NEGOTIATING BANK'S CERTIFICATE AS NOTED ABOVE. 
L/C DETAILS:- 
1.L/C NO.:  CEN/92040198  
2.ISSUED BY:  BANK-C 
                   (CENTRAL BRANCH) 
                   BANJUL, THE GAMBIA(SWIFT CODE OF BANK-C) 
3.BY ORDER OF: THE NAME OF THE IMPORTER, ADDRESS OF THE IMPORTER, TEL:XXXXX 
4.FAVOUR:  THE NAME OF THE EXPORTER, ADDRESS OF THE EXPORTER, TEL:XXXXX  
5.AMOUNT:  US$ 312,500 
6.EXPIRY:  30.06.2010 
7.LATEST SHIPMENT: 09.06.2010 
8.ADVISING BANK: SWIFT CODE OF ADVISING/EXPORTER’S BANK, ADDRESS OF 
                                                 
94 Available at: http://www.ebrd.com/apply/trade/about/tfpfacts.pdf accessed on 25 April 2010. 
95 Available at: http://www.ebrd.com/projects/eval/showcase/tfp.pdf accessed on 25 April 2010.  
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ADVISING/EXPORTER’S BANK 
9.PAYMENT:  AT SIGHT 
10.BANKING CHARGES:ALL BANKING CHARGES OUTSIDE THE GAMBIA ARE FOR 
ACCOUNT OF THE  BENEFICIARY. 
 
IN THE EVENT THERE ARE ANY DISCREPANCIES IN OR AMENDMENTS TO THE ABOVE 
MENTIONED L/C DETAILS OR TO (I) THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, (II) THE 
DESCRIPTION OF GOODS, (III) THE QUANTITY OF GOODS AND (IV)THE TAKAFUL CLAUSE, 
THE PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE BANK-B MUST BE OBTAINED IN ORDER THAT THIS 
COMMITMENT REMAINS OPERATIVE. ANY OTHER AMENDMENTS ISSUED BY THE L/C. 
ISSUING BANK DO NOT REQUIRE THE APPROVAL OF THE BANK-B. UNQUOTE. 
 
KINDLY HONOUR TO THE DEBIT OF BANK-B US DOLLAR CALL ACCOUNT 
NO.3400000002 CLAIMS FROM THE NEGOTIATING BANK AGAINST THEIR TESTED MSG 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE AS ABOVE. YOUR AUTHORITY TO PAY UNDER THIS 
COMMITMENT IS VALID FOR ONE MONTH AFTER THE EXPIRY DATE OF THE L/C. 
Source: Specimen prepared by the author based on draft provided by International Islamic Trade 
Finance Corporation of IDB Group 
2-Step murabahah trade financing through ICR can not only be an effective tool to avail 
more financing in LDMC OIC countries but also play a trade facilitation role by 
eliminating need for additional confirmation outside the country. Hence, diffusion of this 
Islamic finance product would create substantial means for LDMCs to promote their 
trade.  
Apart from L/C, another common method of international trade settlement mechanism is 
“Documentary Collection”. In its simplest form it means the handling of documents by 
banks on instruction received from the exporter.
96
  
A standard Documentary Collection transaction would follows as also indicated in Figure 
4.5:  
(i) An export contract would be signed between the importer and the exporter; 
(ii) The exporter directly makes the shipment to the importer; 
(iii) The exporter sends the necessary documents such as invoice, bill of lading, 
takaful/insurance certificate, certificate of origin, etc. to his own bank 
(remitting bank) together with a collection order; 
(iv) The remitting bank then sends the documents together with necessary 
instruction to the collecting bank (Bank-C in this particular case); 
                                                 
96 
There are two types of documentary collection:  
i. Delivery against Payment (D/P): The handling bank is authorized to release the documents for custom clearance to 
importers only against cash. 
ii. Delivery against Acceptance (D/A): The handling bank is authorized to release the documents for custom clearance 
to importers only against his acceptance of a bill of exchange. 
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(v) The collecting bank informs the importer of the arrival of the documents and 
notifies him of the terms on which these documents shall be released; 
(vi) The importer makes the payment (or accepts a bill of exchange in case of 
Delivery against Acceptance) and in return receives the documents for custom 
clearance of the goods; 
(vii) Collecting bank makes payment to the remitting bank. Then, remitting bank 
pays to the exporter.  
Under 2-Step murabahah operations, collecting bank (Bank-C) informs Bank-B of the 
arrival of the documents. Based on this notification, Bank-B instructs its paying agent to 
transfers money to the remitting bank in favour the exporter.
97
 Upon the transfer of the 
amount the collecting bank releases the documents to the importer.   
Figure 22: Figure 4.5:  Disbursement Procedure under Documentary Collection  
 
 
Source: International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation of Islamic Development Bank Group 
 
                                                 
97 In (6. Payment) Paying Agent would reimburse the Remitting Bank at the date of maturity (i.e. 60 days from the date of invoice) in 
case of Delivery against Acceptance (D/A). 
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4.10 LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR 2-STEP MURABAHAH 
The Islamic Fiqh Academy in its fourth annual plenary session held in Jeddah in 
February 1988 noted that the Shari’ah encourages written contracts as stipulated in the 
Holy Qur’an (2: 282): 
When ye deal with each other, in transactions involving future obligations in a 
fixed period of time, reduce them to writing. …It is more just in the sight of God, 
more suitable as evidence and more convenient to prevent doubts among 
yourselves. 
It is obvious that the cross-border nature of this transaction would be necessitating a solid 
legal framework to ensure the rights of all parties involved. Hence, the legal agreement 
between Bank-B and Bank-C for the above-mentioned disbursement, where exporter is 
from Egypt and importer is from the Gambia, is explained here below. The content of the 
2-Step Murabahah Agreement in this case would look like as follows:  
Section-1 Definitions 
Section-2 Utilisation of the approved amount 
Section-3 Procurement of the goods 
Section-4 Takaful 
Section-5 Delivery 
Section-6 Payment of the purchase price by BANK-B 
Section-7 Promise by BANK-C to purchase the goods  from BANK-B and to resell the same 
Section-8 Sale price payable to BANK-B 
Section-9 Sale of the goods to  BANK-C without  responsibility of  BANK-B for defects 
Section-10 Denomination of the sale price 
Section-11 Payment of the sale price 
Section-12 Manner of payment of the sale price 
Section-13 Delay in the exercise of rights 
Section-14 Cancellation and suspension of the approved amount 
Section-15 Representations and warranties 
Section-16 Events of default 
Section-17 Indemnity 
Section-18 Effectiveness 
Section-19 Conditions precedent to disbursement 
Section-20 Documents-reports 
Section-21 Governing law-settlement of disputes 
Section-22 Notices- requests 
APPENDIX-I Form of opinion of counsel BANK-C 
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APPENDIX-II Form of offer from  BANK-C to purchase the goods from BANK-B 
APPENDIX-III Form of acceptance by BANK-B 
APPENDIX-IV Transaction intimation notice 
The introduction of the agreement would indicate as:  
Table 41: Table 4.4: Introduction of 2-Step Murabahah Agreement 
THIS AGREEMENT is made on ____/____/1430H corresponding to ____/____/2009G between Bank-B and 
Bank-C. 
WHEREAS, 
 
(A) BANK-C has requested BANK-B to purchase a quantity of the Goods (hereinafter defined) and to sell 
the same to BANK-C on murabahah basis, so that BANK-C may resell the same to 
Buyer(s)/Importer(s) (hereinafter defined). 
(B) IBANK-B has, on 21/10/2009, approved the purchase of the Goods in an amount not exceeding US$ 
100 million (United States Dollar Hundred Million) only, and the sale thereof to BANK-C for resale 
to the Buyers. 
(C) The terms and conditions referred to in paragraph (B) above have been accepted by BANK-C on 
27/10/2009. 
(D) BANK-B has agreed, subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, to authorize BANK-C, as 
an agent of and for and on behalf of BANK-B and to the extent of the Approved Amount, to negotiate 
with the Supplier(s)/Exporter(s) (hereinafter defined) and to conclude a contract or contracts for the 
purchase of the Goods. 
 
NOW IT IS HEREBY AGREED AS FOLLOWS: 
 
Source: Outlined by the author based on template provided by the Legal Department of Islamic of 
Islamic Development Bank 
The first section of the agreement highlights the definition for the agreement as such 
“Except where the context otherwise requires, each of the following terms shall have the 
meaning assigned to it hereunder wherever used in this Agreement”. After definitions in 
the form of a table, section two of the agreement explains the utilization of the approved 
amount by Bank-C as indicated in Table 4.5. 
 Table 42: Table 4.5: Utilization of the Approved Amount 
2.1 BANK-B shall, upon effectiveness of this Agreement in accordance with Section 18 hereof, make 
the Approved Amount available to BANK-C for the Operation. 
2.2 The availability of the Approved Amount is subject to, in the absolute opinion of BANK-B, the 
following events: 
(i) a Material Adverse Effect has occurred and is continuing; 
(ii) there being no adverse change in the international money, banking and/or capital markets which 
would have adverse impact on the domestic money, banking and/or capital markets; 
(iii) there being no adverse change in the socio-political, financial and/or economic conditions of the 
GAMBIA, which would have adverse impact on the domestic money, banking and/or capital markets; 
(iv)  there being no adverse effect on BANK-B's access to the money and capital markets. 
2.3 Prior to each Transaction, BANK-C shall provide to BANK-B a Transaction Intimation Notice, 
which shall detail the type of the Goods, the name and contact details of the Buyer and the Supplier and the 
date of the Transaction.  
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2.4 BANK-C shall not proceed with the Transaction without obtaining the prior approval of BANK-B 
to the Transaction Intimation Notice. 
2.5 BANK-C shall pay to BANK-B administrative fees amounting to US$ 100,000 (US$ Hundred 
Thousand) as a condition of effectiveness, prior to utilization of the Approved Amount. 
Source: Outlined by the author based on template provided by the Legal Department of Islamic of 
Islamic Development Bank 
After detailing the utilization matters, section three would explain the procurement 
transaction during utilization of the facility by Bank-C.  
Table 43: Table 4.6: Procurement of the Goods 
3.1 It is agreed between the parties hereto that BANK-C’s authority to purchase the Goods for and on 
behalf of BANK-B covers its procurement from the Supplier/Exporter and that the procurement 
shall be in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Agreement and shall be subject to the 
procedure to which the BANK-B may, in writing, agree or determine. 
3.2 In acting as an agent of BANK-B, BANK-C shall endeavour to act as if acting for its own account 
and shall take all necessary measures to protect BANK-B’s rights and interests and will not do or 
omit to do anything which will be inconsistent with its obligations and responsibilities under the 
Agreement.  
3.3 BANK-C undertakes to select the Goods and to exercise as much care in satisfying itself as to 
matters of quality and quantity of the Goods and title thereto and of performance by the 
Supplier/Exporter as if it were purchasing the Goods for its own account directly from the 
Supplier/Exporter. 
3.4 BANK-C shall be fully and solely responsible for the quality, condition, selection and 
specifications of the Goods and for deciding the need for, and the extent and the manner of, the 
transaction and storage thereof. 
3.5 BANK-C shall ensure that all necessary permits, exchange control approvals, import licenses and 
all other consents required in connection with the purchase of the Goods are obtained.  
3.6 BANK-C shall submit through the most expeditious mode of communication the terms and 
conditions of the draft Purchase Contract for the approval of BANK-B prior to the execution of the 
same. Any reference to the Purchase Contract, shall be taken as a reference to such contract after the 
approval of its terms and conditions by BANK-B and its conclusion by BANK-C on BANK-B’s 
behalf. Once approved by BANK-B, no material amendment to or waiver or cancellation of, the 
Purchase Contract shall be made or agreed by BANK-C without the prior written consent of 
BANK-B. 
3.7 BANK-C shall ensure that the purchase of the Goods will be done without the assistance or 
intervention, whether direct or indirect, of any middleman, commission agent or a similar person. 
3.8 BANK-C shall, on behalf of BANK-B, do all things and observe and perform all obligations 
falling to be done or observed under the Purchase Contract as if the Goods are purchased by 
BANK-B directly from the Supplier. 
Source: Outlined by the author based on template provided by the Legal Department of Islamic of 
Islamic Development Bank 
Section four highlights the responsibility of Bank-C for arrangement of necessary takaful 
as:   
“BANK-C shall insure, or procure takaful of, the Goods during transit and until the 
Sale Contract between BANK-B and BANK-C is concluded in accordance with 
Section-7 hereof. Such takaful shall be, to the full replacement cost of the Goods, with 
reputable insurers acceptable to BANK-B against such risks as are normally insured by 
persons transporting goods in the same manner and of the same kind as the Goods. 
BANK-C shall ensure that a term of such takaful will be that any proceeds payable by 
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the insurers under such policy will be paid in a freely convertible currency. BANK-C 
shall also make sure that, if any of the risks covered by the takaful shall have 
happened, the proceeds of such takaful shall be paid to BANK-B.  
 
Where the draft Purchase Contract does not provide for the takaful of the Goods by 
the Supplier/Exporter in the manner specified in the above paragraph, BANK-C shall, 
at the time of submitting the terms and conditions of the draft Purchase Contract for 
the approval of BANK-B, advise BANK-B of the arrangements it has made, or will 
make, to insure the Goods in the aforesaid manner in order to obtain BANK-B's 
approval for the same.” 
In section five, Bank-C shall ensure that “the Purchase Contract provides for the delivery 
of the Goods to its order, and Bank-C shall be responsible for checking its quality, 
quantity, specifications and all other matters relating thereto”.  The payment of purchase 
price by Bank-B is explained in section six as indicated in Table 4.7.  
Table 44: Table 4.7: Clauses on Payment of Purchase Price by Bank-B 
6.1 Unless BANK-B otherwise agrees in writing, payment of the Purchase Price of all Goods shall be 
made by Documentary Letters of Credit. 
6.2 For each Operation, the minimum drawdown shall be US$ 100,000.00 (United States Dollar One 
Hundred Thousand) and the maximum drawdown shall be US$3,000,000.00 (United States Dollar 
Three Million). 
6.3 Subject to Sections 6.1 and 6.2 hereof, promptly after securing BANK-B’s approval, BANK-C shall 
open the Letter of Credit in favour of the Supplier/Exporter in accordance with the terms mentioned in 
Section 6.4 hereof, and arrange with the issuing bank to send a copy of the full text of the Letter of 
Credit to BANK-B by an authenticated message. Upon receipt of the authenticated message, BANK-
B shall check the terms of the Letter of Credit against the terms of this Agreement. 
6.4 Subject to Section 6.2 hereof, the BANK-C shall open a Letter of Credit in the manner required by the 
Purchase Contract in favour of the Supplier. Each and every Letter of Credit established under this 
Agreement shall contain, inter alia, the following particulars: 
a) The number of the Documentary Letter of Credit. 
b) The name of the issuing bank. 
c) The name of the applicant for the Credit. 
d) The name of the beneficiary of the Credit. 
e) Description and quantity of the Goods. 
f) Origin of the Goods. 
g) The amount. 
h) Takaful cover 
i) The expiry date. 
j) The latest shipment date. 
k) The name of the paying bank or the negotiating bank. 
l) That the Credit will be available by sight/deferred payment. 
m) That the Letter of Credit is subject to the UCP. 
n) That the negotiating bank to inform BANK-B 3 (Three) days prior to the value date of the 
payment to the Supplier.  
6.5 The issuing bank shall communicate to BANK-B through authenticated SWIFT message the full text 
of the Letter of Credit. Provided that the terms and conditions of the Letter of Credit are acceptable to 
BANK-B, BANK-B will, on receipt of the said telex or message, issue an Irrevocable Commitment to 
Reimburse. 
6.6 Amendments of any Letter of Credit relating to the matters specified in Section 6.4 hereof shall be 
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subject to the approval of BANK-B. Any other amendment could be made by agreement of the parties 
to the Letter of Credit without reverting to BANK-B. However, any such amendment shall be notified 
to BANK-B. 
6.7 The first Letter of Credit shall be opened within 2 (Two) months from the Effective Date or any other 
mutually agreed date.  In the event that the first Letter of Credit is not opened or submitted to BANK-
B for the first Disbursement to the Supplier within the period specified hereinabove, and BANK-B is 
not satisfied with the justification for such failure to open or submit the first Letter of Credit, BANK-B 
may, by notice to the BANK-C, terminate this Agreement and cancel the Approved Amount. 
6.8 It is agreed by the parties hereto that the whole of the Approved Amount shall be disbursed within a 
period 12 (Twelve) months from the date of first Disbursement. Unless BANK-B otherwise agrees, 
such part of the Approved Amount as may remain un-disbursed after the expiry of the period specified 
herein, will be considered cancelled. 
6.9 BANK-C shall bear the fees of issuance of any Letter of Credit hereunder or the confirmation thereof, 
if any. 
Source: Outlined by the author based on template provided by the Legal Department of Islamic of 
Islamic Development Bank 
Going through section 6.2 of the agreement in Table 4.7, the agreement sets maximum 
amount of drawdown to ensure that the facility to be availed for SMEs. After 
procurement of goods by Bank-C, the next section, shown in Table 4.8, of the agreement 
would govern promise by Bank-C to purchase the goods from Bank-B and to resell to the 
same.  
Table 45: Table 4.8: Clauses on Promise by Bank-C to Purchase the Goods from Bank-B  
7.1 BANK-C undertakes to purchase the Goods from BANK-B after it has taken delivery thereof on 
behalf of BANK-B on the terms specified in Section 7.2 to Section 21 hereof. 
7.2 The Sale Contract shall be concluded by an exchange of tested telexes, authenticated swift or fax 
messages as soon as BANK-C has taken delivery of the Goods on behalf of BANK-B. The said 
exchange will consist of an offer from BANK-C in the form provided in Appendix-IV, and an 
acceptance from BANK-B in the form provided in Appendix-V. If BANK-C fails, without excuse, to 
communicate with BANK-B for the finalization of the conclusion of the Sale Contract after BANK-C 
has taken delivery of the Goods on behalf of BANK-B, BANK-C shall be liable to BANK-B for any 
damage caused by the breach of BANK-C’s undertaking to conclude the Sale Contract. 
7.3 BANK-C shall, immediately upon purchase of the Goods from BANK-B hereunder, resell the Goods 
to the Buyer on such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon between BANK-C and the Buyer. 
Source: Outlined by the author based on template provided by the Legal Department of Islamic of 
Islamic Development Bank 
Sale price payable to Bank-B from Bank-C would be indicated in section eight. Though 
there exist a controversy, LIBOR usually is used as benchmark in murabahah 
agreements. However, use of LIBOR as a reference is an accepted practice among 
Shari’ah scholars by analogy of grape juice to wine. After the sale of goods from Bank-B 
to Bank-C, Bank-B avails itself from any responsibility for defect with goods by a 
paragraph in section nine as:  
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As  BANK-C will select the Goods relying solely on its own skill and judgment, it is 
expressly agreed between BANK-B and   BANK-C  that  BANK-C shall purchase the 
Goods from BANK-B “As   Is” on delivery without responsibility on the part of 
BANK-B for any defect therein. When BANK-C takes delivery of the Goods and the 
Sale Contract is concluded in accordance with Section 7 hereof, or after 21 
(Twenty-one) days from the date of delivery, BANK-C will be assumed to have 
examined the Goods and has satisfied itself as to its quality, quantity etc. However, 
if any defect appears in the Goods, BANK-B undertakes to assign to BANK-C, or to 
its nominee, the rights and warranties to which BANK-B may be entitled under the 
Purchase Contract, together with any other rights and warranties which may be 
implied by law or custom in favour of a purchaser. 
In this case denomination of the sale price is defined in United States Dollar in section 
ten of the agreement. Based on this sale price, section eleven of the agreement governs 
the payment of sale price as indicated with Table 4.9. 
Table 46: Table 4.9: Payment of Sale Price Clauses 
11.1 BANK-C shall pay to BANK-B the Sale Price 12 (Twelve) months from the date the corresponding 
Purchase Price is paid by BANK-B. 
11.2 If any payment becomes due on a day on which the banks are not officially open for business in the 
place where payment is to be effected by BANK-C to BANK-B hereunder, such payment shall be made 
on the next following day on which such banks are open for business. 
11.3 If the BANK-C fails to pay any amount payable hereunder when it is due in accordance with the terms 
of this Agreement, then in addition to paying such amount, the BANK-C shall pay BANK-B a late 
payment charge in respect of overdue amount and any such late payment charge shall be calculated and 
applied as follows:  
 
(a) a sum determined by BANK-B after applying the formula indicated below: 
 
A x B x C 
 360 
Where: “A” means the unpaid amount; 
 “B” a sum in aggregate equal to 1% per annum; 
 “C” means the number of days from and including such 
due date to, and, including the date of actual payment 
(whether before or after judgment). 
(b) all reasonable costs and expenses (including, without limitation, any legal, or  
collecting agent’s costs and expenses) incurred by BANK-B as a result of delay in  
payment to BANK-B. 
 
Source: Outlined by the author based on template provided by the Legal Department of Islamic of 
Islamic Development Bank 
In case of late payment by Bank-C, Bank-B charges late payment charges though it might 
be concern from the aspect of Shari’ah compliance. However, Bank-B shall, after 
deducting all costs and expenses incurred, pay any amount received pursuant to this 
Section-11.3 to a Charity Fund Account, details of which are stipulated in the same 
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section. In doing so, Bank-B would ensure that no late payment charges are incurred by it 
(except from cost incurred for recovery) but all late payment charges are directed to 
charity in order to comply with Islamic finance principles. 
Section twelve of the agreement would clarify the manner of payment of the sale price as 
such:  
BANK-C shall pay each Sale Price to BANK-B by telex or cable transfer to such bank 
account as BANK-B shall specify to BANK-C, or in such other manner as BANK-B 
may direct from time to time. All charges and expenses in connection with any 
payment by BANK-C to BANK-B hereunder, including legal fees, agent bank fees and 
taxes, shall be paid by and shall be for the account of BANK-C. All payments by 
BANK-C to BANK-B hereunder shall be made without any set-off or counterclaim and 
free and clear of all taxes, charges, deductions or withholdings of whatever nature, all 
of which shall be for the account of BANK-C. 
After the clause on delay in the exercise of rights as such: “No delay, forbearance or 
other indulgence on the part of BANK-B or BANK-C in exercising any rights, which it 
may have against the other party, shall constitute a waiver thereof”, section fourteen 
governs cancellation and suspension as provided in Table 4.10. 
Table 47: Table 4.10: Clauses on Cancellation and Suspension  
14.1 Unless a commitment has been made with a third party by, or on behalf of, BANK-B: 
(i) BANK-C may request BANK-B to cancel the Approved Amount or any part thereof. 
(ii) BANK-B may, by notice to BANK-C, suspend the authority of BANK-C to purchase the 
Goods on behalf of BANK-B in any of the following cases: 
(a) If the Agreement is not declared effective within 2 (Two) months of the date of the 
Agreement. 
(b) An Event of Default shall have occurred and be continuing. 
(c) A Material Adverse Effect shall have occurred and be continuing. 
(d) Any action shall have been taken or legal proceedings shall have been started for 
the winding up, dissolution or reorganization with effect on the capacity of BANK-
C to implement the Operation or meet its obligations under the Agreement 
(otherwise than for the purposes of an amalgamation or reconstruction while 
solvent on terms approved by BANK-B in writing) or for the appointment of a 
receiver, trustee or similar officer of BANK-C or of any or all revenues and assets 
of BANK-C. 
(e) An extraordinary situation shall have arisen which (i) shall make it, in the opinion 
of BANK-B, improbable that the Operation can be carried out by BANK-C, or (ii) 
shall prevent the attainment of the purposes for which this Agreement is entered 
into. 
14.2 Suspension of the authority of BANK-C to purchase the Goods on behalf of BANK-B shall continue, 
in whole or in part, as the case may be, until the event or events which gave rise to such suspension 
shall have ceased to exist before the expiry of the time limit indicated in Section 6.3 hereof, or until 
BANK-B shall have notified BANK-C that the suspension has been lifted, whichever is earlier, 
provided, however, that in the case of any such notice, the lifting of the suspension shall only be to the 
extent and subject to the conditions specified in such notice, and no such notice shall affect or impair 
any right, power or remedy of BANK-B in respect of any other or subsequent event described in this 
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Section. 
14.3 If (a) suspension under Section 14.2 hereof shall have continued with respect to any part of the 
Approved Amount for a continuous period of 30 (Thirty) days or (b) at any time BANK-B determines, 
after consultation with BANK-C, that any part of the Approved Amount will not be required to 
finance the purchase of the Goods hereunder, BANK-B may give notice to BANK-C cancelling such 
part of the Approved Amount. That part of the Approved Amount shall be considered cancelled as 
from the date specified in such notice. 
14.4 BANK-C shall have no authority to make any commitment on behalf of BANK-B after the date 
indicated in Section 14.3 hereof. 
14.5 Cancellation of the Approved Amount or any part thereof under Section 14.3 hereof shall not 
affect any commitment made, obligations incurred or rights accrued prior to date of cancellation. 
Source: Outlined by the author based on template provided by the Legal Department of Islamic of 
Islamic Development Bank 
Like any international agreement, 2-Step murabahah Agreement would have clauses on 
representations and warranties.   
Table 48: Table 4.11: Representation and Warranties Clauses  
15.1 BANK-C represents and warrants to BANK-B and acknowledges that BANK-B has agreed to this 
Agreement in reliance on the following representations and warranties: 
(a) BANK-C is duly established and validly existing under the laws of Gambia and has the 
corporate power and has obtained all required Authorisations to own its assets, conduct 
its business as presently conducted and to enter into, and comply with its obligations 
under, this Agreement and the Transaction to which it is a party or will, in the case of any 
Transaction document not executed as at the date of this Agreement, when that 
Transaction document is executed, have the corporate power to enter into, and comply 
with its obligations under, that Transaction document. 
(b) Each Transaction document to which BANK-C is a party has been, or will be, duly 
authorised and executed by BANK-C and constitutes, or will when executed constitute, a 
valid and legally binding obligation of BANK-C, enforceable in accordance with its 
terms and BANK-C is not, nor will it be, a party to any agreement other than the 
Transaction documents, and none of the Transaction documents has been, or will be, 
amended or modified except as permitted under this Agreement. 
(c) Neither the making of any Transaction document to which BANK-C is a party nor the 
compliance with its terms will conflict with or result in a breach of any of the terms, 
conditions or provisions of, or constitute a default or require any consent under, any 
indenture, mortgage, agreement or other instrument or arrangement to which BANK-C is 
a party or which it is bound, or violate any of the terms or provisions of the BANK-C’s 
constitutive documents or any Authorisation, judgment, decree or order or any statute, 
rule or regulation applicable to BANK-C. 
(d) To the best of BANK-C’s knowledge, after due inquiry all the Authorisations (other than 
Authorisations that are of a routine nature and are obtained in the ordinary course of 
business) needed by BANK-C to conduct its business, carry out the Transactions and 
execute, and comply with its obligations under, this Agreement and each of the other 
Transaction documents to which it is a party; and (ii) except for rights that can reasonably 
be expected to be obtained on commercially reasonable terms at the time required, the 
Transaction documents contain all rights that are necessary for the conduct of the 
obligations of BANK-C as contemplated under this Agreement. 
(e) The BANK-C’s constitutive documents have not been amended since 1 July 2009. 
(f) Neither BANK-C nor any of its property enjoys any right of immunity from set-off, suit 
or execution with respect to its assets or its obligations under any Transaction document. 
(g) Since 1 July 2009, BANK-C: 
(i) has not suffered any change that has a material adverse effect or incurred any 
substantial loss or liability; and 
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(ii) has not undertaken or agreed to undertake any substantial obligation. 
(h) The financial statements of BANK-C for the period ending on 1 July 2009: 
(i) have been prepared in accordance with the accounting standards, and give a true 
and fair view of the financial condition of BANK-C as of the date as of which 
they were prepared and the results of BANK-C's operations during the period 
then ended; and 
(ii) disclose all liabilities (contingent or otherwise) of BANK-C or and the reserves, 
if any, for such liabilities and all unrealized or anticipated liabilities and losses 
arising from commitments entered into by BANK-C (whether or not such 
commitments have been disclosed in such financial statements). 
(i) BANK-C has good and marketable title to all of the assets purported to be owned by it, in 
all cases free and clear of all liens, other than Permitted Liens and no contracts or 
arrangements, conditional or unconditional, exist for the creation by BANK-C of any 
lien; 
(j) All tax returns and reports of BANK-C required by law to be filed have been duly filed 
and all taxes, obligations, fees and other governmental charges upon BANK-C, or its 
properties, or its income or assets, which are due and payable or to be withheld, have 
been paid or withheld, other than those presently payable without penalty. 
(k) BANK-C is not engaged in nor, to the best of its knowledge, after due inquiry, threatened 
by, any litigation, arbitration or administrative proceedings, the outcome of which could 
reasonably be expected to have a material adverse effect. 
(l) No judgment or order has been issued which has or may reasonably be expected to have a 
material adverse effect. 
(m) To the best of its knowledge and belief after due inquiry, BANK-C is not in violation of 
any statute or regulation of any authority. 
(n) There are no ongoing or, to the best knowledge of BANK-C after due inquiry, threatened, 
strikes, slowdowns or work stoppages by employees of BANK-C or any contractor with 
respect to this Agreement. 
(o) None of the representations and warranties in this Section omits any matter the omission 
of which makes any of such representations and warranties untrue or misleading in any 
material respect. 
15.2 Each representation and warranty is deemed to be repeated by BANK-C on the date of each 
Disbursement. It is deemed to be made by reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the 
representation or warranty. 
Source: Outlined by the author based on template provided by the Legal Department of Islamic of 
Islamic Development Bank 
As part of the process, afterwards, standard clauses governing events of default by Bank-
C, indemnity for Bank-B, declaration of effectiveness conditions for the facility under 2-
Step murabahah scheme as well as conditions precedent to disbursement, documentation, 
governing law for settlement of dispute for the agreement and notice by Bank-C would 
follow. This agreement with Islamic finance components would differ from conventional 
internal finance agreements in governing law for settlement of dispute as the clauses 
indicated in Table 4.12. Most of the Islamic Banks use English Common Law as 
governing law in their agreement but recent cases show that under English Law, Shair’ah 
principles might be disregarded by the courts. In this regard direct reference to Shari’ah 
Law as governing law would be instrumental.  
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Table 49: Table 4.12: Clauses on Governing Law/Dispute Settlement 
21.1 This Agreement shall be governed by and be construed in accordance with Islamic Shari’ah (as set 
out in Shari’ah Standards published by the Accounting and Auditing Organization of Islamic 
Financial Institutions and as interpreted by the Islamic Fiqh Academy of the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation or BANK-B’s Shari’ah Committee). 
21.2 Any dispute between the parties to this Agreement and any claim by any party against the other 
party arising under this Agreement, which could not be determined by agreement of the parties 
within 60 (Sixty) days of notice by one party to the other, shall be submitted to an arbitration panel 
for final and binding decision in accordance with the rules and procedures of the International 
Islamic Centre for Reconciliation and Arbitration (IICRA), Dubai. The arbitration rules and 
procedures of IICRA shall be in lieu of any other procedure for the determination of disputes 
between the parties to this Agreement or any claim by any party against the other party arising 
thereunder. The English language shall be used throughout the arbitral proceedings and the 
resulting award shall be final, binding and enforceable on the parties. 
21.3 If within 30 (Thirty) days after counterparts of the award shall have been delivered to the parties, 
the award is not complied with, any party may enter judgment upon, or institute a proceeding to 
enforce the award, in any court of competent jurisdiction against the other party, may enforce such 
judgment by execution or may pursue any other appropriate remedy against the other party for the 
enforcement of the award or the provisions of this Agreement. 
21.4 BANK-C agrees that any judgment rendered under this Agreement against it may be executed 
against its funds (assets) in any jurisdiction. BANK-C hereby irrevocably waives any objection it 
may have to any suit, action or proceeding arising out of or relating to the enforcement of an 
arbitration judgment under this Agreement, whether brought in any jurisdiction in which it has 
funds (assets), and hereby further irrevocably waives any claim that any such suit, action or 
proceeding brought in any jurisdiction has been brought in any inconvenient forum. 
21.5 To the extent that BANK-C may in any jurisdiction claim for itself or its assets immunity from 
suit, execution, attachment (whether in aid or execution, before award or judgment or otherwise) 
or other legal process or to the extent that in any such jurisdiction there may be attributed to itself 
or its assets such immunity (whether or not claimed), BANK-C hereby irrevocably agrees not to 
claim and hereby irrevocably waives such immunity. 
21.6 Notwithstanding Section 21.2 above, before an arbitrator has been appointed to determine a 
dispute or a claim, BANK-B may, by notice in writing to BANK-C require that a specific dispute 
or claim to be heard by a court of law and commence proceedings accordingly in such court of 
law. This section is for the sole benefit of BANK-B. 
Source: Outlined by the author based on template provided by the Legal Department of Islamic of 
Islamic Development Bank 
The agreement would also provide formats for effecting the transaction during the 
implementation phase of the facility in the appendix. In any case, any disbursement 
request through SWIFT messages would suffice to fulfil the requirement stipulated in the 
formats in the appendix as authenticated SWIFT messages are legally binding.  
4.11 CONCLUSION: EVALUATION OF THE STRUCTURE 
The main purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the mobilization of resources with 
(Reverse) 2-Step murabahah Agreements by which fund providers are expected to 
assume only the risk of another financial institution rather than small beneficiaries. Two 
193 
 
different frameworks namely, (Reverse) 2-Step murabahah and mudarabah for resource 
mobilization are provided.  
In the first framework, called Reverse (from Bank-B’s point of view) 2-Step murabahah 
financing, Bank-A signs a murabahah agreement with Bank-B where Bank-B signs 
another murabahah agreement with its customers. In other words, Bank-B purchases 
goods and commodities from Bank-A and sells them to its customers. Under Reverse 2-
Step murabahah financing Bank-A takes the direct risk of Bank-B. That is, unlike the 
resources mobilized by mudarabah, Reverse 2-Step murabahah would appear on Bank-
B’s balance sheet and increase the leverage. Besides, based on real life experiences this 
structure may not be feasible for some banks in the position of Bank-B due to the banking 
regulations, which prohibits banks’ involvement in commodity trade in some countries. 
To overcome these types of obstacles, an agency agreement between Bank-A and Bank-B 
can be signed where Bank-A authorizes Bank-B for identification of potential 
beneficiaries for Bank-A’s financing. Then Bank-A directly signs murabahah Agreements 
with these entities identified by Bank-B. In this structure Bank-A again can take the direct 
risk of Bank-B alone through a Letter of Guarantee from Bank-B. Reverse 2-Step 
murabahah structure is easier for implementation and gives more flexibility to Bank-B 
for its relation with customers since the role of Bank-A is not necessarily highlighted as 
opposed to an agency agreement.  
The second framework for resource mobilization, mudarabah, creates some complexities, 
as it requires cumbersome money transfer processes. Transferring money to Bank-B’s 
(mudarab) account in the paying agent bank by syndication participants and then transfer 
of money forward by the mudarab decreases the efficiency. Besides, it lacks the 
attractiveness as syndication participants are expected to take direct credit risk of the 
importer possibly unknown to them. On the other hand, for Bank-B, the resources 
mobilized by mudarabah would be off-balance sheet items, the credit risk of the importer 
would be shared with other participants and Bank-B would receive mudarab fee out of 
profit realized by the participants.      
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Going through the disbursement mechanism under the 2-Step murabahah Agreement, 
one can discern the complexity created by ICR. As a matter of fact in any case Bank-C, 
supposedly local and not internationally recognized, would need an L/C confirmation 
from an international bank such as Bank-B. However, under the 2-Step murabahah 
transaction there is no harm for the importer to directly enjoy internationally recognized 
Bank-B’s L/C. Note that this might not be attractive for Bank-C as it loses fees charged to 
the importer for opening L/C and turn the 2-Step murabahah Agreement into a de facto 
agency agreement. Pros and cons of an agency would come across then as explained here 
above.     
After evaluating the different dimensions, one may appreciate the superiority of 2-Step 
murabahah financing for the simplicity it brings to the disbursement mechanism. 
Besides, 2-Step murabahah financing is very likely to be preferred by syndication 
participants over mudarabah as participants would like to avoid the credit risk of a small 
importer. However, as mentioned above, in some jurisdictions 2-Step murabahah 
financing may create legal problems to be overcome by an agency agreement 
accompanied by a Latter of Guarantee (L/G) from the fund-raising Bank. In addition, the 
fund-raising bank, Bank-B, would prefer mudarabah as it would not affect the leverage 
and brings a mudarab fee. In any case, this chapter demonstrates the potential of 2-Step 
murabahah for resource mobilization/liquidity management in Islamic finance as an 
alternative to not only mudarabah but also sukuk and commodity murabahah by 
constructing and structuring a particular mechanism.  It is expected that this might be 
utilized by IDB’s agencies in facilitating trade financing between member countries and 
also between the Bank and the member countries. 
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Chapter 5 
CONTEXTUALISATION, DISCUSSION AND 
CONCLUSION 
5.1 SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS 
The first part of Chapter 2 on determinant of intra-OIC trade indicates that recent increase 
in intra-OIC trade ratio is not achieved through existing polices of OIC organs. Hence, 
several policy measures need to be implemented to turn the OIC-Ten Year Programme of 
Action on. The majority of the possible measures relates to customs. With reference to 
many OIC countries’ worries on loss of valuable tax revenue from customs, second part 
of Chapter 2 examined the determinants of OIC countries’ customs revenue to suggest 
that trade integration itself may not lead to loss of revenue from customs. Chapter 2 is 
structured by classifying the sample of OIC countries according to GDP sizes as OIC 
countries whose GDP is less than US$40 billion are deemed small while others deemed 
as big country. The results of the econometric model indicates that tariff as well as policy 
measures such as implementation of WTO customs valuation agreement might not have 
impact on customs revenue for small OIC countries. It is argued that the lack of capacity 
in small countries to impose requirements of these policy measures is a possible cause of 
leakage in tax collection. Accordingly, the survey on trade facilitation, employing the 
same GDP size classification, under this research directed to senior government officials. 
The survey on “Trade Facilitation in OIC Member Countries vis-à-vis WTO Trade 
Facilitation Negotiations on GATT Articles V, VIII and X and Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VII (Customs Valuation) of GATT”, as provided in Appendix 
IX, was conducted during the seminar on “Non-tariff Barrier Impact on Market Access” 
in Tunisia, 4-8 October 2009. The objective of this survey is (i) to assess the level of 
implementation of GATT articles V, VII, VIII and X in OIC countries so as to diagnose 
relevant needs and (ii) to identify important trade facilitation needs/remedies as a base for 
cooperation among OIC countries. The main motivation behind such a humble survey 
initiative was to have reflections of government officials on the issue as complement to 
results of econometric models. The results of the survey indicate differing stands of OIC 
countries based on their economic size. Small countries mainly suffer from supply side 
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constraint, including lack of trade finance, as well as lack of capacity for standard and 
conformity assessment testing. Besides, public authorities of small countries hold very 
strong concerns on customs revenue loss while big countries’ main concern is the market 
access to other OIC countries especially market access to small OIC countries. The result 
of the survey is provided in Table 5.1. As per indication of second part of Chapter 2, OIC 
countries are classified as small and big based on their GDP size while designing the 
questionnaire.      
Table 50: Table 5.1: Summary for the Results of the Survey
98  
Small Countries (GDP less than US$ 40 billion) Big Countries (GDP more than US$ 40 billion) 
1- Supply side constraints for trade (with reference 
WTO Aid-for-Trade Agenda): 
1.a.Insufficient transportation infrastructure;  
1.b. Low industrial production capacity;  
1.c. Inefficient customs; 
1.d. Low Port efficiency.  
1- Market access to other OIC countries: 
1.a. Insufficient transportation infrastructure of 
small OIC countries; 
1.b. Low port efficiency of small OIC countries;  
1.c. Irregular payments in customs to expedite 
customs clearance;   
1.d. Technical barriers to trade in OIC countries;  
1.e. Custom Valuation problem in OIC countries; 
1.f. Various Non-Tariff Barriers in OIC countries.    
2- Fear for loss of customs revenue and irregular 
payments in customs: 
2.a.Non-Harmonization of tariff nomenclature, 
customs valuation practices and rule of origin;  
2.b.Non-Harmonization of customs procedures 
as well as non-existence of well established 
Information and Communication Technology 
implications in the form of Single Window for 
customs administrations. 
3- Lack of capacity in testing bodies and labs to 
exercise standard testing for imports. 
Source: Compiled by the author from the results  
In parallel to the survey conducted under this research, SESRIC conducted a 
questionnaire on ‘Enhancing Economic and Commercial Cooperation among OIC 
                                                 
98 The survey on trade facilitation in OIC member countries Vis-à-vis WTO trade facilitation negotiations on GATT Articles V, VIII 
and X and agreement on implementation of Article VII (Customs valuation) of GATT. The survey was conducted during the Seminar 
on “Non-tariff Barrier Impact on Market Access” in Tunisia, 4-8 October 2009. The survey is provided as in the Appendix IX. 
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Member Countries’. The questionnaire was directed to eminent persons and experts from 
international organizations, academia, private sector representatives, OIC bodies and 
government bodies. The forth section of the questionnaire enquired benchmark regional 
integration for additional insight to OIC economic integration. Most of the respondents 
counted the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a good benchmark 
since it could successfully bring countries with very different socio-economic 
development levels together. Together with the implementation of ASEAN AFTA, 
ASEAN countries successfully introduced complementary trade facilitation measures. In 
addition to electronicization of customs (establishment of national Single Window) to be 
integrated in the next step, development of mutual recognition agreement for chemical 
products and electrical equipments, ASEAN very successfully harmonized customs 
procedures of very diverse member countries including Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Singapore, Indonesia, etc. which tremendously vary in socio-economic and public 
management dimensions. Respondents also count European Integration as an excellent 
example of strong political will. However, they do not take European Integration as a 
good benchmark as it is highly institutionalized, costly and comprises of politically alike 
countries. The respondents very often stressed the removal of non-tariff barriers 
alongside the tariff reduction for a deeper economic integration. Also, for a deeper 
economic integration cooperation among customs authorities of OIC member countries, 
technological improvements in customs procedures and mutual recognition of standard 
and conformity assessment test were listed to be pursued. In an interview conducted for 
this research with Mr. El Hassane Hzaine from Islamic Center for Development of Trade, 
he warns the potential shortfalls with the harmonization course and proposes the mutual 
recognition principle as an alternative, practical, and cost-effective course. Another major 
recommendation from the SESRIC’s questionnaire is establishment of Free Trade Zones 
for small countries to create tax incentives in order to build domestic production capacity 
to engage in international trade.  
In Chapter 3, creative value chain financing for cotton sector development has been 
proposed to avail needed funds for addressing the supply side constraint which is also 
within WTO Aid for Trade initiative. However, trade finance alone would not suffice to 
achieve the aspiration of the OIC Five-Year Cotton Action plan. Particularly, policy 
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measures for enhancing agricultural efficiency, especially yield per hectare, in cotton- 
producing OIC member countries are needed.    
Lack of trade finance is also indicated as an impediment to more trade for OIC countries. 
Indeed, the importance of trade finance is eminent even in the legal text of the 
Framework Agreement in TPS-OIC, which was drafted in the mid-1980s. As stated in 
Article 2, the agreement aims at the promotion of trade among OIC Member States 
through the exchange of trade preferences by “making use of the trade financing and 
export credit insurance facilities provided by OIC institutions, in conformity with their 
rules and regulations, for products exchanged under this Agreement”.99 Accordingly in 
Chapter 4, 2-Step murabahah is proposed to direct more funds to support OIC countries’ 
trade. Nevertheless, the proposed structure needs to be placed under a market for 
mobilizing more resources in an efficient manner. In an interview with Mr. Hani Salem 
Sonbol, Deputy Chief Executive Officer of International Islamic Trade Finance 
Corporation of Islamic Development Bank Group, he listed the limitations to enhance 
intra-OIC trade by availing trade finance: 
Even in a concessional form, trade finance might do very little to affect importers’ 
preference of supplier. Concessional trade financing alone to promote imports 
from OIC countries is likely to be curbed given the importance of quality and 
timely delivery of shipment commitment in trade business. As long as the private 
sector in OIC countries develops its capacity to supply quality on a timely basis, a 
couple of hundred basic point concessions in trade finance would not urge imports 
from OIC countries. Hence, he suggests mobilizing resource for availing trade 
finance to enable OIC countries to sustain their economy/industry by imports in a 
competitive global market where the private sector in OIC countries should 
survive. That is, trade financing activities should have trade-creation effects for 
all and urge a more competitive business environment for the private sector in 
OIC countries by availing more trade finance especially in favour of Least 
Developed OIC Countries.     
Besides, he suggests that the greatest challenge for intra-OIC trade comes from supply 
side constraints in the form of production capacity and trade infrastructure. OIC countries 
still lack in production capacity for non-oil sectors especially in industry. Basically, if 
they are not able to produce enough even for the domestic market with reasonable prices, 
                                                 
99 The Framework Agreement for TPS-OIC legal text is available at http://www.comcec.org/EN/belge/agreements/doc/TPS-
OIC(E).doc last accessed on 22 November 2009.  
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it is difficult to urge them to sell to other OIC countries. Although many OIC countries 
have comparative advantages in the agricultural sector, given the price suppression as a 
result of agricultural subsidies, most prominently in cotton, in developed countries it is 
not possible to capitalize this for enhancing trade among OIC countries. Paying over 
international prices for the sake of enhancing intra-OIC trade might not be expected from 
importers. Even after heavy investment to meet domestic consumption many OIC 
countries need to have enough transport infrastructures, i.e.efficient ports to handle heavy 
traffic, and human capacity in their countries and in partner OIC countries to handle 
international trade transactions. Even then existence of Non-Tariff-Barriers in partner 
OIC countries might turn out to be a hurdle. He counts lack of trade infrastructure and 
very existence of Non-Tariff-Barriers as serious challenges especially for small OIC 
countries. However, there might be some improvement opportunities by providing trade 
finance solutions in the form of capacity building of financial institutions, cooperation 
among stock exchanges and other financial institutions to develop a settlement system for 
payment of trade transactions. Besides, this cooperation can be expanded to mobilize 
more resources to be availed for entities in OIC countries in order to decrease trade 
financing costs.   
5.2 POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH  
As evidenced from deliverables mentioned here above, there are many items proposed 
which do not seem to be in a well-designed framework. Since the effectiveness of 
PRETAS as of 25th COMCEC in November 2009, it would be a good gain to discuss a 
formal framework and continue activities on OIC trade integration within a formal 
framework for any future initiative. Based on the mentioned observations, this section 
proposes outward-looking, cost-effective, and informal policy options for a resilient OIC 
trade integration framework which avoids rigidly structured, highly institutionalized 
integration so the costs associated do not exceed the benefit generated out of integration.  
Non-feasibility and unsuitability of the projects are major risks in the process of 
designing a trade integration framework. Hence, benchmarking is very important to 
identify implementable projects. European Integration for trade integration could have 
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been a good benchmark in many ways but ASEAN integration would be much more 
suitable for OIC, as per reasons provided above. The ASEAN Trade Integration Model 
can be benchmarked as summarized by Gundogdu (2007):  
(i) Harmonization of tariff nomenclature;  
(ii) Harmonization of custom valuation;  
(iii)Harmonization of custom procedure;  
(iv) National Single Windows to be integrated;    
(v) Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs).100  
These projects require high involvement from the member countries, as it involves major 
risks in implementation. For example, introduction of Single Window often gets 
resistance from well-established Custom connections. The preference, therefore, is to 
maintain the status quo.  
Table 51: Table 5.2: The Outline of the OIC Trade Integration 
Strategy: Structure: 
A.      Capacity building in trade facilitation for 
small OIC countries 
  
  
  
  
A.1. Harmonization of tariff nomenclature  
A.2. Harmonization of custom valuation  
A.3. Harmonization of custom procedure  
A.4. Improving port efficiency 
A.5. Capacity building for testing bodies and labs 
A.6. Establishment of National Single Windows 
B.      Improving market access among OIC 
countries 
  
  
B.1.Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs)- 
based on HALAL Standards 
B.2.Trade Preferential System (PRETAS) for OIC 
Member Countries 
B.3.Unified Rule of Origin Cumulation System 
C.      Developing a scheme to encourage 
companies for cross border trade by relieving tax 
burdens  
C.1. Inward Processing Regime  
D.      Develop a system based on Information and 
Communication Technology for collaboration 
among OIC countries in the area of customs 
valuation, inspection, etc. 
D.1. Integrated Single Window   
E.      Divert funds from speculative instruments to 
trade finance needs of OIC countries 
E.1. 2-Step murabahah 
F.      Cotton Sector Development 
F.1.  Enhancing productivity and production 
techniques;   
F.2.  Strengthening member countries’ structural 
capacities and organizations;  
F.3.  Developing the fields of processing and 
marketing;   
F.4. Trade and international competitiveness;   
F.5. Arranging finances. 
Source: Drawn by the author 
                                                 
100 ASEAN Cosmetics MRA was signed in 2003 and electrical&electronical equipments MRA signed in 2002. 
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Based on the result of three essays and connected surveys an outline for OIC trade 
integration is developed in Table 5.2. The recommendations in the outline are explained 
hereafter.     
 
5.2.1 Capacity Building in Trade Facilitation 
Although there is no clear definition of ‘trade facilitation’, based on the international 
organization’s definition, it implies improved efficiency in the administration, procedure, 
and logistics at ports and customs in order to decrease time and cost of cross border trade. 
Trade facilitation has been subject of many international initiatives but it was at the 1996 
Singapore Ministerial Conference where ministers from WTO member-countries 
instructed the WTO Goods Council to look at possible ways of simplifying trade 
procedures, an issue referred as “trade facilitation”.101 
Going through Table 5.1, the importance of trade facilitation especially for small OIC 
countries is eminent as it can mitigate some of the supply side constraints while assuring 
reasonable customs revenue. However, as evidenced from the definition above, scope of 
trade facilitation is up to customs and ports. Any supply side constraints afterwards such 
as transportation infrastructure development should not be in the framework as this can 
undermine  cost-effective and informal policy options for a resilient OIC trade integration 
framework. Those supply side constraints such as transportation infrastructure or 
industrial capacity building might better be the subject of development banks and 
governments agencies.   
On the other hand, capacity building in trade facilitation would boost cross-border trade 
for not only members of an economic integration but also non-members once 
implemented by a country as stated by Cernat (2001; Page-15) after puzzling results for 
trade-creating effect of African RTAs, who argued that  
Unlike widespread opinions and standard theoretical prediction, a large number of 
African RTAs are not trade-diverting but trade-creating, both with regard to intra-
and extra-RTA trade. Explanation for these apparently puzzling results is to be 
                                                 
101 The Singapore issues were cited in the 1 August 2004 decision which broke the Cancún deadlock. WTO Members agreed to start 
negotiations on trade facilitation, but not the three other Singapore issues.  
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found in the reduction of invisible trade barriers that hampered trade with both 
RTA members and third countries. 
 That is, trade facilitation itself is not trade diverting at all. However, since they boost 
economic development through more cross-border trade, they should not be ignored.  
As indicated in Table 5.2, Items A.1. to A.3.,very often, are implemented through the 
WTO / regional economic integration membership process and it is very likely that many 
OIC countries have gone through those. On the other hand, there exists huge trade 
facilitation gain through improving port efficiency of OIC countries. Without efficient 
ports, any improvement in custom clearance would mean very little as inefficient ports 
would neutralize the gains in custom clearance.  Recent work at the World Bank (Wilson 
et al., 2003) examines the relationship between trade facilitation and trade flows in the 
Asia-Pacific region. The study defines and measures trade facilitation using four broad 
indicators. Each one is constructed using country-specific data for 19 members of the 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) to build the following measures:  
(i) Port efficiency;  
(ii) Customs environment;  
(iii) Regulatory environment; and  
(iv) E-business usage.  
The findings suggest that enhanced port efficiency among these countries has a large and 
positive effect on trade and that regulatory barriers reduce trade prospects. Improvements 
in customs and greater e-business used significantly also improve trade, however, to a 
lesser degree than the effect of increased efficiency of ports. It is argued that a 
programme to raise capacity ‘half-way’ to the APEC average in all four areas among 
those countries below average would yield an increase in intra-APEC trade of about $254 
billion dollars. This is about a 21% rise in total intra-APEC manufactures trade. About 
$117 billion of the gain (and 10% of the increase in trade) comes from the improvement 
in port efficiency. 
With implementation of trade facilitation activities trade potential for private entities in 
small OIC countries should be expected to expand substantially. Given the strong base 
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after capacity building in trade facilitation, a resilient OIC trade integration framework 
can have strong base for any further initiative.  
Figure 23: Figure 5.1:  The Framework for OIC Trade Integration 
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Source: Designed by the author  
In the next stage, further market access opportunities should be sought for OIC countries 
so they can have more trade opportunities with each other. The proposed framework, as 
depicted in Figure 5.1, requires strong foundations to be addressed with capacity building 
in trade facilitation. It is the sound capacity of OIC member countries in trade facilitation, 
which can substantiate other building blocks of B. for market access, C., D., E. and F. 
After elaboration of capacity building in trade facilitation, building pillars of the 
proposed trade integration framework:  
(i) B. Mutual Recognition Agreement  
(ii) B. PRETAS 
(iii) B. Cumulation System of Rule of Origin 
(iv) C. Inward Processing 
(v) D. Integrated Single Window 
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(vi) E. Two-Step Murabahah 
(vii) F. Cotton Sector Development 
 are explained hereafter starting with Mutual Recognition concept.  
5.2.2 Mutual Recognition Agreement for Market Access 
As stated by Pascal Lamy, the Director General of WTO, “while international standards 
are important, the procedures that are used to assess compliance with them are equally 
important, since they too can obstruct trade”.102 Very often exporters, even if they have 
international as well as own countries’ certificates, might be required to obtain some 
national conformity assessment test for other countries. Obviously this would necessitate 
many standard tests for each country as per the national regulations of the country and 
gives rise to higher transaction cost and increases red tape, which may result in decreased 
probability of exports. On some occasions disturbance caused by standard and conformity 
even discourage exporters to do business with some countries (Gundogdu, 2007).   
Any gain under OIC trade integration might be seriously curbed by technical barriers and 
cumbersome procedures of standard and conformity assessment tests for customs 
clearances. This issue was also in the agenda of ‘Transatlantic Economic Partnership’ 
between USA and EU to introduce a ‘Mutual Recognition Agreement’ (MRA) in order to 
mutually recognize each other’s conformity assessment test.103 Besides, MRAs have been 
subject of much other regional integration such as NAFTA, MERCOSUR and APEC, 
ASEAN, etc.104 It should also be noted that the concept of mutual recognition was also an 
important part of European integration since the Cassis De Dijon case in 1979 which 
changed the direction from harmonization of standards to mutual recognition principle 
for “Single European Market” (Stephenson 1998). 
It can well be one of OIC trade integration strategy for a deeper OIC economic 
integration, as it can be a base for standard and conformity assessment tool for accepting 
                                                 
102 International Electrotechnical Commission IEC Council Centennial Session held on 26 September 2006, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl41_e.htm last accessed on 10 November 2009. 
103 The London EU-US Summit of 18 May 1998. 
104 S. M. Stephenson, “Mutual recognition and its role in trade facilitation,” Journal of World Trade vol.33, No2 (1998). 
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the education and training standards of member countries which was also planned under 
ASEAN integration (Gundogdu 2007). In that regard, OIC MRA based on HALAL 
standard and conformity assessment would pave the way not only for easier cross-border 
trade but also for a deeper OIC economic integration. In its eleventh session, Islamic 
Summit Conference 2008 placed ‘Halal food standards’ within OIC economic integration, 
as it would be read from the final communiqué:   
135. The Conference commended the major role undertaken by the Islamic 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ICCI) to reinforce Economic and Trade 
Cooperation among Member States. Furthermore, it welcomed the plans of the 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry and supported it as the principal 
representative of the private sector in OIC Member States with regards to values, 
Halal, and quality control. The Conference, likewise, expressed its appreciation 
for the pioneering leadership of the Chamber's Chairman. Furthermore, the 
Conference underlines the urgent need for the speedy implementation of the 
Chamber's Plan of Action to consolidate economic and trade cooperation among 
Member States. It urged all Muslim governments to facilitate the procedures in 
activating its mechanisms.105 
In a similar fashion the 34th session of the Council of OIC Foreign Ministers in 2008 
adopted the following resolution:  
RESOLUTION NO. 7/35-E THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
HALAL STANDARD 
(Extracts) 
3. Commends the ongoing efforts to develop an OIC Halal Standards, in particular 
regarding certification and accreditation among OIC Member States. 
4. Welcomes the contribution of RM15 million by the Government of Malaysia 
over the next 3 years for the funding support of the operating cost of The 
International Halal Integrity Alliance, a non-profit organisation with the objective 
to promote and enhance international collaboration amongst national halal 
authorities...”106 
                                                 
105 http://www.ihialliance.org/oic.php last accessed on 0 December 2011. 
106 http://www.ihialliance.org/oic.php last accessed on 0 December 2011. 
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This resolution was adopted during the session of prosperity and development.107 For this 
purpose, projects for synchronization and capacity building of testing Labs/Bodies of 
OIC countries are needed as Director General of WTO drew the attention to the 
particularly acute problem in developing countries in stating “the fact that there are not 
enough internationally recognized conformity assessment institutions in these 
countries.”108 Patent offices in OIC countries might also be included to MRA activities 
based on ongoing Halal standards initiatives.  
Again going from Figure 5.1, PRETAS is recommended to be another pillar of the OIC 
trade integration framework.  
5.2.3 Protocol on the Preferential Tariff Scheme for TPS-OIC (PRETAS) for Market 
Access109 
Became effective after ratified by 10 OIC member countries as of 25
th
 COMCEC, the 
PRETAS is a milestone for OIC Trade integration. Indeed, it is an additional protocol to 
the more comprehensive TPS/OIC Agreement. PRETAS covers both industrial and 
agricultural products identified at HS level of the National Tariff Codes. The protocol 
operates based on the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle and the rules of origin for 
eligible products regulated according to the Annexed III of the Framework Agreement 
TPS/OIC until new TPS-OIC Rules of Origin Agreement become effective. The protocol 
includes special treatment for the Least Developed Countries by a three-year grace period 
for tariff reduction. The protocol introduces the following tariff reduction programme: 
Each participating state covers 7% of its total HS lines but any state with 90% and above 
of its tariff lines less than 10% shall cover only 1% of the same total HS lines. 
Participating States are given option to products list to be liberalised. Besides, the 7% of 
total HS lines referred only includes the lines with tariff above 10%. Accordingly 
(i) Tariffs above 25% shall be reduced to 25%; 
                                                 
107 Obtained from Halal Alliance web page at http://www.ihialliance.org/oic.php last accessed on 03 June 2010. 
108 International Electrotechnical Commission IEC Council Centennial Session held on 26 September 2006, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl41_e.htm las accessed on 10 November 2009. 
109 Available at http://www.comcec.org/EN/belge/agreements/doc/PRETAS(E).doc  last accessed on 22 September 2009. 
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(ii) Tariffs above 15% and up to 25%, shall be reduced to 15%; 
(iii)Tariffs above 10% and up to 15% shall be reduced to 10%. 
 
These reductions are considered to take place in a gradual way. The implementation 
period is divided into six instalments for the Least Developed Countries and into four for 
others as of effectiveness date of PRETAS. The protocol also propose voluntary fast track 
tariff reduction schedule in the Article 4. Besides, it also necessitates abolishment of 
para-tariff and non-tariff barriers on the products subject to tariff reduction.  
For a higher market access, percentage of tariff lines included might be extended in the 
future and more emphasis is to be given for non-oil products in tariff reduction to boost 
intra-OIC trade as evidence from “double dominance effect” mentioned before.  
5.2.4 Cumulation System of Rules of Origin for Market Access 
Cumulation system is a tool to allow imports from certain countries without undermining 
the origin of the final product to be exported.110 Under a full cumulation system, products 
which have obtained originating status in one of the member countries may be added to 
products originating in any other member country without losing their originating status 
within the region. To enjoy preferential tariff rates in custom clearance, goods are 
required to obtain certificate of origin showing they have originated from (i.e. 40% of the 
content) a member country of preferential trade agreement. Under the full Cumulation 
system, even if the content is, let’s say, 20%, and if the trader proves that other 20% is 
from another member of the free trade agreement, these products can still enjoy 
preferential tariff rate.111  
Pan-European Cumulation System, for example, was introduced in 1997, effectively 
created the Pan-European free trade zone for industrial goods. Turkey, which had been in 
customs union with the EU since 1996, joined the system in 1999. The system, with 
                                                 
110 There are three type so cumulation namely, bilateral, diagonal and full cumulation.  
111 For more detail please refer to “Rules of Origin, Trade and Customs” by Paul Brenton and Hiroshi Imagawa, Customs 
Modernization Handbook, p.183-212, published by World Bank available on line at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEXPCOMNET/Resources/Customs_Modernization_Handbook.pdf last accessed on 21 
November 2009.  
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diagonal cumulation base, is being enlarged to the OIC member Mediterranean countries 
under the ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative’.112   
PRETAS is a very important initiative and it should be further fortified by a Unified 
Rules of Origin Cumulation System. In this regard, TPS-OIC Rules of Origin Agreement 
is already being prepared by the Trade Negotiation Committee would come into force 
after necessary number of ratification of 10 states.113 The Trade Negotiation Committee 
prepared a very comprehensive TPS-OIC Rule of Origin document which not only 
propose a full cumulation system under TPS-OIC Certificate Origin but also refers to 
customs valuation issues within the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement principles.114 
Besides, Chapter V of the agreement makes arrangements for administrative cooperation 
for mutual assistance and verification of certificate of origin.  
There seems, however, to be a potential bottleneck for the verification of certificate origin 
issued by another member country. The cooperation among customs authorities, as in 
compliance with the Doha Ministerial Conference decision for identifying and assessing 
practical means for the exchange of information among customs authorities, might not be 
efficient. Establishment of Single Windows at national level to be integrated to other OIC 
countries’ Single Windows as planned by ASEAN countries, might more effectively 
address this bottleneck as well as undervaluation with customs valuation procedure and 
identification of tariff nomenclature during the customs clearance as proposed in Chapter 
2 of this work.  
                                                 
112
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/preferential/article_783_en.htm accessed on 30 October 
2009. 
113 Available at http://www.comcec.org/EN/belge/agreements/doc/TPS-OIC%20RULES%20OF%20ORIGIN(E).doc last accessed 
on 23 November 2009.   
114 According to the agreement, customs value for taxation should be determined by transaction value. In case of customs value can 
not be determined by transaction value it should be determined by either: 
Transaction value of identical goods; 
Transaction value of similar goods; 
Deductive value method; 
Computed value method; 
Fall-back method.   
Not surprisingly, the process is a replica of the system introduced with “WTO Customs Valuation Agreement”.   
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5.2.5 Inward Processing Relief as an Alternative to Free Trade Zones  
Inward Processing Relief (IPR) is a method of obtaining relief from customs duties, 
financial transaction taxes for imports and Value Added Tax (VAT) charges for imports 
processing against a specific export commitment. The relief applies to raw 
materials/goods imported from outside the country, processed and exported back to 
outside the country. IPR provides relief to promote industrial exports and enhance 
competitiveness of local industries in the world market.115 In this regard, it can be a very 
effective tool for strategic product and export-oriented industry development for small 
OIC countries as an alternative to establishment of Free Trade Zones which are highly 
institutionalized and costly.  
IPR has been employed by the European Union for a long time and proved to be a very 
effective tool. As a part of EU Custom Union, Turkey has a long tradition of 
implementing inward processing in alliance with EU practices based on EC-Turkey 
Association Council Resolution 1/95.116  
To provide an idea about its widespread utilization, as stated in WTO Trade Policy 
Review of Turkey, recently more than half of the imports of Turkey has been cleared 
under IPR. There is a strong correlation between the number of IPR Licenses issued and 
the recent foreign trade increase of Turkey. Presently, IPRs are used even for local inputs 
to be processed for domestic and foreign markets. To give an idea about its 
instrumentality, Turkey issues IPR licenses for the Electrical Generator sector (identified 
as a strategic sector), which obtains its input from the domestic market  and are exempted 
from VAT and some banking taxes related to purchase under IPR, for exports and even 
domestic sale.117   
Similar to the cumulation system, this tool also has a bottleneck as tracking of an IPR 
license is very cumbersome and requires cooperation of many national agencies. As 
observed with the Free Trade Zone, ineffective controlling might lead to customs revenue 
                                                 
115 Accessed on 10 November 2009 at 
http://customs.hmrc.gov.uk/channelsPortalWebApp/downloadFile?contentID=HMCE_CL_000229 
116 Accessed on 10 November 2009 at undp.un.org.tr/unido/documents/nationalprogtr-41.rtf 
117 Refers to the author’s own experience with Turkish Exporters Unions 
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loss and paper-base monitoring would create huge and discouraging red tape. In this 
regard, implementation of the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) system 
under national Single Window which allow effective cooperation among national 
agencies and preferably other OIC countries’ public authorities might be essential.  
5.2.6 Integrated Single Window  
The framework developed up to now indicates the importance of cooperation among 
public authorities within the country and cooperation of public authorities among OIC 
countries. Inefficient communication might seriously undermine the proposed framework 
as it might create huge red tape as an impediment to cross-border trade rather than 
encouragement for private sector in OIC countries to trade more among each other.   
As a result implementation of information and communication technology solutions is an 
utmost important issue for successful OIC trade integration. In brief, a Single Window 
system refers to single submission of data and information, single and synchronous 
procession of data and information, single decision-making for custom release and 
clearance by information and communication technology applications. For example, in 
the ASEAN region, Singapore developed a very reputable single window called 
TradeNET by which traders can submit export/import documentations electronically to 
the various government agencies for processing and electronically receiving approval 
notification. TradeNET entertains about 30,000 transactions per day, and decreased 
customs declaration approval time to 5 minutes.
118
 In this regard, single window 
applications can decrease time and cost of cross-border trade, hence, stimulates trade of a 
country. Some OIC countries have already implemented national single window systems 
such as Malaysia’s DagangNET and Turkey’s Bilge System.119 Tunisia benchmarked 
Singapore’s TradeNET. Also, some OIC countries adopted ASYCUDA system 
developed by UNCTAD.
120
    
                                                 
118 R. Jayanta, B. Shweta, “Key issues in trade facilitation, summary of World Bank/EU workshops in Dhaka and Shanghai in 2004,” 
World Bank Policy Research Paper 3703(2005). 
119 For more information on Bilge see http://en.gumruk.gov.tr/e-customs/projeweb_eu.pdf; for more information on DagangNET see 
http://www.unescap.org/tid/projects/da6_symposium_s2mah.pdf  last accessed on 23 November 2009. 
120
Iran, Jordan, Yemen, Burkina Faso, Mali, Gambia, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mauritania, Uganda, Chad, Sudan, Comoros, 
Gabon, Niger, Cameroon, Nigeria Bangladesh, Maldives, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria. Accessed on 10 August 2009 at 
http://www.asycuda.org/countrydb.asp.   
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The integration of single window within the OIC trade integration framework should be 
two-fold. First of all, given the very complicating and crucial taxation issues expected to 
be caused by inward processing, rules of origin cumulation system and mutual 
recognition agreement, national single windows for customs might be integrated to local 
government agencies involved with inward processing relief and TPS-OIC Certificate of 
Origin issuing agencies as well as testing bodies. In the second stage, national windows 
of OIC countries can be integrated to allow an efficient cooperation among OIC 
countries’ customs authorities for identification of tariff nomenclature for customs 
taxation, preventing undervaluation during customs clearance as well as verification of 
TPS-OIC Certificates of Origin. Such cooperation can serve to prevent valuable customs 
revenue loss especially for small OIC countries.  
5.2.7 Two-Step Murabahah 
Lack of trade finance is identified as one of the impediments for enhancing OIC 
countries’ trade as evidenced from the legal text of Framework Agreement in TPS-OIC. 
As mentioned before, Article 2 of the agreement proposes the use of trade finance for 
promoting trade between OIC countries. Based on the findings, the lack of trade finance 
seems to be a much more severe problem for least developed OIC countries. Even after a 
successful implementation of the above-mentioned framework, there needs to be a trigger 
for those countries so they can ignite the production cycle by trade.     
Most of the time, international banks are not willing to take the risk of importers in a 
market unknown to them. However, they might be expected to assume only the risk of 
another financial institution rather than small beneficiaries in different countries 
(Gundogdu 2009). ‘2-Step Murabahah Financing Mechanism’ can be used to mobilize 
resources from financial institutions to serve least developed OIC member countries. 
Under this mechanism, international banks avail funds to a local bank in least developed 
OIC member countries which then provides it to the traders/SMEs. In this scheme, 
international banks would take the risk of a local bank, which lacks in necessary foreign 
exchange loan capacity to support traders/SMEs.  
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Going through the example in Figure 5.2, the system would work such that ‘Bank-A’ 
purchases the goods and sells it to ‘Bank-B’ for a mark-up on a predetermined maturity 
date. Then, ‘Bank-B’ sells the goods to the importer/SME according to a murabahah 
agreement between them.  
Figure 24: Figure 5.2:  Two-Step Murabahah in the Context of International Trade 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation of IDB Group  
This mechanism transfers the direct credit risk of the importer SME to Bank-B which 
would be considered for exposure by Bank-A. It can be discerned that this mechanism can 
be used to boost SMEs in least developed OIC countries to turn on the engine of growth. 
2-Step murabahah mechanism can also be used for mobilizing resources for the cotton 
sector under the supply chain financing introduced in Chapter 3.  
In order to divert more funds from speculative financial instruments to trade finance, 
cooperation among OIC Stock Exchanges is essential. 2-Step murabahah scheme can be 
embedded into stock exchanges as an alternative to Bonds, sukuk, and commodity 
murabahah so as to support real economic transactions and decrease the cost of trade 
finance for least developed OIC member countries by creating competitive 2-Step 
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5.2.8 Cotton Sector Development 
Development of cotton sector is an important element of OIC trade integration as this 
commodity itself is the only exportable items of many least developed OIC countries. 
Going through the deliverables of the OIC Five-Year Programme of Action and insight 
provided in the second essay in Chapter 3, the following items are identified as major 
issues throughout the action plan for OIC cotton-sector development:   
 
(i) Countries with insufficient yield suffer the decrease of both international 
market share and prices; 
(ii) The large variation in cotton yield among the OIC members and the need 
for improving the productivity create a wide margin for cooperation in this 
sector; 
(iii) High levels of production and/or export subsidies provided by developed 
countries to their domestic producers lead to serious distortions in 
international cotton markets; 
(iv) As a result, the increase in world cotton production (supply) reduces its 
price and this, in turn, reduces the revenues that could be obtained by the 
cotton exporting countries in the developing regions, including the OIC 
members; 
(v) Demand for cotton is highly affected by its quality and consistency. So, to 
maximize revenue, producers must properly classify their product. USA 
cotton is promoted by claims that it is less contaminated and better 
classified. Manual classification in most African countries reduces the 
value of their cotton; 
(vi) The lack of skilled labour and capital and high cost of energy and 
transportation are among the factors that still impeding the development of 
sustainable textile industry (processing the raw cotton) in most OIC West 
African cotton producing countries where these factors raise the cost of 
textile production; 
(vii) The OIC cotton producing countries, combined together, are net exporters 
of cotton, but many of them, particularly those in West Africa, are among 
the poorest in the world lacking the capacities for developing textile 
industries; 
(viii) Yet, sustainable and modern textile sectors have already been developed 
by some of the OIC countries who are also among the major importers of 
cotton in the world; 
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(ix) Cotton producers, exporters and industrialists in the OIC countries should, 
therefore, lead the way of cooperation in the cotton sector. They can 
facilitate cooperation among themselves. 
Figure 25: Figure 5.3:  Cotton Sector Development  
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Going through the above Figure 5.3., one can easily see the importance of cotton-sector 
development in developing textiles and subsequent higher value added industries. 
Without developing an efficient cotton sector, it would be of a hurdle to streamline many 
Least Developed OIC countries into OIC trade integration. Obviously sustainable cotton 
production depends on four components: price, quantity, quality and cost. The issue of 
international price has been subject of WTO negotiation and very little can be done. 
However, there is opportunity especially in quality and quantity of cotton produced to 
increase economic value of the endeavour.  As the figure indicates improvement shall 
come from planting, growing and harvesting practices. Hence, complete supply chain 
financing is to be complemented with quality, quantity and value increasing initiatives in 
order to make cotton production business profitable/sustainable as: 
   
(i) Improving the productivity and yield levels (introducing better seeds, irrigation, 
mechanization of seeding); 
(ii) Decrease the contamination (use of special bags for harvesting, establishing 
basic warehouses in villages); 
(iii) Improving testing and classification of cotton (grant for HVI testing machines 
and training); 
(iv) Promoting investment opportunities in cotton sector (Ginning machines) for 
processing and marketing of cotton in order to enhance international 
competitiveness; 
(v) Eliminating intermediaries between net cotton exporting and net cotton 
importing OIC countries (trade bridges, bringing West African cotton to 
warehouses in the net cotton importing OIC countries). 
With reference to agricultural financing toward poverty alleviation, it is obvious that 
supply chain financing to the cotton sector in the form of discounted formal credit would 
help alleviating poverty subject to:  
(i) The discounted funds with formal credit should be assured to reach farmers but 
not informal credit providers which may include local banks, landlords, and 
unscrupulous managers of agricultural cooperatives who may apply local market 
interest rate to poor farmers while enjoying discounted funds mobilized through 
formal credits; 
(ii) The funds should focus on procurement of inputs for agricultural production but 
not purchase of consumption items giving rise to impoverishment of farmers. In 
this regard, availed funds should be monitored to assured that they are used for 
procurement of input to boost agricultural production; 
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(iii) Formal discounted credit should be accompanied by several infrastructure 
development projects in the form of transportation, irrigation, etc. which targets 
to increase agricultural productivity to make agricultural input financing 
sustainable by assuring reasonable level of yield for harvest and market access 
for sale of yield.  
 
Any formal credit targeted to the cotton sector should observe these concerns in order to 
develop a financially but also socially optimal solution. 
5.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEACH AND FUTURE RESEARCHES  
An important strength of this research is its relation to real-life cases, in which the 
researcher was involved in developing.  However, similar to any other research, this 
research also has certain limitations, as discussed below. 
In this research, while analysing the determinants of intra-OIC trade and OIC countries’ 
customs revenue in Chapter 2, an econometric model is employed. However, the data set 
for the model includes 1995-2007 time periods which exclude data after the global 
financial crisis. Data for 2008 and 2009 became available by the end of the completion of 
this research. In this regard, future research on determinants of intra-OIC trade and OIC 
countries’ customs revenue would be useful for data set including aftermath of the global 
financial crisis to validate findings. 
In Chapter 3, focus is on financing part of cotton sector development. However, there 
needs to be further studies which should propose to-the-point intervention for other 
aspects of cotton sector development in OIC countries to address policy guidance of the 
OIC Five-Year Cotton Action Plan.  The prospective research might be conducted on:  
(i) Seeding selection; 
(ii) Land preparation; 
(iii) Sowing activities; 
(iv) Weeding: mechanical and chemical;  
(v) Plant trimming; 
(vi) Defoliation (by chemicals); 
(vii) Harvesting; 
(viii) Collection of plant stems activities; 
(ix) Logistics of transporting seed cotton to collection centre; 
(x) Storage (examining contamination); 
(xi) Grading of seed cotton; 
(xii) Ginning activities; 
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(xiii) Quality and weight control; 
(xiv) Lot allocation; 
(xv) Logistics of storing of bales at warehouse; 
(xvi) Commercial enhancement review-sale. 
In Chapter 4, the concept of 2-Step murabahah is introduced and this structure is 
proposed to be embedded in exchanges. Another study to develop a system to divert the 
funds of Islamic Banks from questionable liquidity management instruments to real 
economy via L/C financing would be complementary to this research. Accordingly, 
prospective research should show in detail how to embed the 2-Step murabahah concept 
into stock exchanges based on the case provided in this research.  
5.4 EPILOGUE  
This thesis aimed to develop a resilient framework for outward-looking and cost-effective 
OIC trade integration in order to constitute a base for future direction to avoid rigidly 
structured and highly institutionalized discourse. Given the strategic consideration a 
special section is devoted to the cotton sector as per OIC mandate.  
The empirical chapters evidence that the aim and objectives of the research set at the 
beginning of this journey have been achieved.  However, by no means does it put a halt 
on the discussion but rather aims to initiate further discussions for enrichment of the OIC 
trade integration agenda by attracting more appeal within the OIC community. Therefore, 
a special emphasis is given to propose feasible and concrete building blocks by 
evidencing from other regional integration and national best practices to discourage 
vague ideas for OIC trade integration. In line of such expectation, further details might be 
embedded to the proposed framework in future studies.     
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APPENDIX I  
DRAFT ROAD-MAP FOR ACHIEVING INTRA-OIC TRADE VOLUMES TARGETS  
Area Recommended Action Desired Result Partners Timeline 
1.Trade Financing 
1.1 Develop and introduce new 
mechanisms/tools aimed at increasing financing 
for SMEs and LDMCs 
Enable SMEs to access financing better and 
more easily 
ITFC, ICIEC   
1.2 Enhance ITFC field presence  
Increase awareness and bring the ITFC 
closer to the MCs 
ITFC  
1.3 Introduce new trade finance products 
Meet needs of the clients for requirements 
such as LC confirmations, etc. 
ITFC, ICIEC  
2.Trade 
Facilitation 
2.1 Expedite the ratification of PRETAS by the 
MCs 
Achieve greater liberalization of trade 
OIC, MCs, 
COMCEC 
 
2.2 Conduct annual meetings on specific 
infrastructure issues which will have a direct 
impact on trade facilitation 
Facilitate the implementation of  specialized 
projects 
COMCEC,  ICD  
2.3 Enhance partnership with TPOs in MCs 
Enable the exchange of trade related 
information 
ITFC, ICDT, 
ICCI 
 
2.4 Continue to conduct annual meetings for 
TPOs in MCs 
 
ITFC, ICDT, 
ICCI 
 
2.5 MCs to ease visa processes for member 
country businessmen 
Facilitate easier business travel MCs, COMCEC  
2.6 Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) for 
certification and testing bodies 
 
MCs, COMCEC, 
ICCI 
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Area Recommended Action Desired Result Partners Timeline 
3.Capacity 
Building 
3.1 Organize more training programs for 
MCs/enterprises in trade related areas 
Respond to the demand for Islamic financial 
products 
IDB, ITFC, 
ICDT, SESRIC, 
UNCTAD, ITC 
 
3.2 Organize seminars on 'best practices' for 
MCs 
Migration of best practice 
ITFC, ICCI, 
TPOs, ITC 
 
3.3. Cost sharing schemes for marketing and 
enhancing of exports 
 MCs, TPOs  
4.Trade Promotion 
4.1 Strengthen brand awareness and promote 
products made in OIC MCs 
Increase exports of MCs 
MCs, ICCI, 
ICDT 
 
4.2 Encourage MCs to utilize the existing 
platform within the OIC organs such as ICDT's 
trade network (TINIC) 
Increase awareness and broaden 
opportunities 
MCs, ICDT  
4.3 TPOs to encourage and facilitate annual 
buyers-sellers meetings (business matching, 
trade bridging) 
Expand trade opportunities 
ITFC, ICCI, 
TPOs, ITC 
 
4.4 Encourage MCs to increase participation in 
trade fairs and activities organized by ICDT 
 
COMCEC, 
ICDT,ITFC 
 
5. Development of 
Strategic 
Commodities 
5.1 Create funds for investment in agriculture 
and other strategic commodities 
To increase food self sufficiency 
MCs, IDB, 
Financial 
Intuitions and 
Specialized 
Funds 
 
5.2 Expedite the implementation of Action Plan 
in cotton development and develop new action 
plans for development of other strategic 
commodities 
Increase marketable the quality/quantity and 
benefits for MCs 
OIC, MCs, 
COMCEC, IDB, 
ITC, UNIDO 
 
Source: COMCEC 
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EXECUTIVE PROGRAMME OF THE ROAD-MAP FOR ACHIEVING INTRA-OIC TRADE 
VOLUMES TARGETS 
 
Area Recommended Action Projects/ Programs/Activities 
1. Trade Financing 
Coordinator: ITFC 
 
1.1 Develop and 
introduce new 
mechanisms/ tools   
aimed   at   increasing 
financing for SMEs 
and LDMCs 
Introduce new lines of financing in addition to the existing ones in 1430H (2009) 
1.2 Enhance ITFC field 
presence 
a. Opening of Dubai Branch and then others 
b. “ITFC Focal Points” will be nominated in existing IDB Regional Offices 
c.  “ITFC Customer Days”  will be organized in some MC’s 
1.3 Introduce new trade 
finance products 
a. Meeting of Financial Institutions on Resources Mobilization 
b. Meeting/Brainstorming to discuss creation of Specialized Funds 
c. Workshop on ITFC’s Lines of Finance: Challenges and Opportunities 
d. Meeting for Trade Finance and Insurance of Credit Institutions. 
e. Workshop on LC Confirmations and Possible Role of IDB Group in this regard for enhancing intra-OIC Trade 
f. Training Programme for Central Banks and Financial Institutions to enhance the awareness of export credit 
insurance and its benefit in facilitating trade finance 
g. Promotion of DCIP (Documentary Credit Insurance Policy) among the OIC Financial Institutions to enable 
them to increase their exposure in relatively high risk countries 
h. Possibility to consider ICIEC’s insurance policies as collaterals to extend financing for Intra-Trade 
i  Exploring the ways and means to develop new structures and products which will help in meeting the market 
demand and accessing new segments 
2. Trade Promotion 
Coordinator: ICDT 
2.1   Strengthen   brand   
awareness   and 
promote products 
made in OIC MCs 
a. Showroom of OIC products and Services 
b. Prepare a study on establishing  an e-marketplace 
2.2 Encourage MCs to 
utilize the existing 
platform within the 
OIC organs such as 
ICDT's trade network 
(TINIC) 
a.  Enhancement of virtual exhibition 
b. OIC Tijari Exchange (with a view to complement TINIC) 
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2. Trade Promotion 
Coordinator: ICDT 
 
 
 
 
2.3  TPOs   to   encourage   
and   facilitate annual 
buyers-sellers 
meetings (business 
matching, trade 
bridging) 
a. Specialized exhibition and supply/demand workshop on agribusiness products 
b. Cotton 
c. Agro-industry 
d. Building and construction services 
e. Pharmaceuticals, medical equipment and services 
f. Clothing industry 
g. Furniture 
h. Logistics and transportation 
i. World Halal Forum 
j. Turkey, Africa, Foreign Trade Bridge 
k. Intra-Trade Malaysia 
2.4. Promotion of Trade 
in services 
Study to identify Potential services to traded among OIC Countries 
Specialized Exhibitions and Partnership forum on High trading potential 
services on: 
a. Architecture /Construction/Engineering 
b. E-commerce, IT and related services 
c. Distribution services: franchising 
d. Health related services 
e. Education and training 
2.5 Encourage MCs to 
increase participation 
in trade fairs and 
activities organized 
by ICDT 
a. 12th Islamic Trade Fair 
b. Trade Fairs of  OIC Countries (OIC EXPO) 
c. Tourism Fair of Islamic Countries 
d. Tourism Fair of Islamic Countries (OIC TOURISM) 
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3. Trade Facilitation 
Coordinator: ICDT 
3.1 Expedite the 
ratification of 
PRETAS by the MCs 
a. Implementation of  PRETAS 
b. Training Seminar on PRETAS for North Africa (CENCAD, AMU and Middle East) 
c. Training Seminar on PRETAS for  Central Asia and ECO Countries 
d. Training Seminar on PRETAS for  WAEMU Countries 
e.  Training Seminar on PRETAS for   ECOWAS Countries 
f.   Training Seminar on PRETAS for   South East and South Asia Countries 
g. Training Seminar on PRETAS for   COMESA Countries 
3.2 Conduct  meetings on 
specific infrastructure 
issues which will 
have a direct impact 
on trade facilitation 
a. Forum on “Trade Efficiency and the Role of the Customs in the Context of International Trade 
b. Seminar on “Transport Facilitation and Intra-OIC Trade” 
c. Expand the relationship between Bakkah Shipping Company (OISA Project); IDB Group and 
ITFC 
d. Opening new branch of Islamic Protection and Indemnity Club “IPIC” (OISA Project) in Jakarta 
Indonesia 
e. Signing the Statute of OISA by the member states which have not done so 
f. Registration of member states maritime companies’ suitable tonnage with Islamic P&I Club 
Branches in Tehran, Dubai and Jakarta 
3.3  Enhance  partnership  
with  TPOs  in  MCs 
a. Meeting of the TPO’s for evaluation of export performance and competitiveness of OIC Member 
Countries 
b. 1st Annual Meeting of the Export Promotion Centers of French Speaking OIC Member Countries 
c. Establishment of Trade Information Facilitation System 
 d. Meeting on Aid-for-Trade for ESCWA Region 
e. Expert Meeting on Aid-for-Trade Road Map for SPECA Region 
f. Ministerial Meeting on Aid-for-Trade Road Map for SPECA Region 
g. Meeting of Investment Promotion Agencies for the Evaluation of Investment Performance and 
improvement of doing business in OIC Member Countries 
h. Development of  a database in order to facilitate commercial exchanges as well as cooperation and 
coordination 
i. preparation of a framework for statistical activities coordination among OIC Institutions 
j. Launching of a trade facilitation Programme  (Needs Further Details) 
k. Setting up of an observatory on procedures of Intra-OIC trade (Needs Further Details) 
3.4 Continue to conduct 
annual  meetings for   
TPOs in MCs 
OIC TPO’s Meeting 
3.5   MCs   to   ease   visa   
processes   for 
member country 
businessmen 
Establishment of Business Owners Union 
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3. Trade Facilitation 
Coordinator: ICDT 
3.6   Mutual   Recognition   
Agreements (MRAs)   
for   certification   and   
testing bodies 
a. Development of OIC Halal Food Standards 
b. 10th OIC Standardization Expert Group Meeting 
c. Operationalization of SMIIC (Islamic Countries Metrology and Standards Institute) 
d. Establishment of Islamic Rating and Certification Agency (Needs Further Details 
 
 
 
 
4. Development of Strategic 
Commodities 
Coordinator: ITFC 
4.1   Create   funds   for   
investment   in 
agriculture and other 
strategic commodities 
a. Gulf Cooperation Council Food Security Initiative (Promoting Intra Investment by private sector 
and the role of IDB Group) 
b. Summit on International Food Crisis 
 
 
4.2   Expedite   the   
implementation   of 
Action  Plan  in  cotton  
development  and 
develop new  action 
plans for development 
of other  strategic 
commodities 
a. Trade and Investment Cooperation Opportunities among the OIC Member Countries in Cotton 
industry 
b. Forum on development of investment and trade in the field of basic food commodities 
c. Revitalization of the groundnut sector in selected sub-Saharan countries (Senegal, Gambia, 
Guinea-Bissau) 
d. Forum on ways and means to enhance Trade and investment in food in Africa 
5. Capacity Building  
Coordinator: SESRIC with in 
collaboration of ICDT and ITFC 
5.1 Organize more training 
programs for MCs/ 
enterprises in trade 
related areas 
a. Training Course on Export Strategies and International Marketing 
b. Training Workshop on SME Cluster Development for OIC Member Countries 
c. Workshop on “Promotion of Export Processing of Value Added Fishery Products” 
d. Training Program on Micro Finance Sector Development 
e. Workshop on “Small-scale Food Processing” with COMSTECH 
f. Workshop on “Oilseed Processing for Small-Scale Producers” with COMSTECH 
g. 13th Private Sector Meeting for Promotion of trade and joint venture investment among the OIC 
h. Workshop on Coffee Processing 
i. Regional training program for  the staff of the chambers of Arab Member Countries 
j.  Regional training program for  the staff of the chambers of African Member Countries 
k. Fifth Forum for Businesswomen in Islamic Countries 
l. 3rd International Islamic, Economic and Cultural Conference 
m. Workshop for “Incubator  Management training in Islamic Countries 
n. Workshop on export competitiveness 
o. Logistics and its role in developing intra-OIC trade 
p. Agreement of the Doha Round and intra-OIC trade negotiations 
q. Competition Policy and regulations in Islamic Countries 
r.  Competition trade intelligence and export decision making  
s. Training course on enterprises strategy and international marketing 
t. Export Auditing and capacity building of the SMEs for Arab States. 
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u. Seminar on “The Project on the Intra-OIC Free Trade Area 
v. Launching  of feasibility study on ‘‘the project  of intra-OIC  Free Trade Area’’ 
w. Seminar on Regional economic grouping within the OIC: Current status and prospects 
x. Training courses and forum on e-commerce and technical assistance (Needs Further Details) 
y. Follow up of the Multilateral Trade Negotiation  in this sector and coordination  of Member 
States’ positions with a view to setting up of a common negotiations platform 
5.2 Organize seminars on 
'best practices' for 
MCs 
a. OJT for staff of TPOs of MC’s on Foreign Trade Bridges 
b. OJT for Officials and staff of Chamber of Commerce of the AMCs 
c. OJT for Trade Mapping 
 
 
 
5.3. Cost sharing schemes 
for marketing and 
enhancing of exports 
a. Develop High Trade School of Tunisia 
b. Training Seminar on Doha Development Round 
c. Help to develop the training Department of IGEME 
d. Help to develop the training department of MATRADE 
Source: COMCEC 
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APPENDIX II  
OIC FIVE YEAR COTTON ACTION PLAN COOPERATION AREAS 
 
- COOPERATION AREA : 1- ENHANCED PRODUCTIVITY AND PRODUCTION TECHNIQUES 
- STRATEGIC GOALS : 
 
 Increasing the   productivity and decreasing the costs;   
 Solving the basic problems faced in production by bilateral or multilateral cooperation;   
 Encouraging and supporting the usage, production, and trade of quality input, enhanced technologic machines and devices in the 
countries;  
 Improving the product quality and leading production towards variety, standard and quality demanded by the member countries;   
 Selecting three cotton research institutes as centers of excellence one in Africa, one for Arab countries and one for Asian countries with a 
view of harmonizing and strengthening research for the development of the cotton sector and cotton related activities.  
 
No Actions/Activities Timeframe Implementation Expected Outcomes / Impacts 
 
   Instruments (*)  
 
      
1.1. Cooperation in the area of Research and Preparation: Cooperation - Providing countries with R & D 
 
 Development: Medium term Agreements (in services, 
 
 
- Developing the collective working capacity of Putting into 
progress). 
- Improving quality seed and 
 
  
 
 research centers of willing countries under the service: Long  production techniques for demanding 
 
 coordination of three designated cotton research term  countries, 
 
 institutes on regional basis among member states,   
- Seminars/workshops for 
 
    
 
 - Conducting research on combating   awareness and education. 
 
 diseases and insects and increasing production    
 
 efficiency and creating a gene bank within   - Establishment of Gene Bank at 
 
 designated institutes for  use of participating   three identified regional R  & D 
 
 countries.   centers, 
 
    - Availability of clean cotton. 
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No Actions/Activities Timeframe Implementation Expected Outcomes / Impacts  
   Instruments (*)   
1.2. - Generalizing the use of new, productive, efficient 
inputs and techniques, as well as extending a  wide 
spread education programs for producers. 
 
Preparation: -do- -Extending the usage and promotion  
     
 Short term  of new technologies; producing seed  
  varieties, and other inputs,  
 Putting into  - Efficient usage of limited water  
 service: Long  supplies,  
 term  - Increasing productivity and  
   decreasing cost of production,  
   - Creating the consumers awareness,  
   - Producing quality in accordance  
   with the international standards.  
     
1.3. - Transfer of technology among member states Long term -do- - Development of latest technology,  
 and acquiring latest technology from developed     
 world.   - Successful transfer of technology,  
 In this context; Short-term  - Preventing the wasting of  
 - determining the sharing and exchange and long  resources,  
 opportunities of technology,  devices and term    
 equipment among member states,   - Shifting Project support to those  
    which have or will have practical  
 
- Supporting projects that have immediate, short- 
term and practical consequences, 
  consequences,  
     
     
 - Encouraging preparation and implementation of     
 joint projects among countries,     
 - Preparation of a guide relating to projects for     
 support.     
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No Actions/Activities Timeframe Implementation Expected Outcomes / Impacts  
1.4 - Preparing a catalogue on variety, standard and Preparation: -do- - Opportunity to know the market and 
 
 
 quality of cotton by member states. Short –  to produce in accordance with market  
  Medium  expectations,  
 - Reviewing the cotton classification systems of Term    
 member states and developing international level   - Development of Data Bank.  
 of OIC standards of cotton.   
- Easy marketing of cotton, 
 
     
    - Setting up of OIC standards of  
    cotton.  
      
1.5. - Development and application of education and Preparation: -do- - Increasing cotton quality,  
 combating programs for the countries which have Short term    
 contamination problems. 
Putting into 
 - Increasing marketing opportunities,  
     
  Service:  - Decreasing the loss in value,  
  Long Term  
- Providing clean and quality raw 
 
     
    material for cotton processing  
    industry.  
      
1.6. - Improving quality and appropriate input systems. Medium and -do- - Providing producer with quality and  
  Long Term  appropriate input.  
    - Decreasing input costs,  
    - Developing the capacity of  
    organizations/institutions acting in  
    this field.  
      
Source: OIC Secretariat 
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- COOPERATION AREA : 2- STRENGHTENING MEMBER COUNTRIES OF STRUCTURAL CAPACITIES AND 
ORGANISATIONS. 
- STRATEGIC GOALS : 
 
 By strengthening institutions and associations taking part in production-marketing-processing chain, streamlining and making 
them more competitive, effective and active;  
 Taking appropriate measures to develop the liberalization of market in national and intra OIC-CPCs levels, and increasing the 
role of private sector; 
 Strengthening the communication channels among countries and institutions, enhancing the knowledge sharing, formation of an 
experts bank and achieving the knowledge and technology transfer through expert exchange; 
 Constituting facilitator and developer agreements and regulations at the national and intra OIC CPCs level. 
 
 
- COOPERATION AREA : 3- DEVELOPING THE FIELD OF PROCESSING 
- STRATEGIC GOALS : 
 Development  of  cotton  classification  laboratory  and  processing  industry  and  facilities;  shift  of  the  inactive  capacity  to  
the  other; 
 Supporting the cotton development programs, especially the projects related to vertical integration. 
 
- COOPERATION AREA : 4- MARKETING, TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 
- STRATEGIC GOALS : 
 For the marketing of cotton over developed stock exchange/exchanges of the member states to a large segment of buyers,  
 Increasing the cooperation and the capacity among the countries in this field;  
 Educate OIC member countries about WTO laws;   
 Develop their own hedge market;  
 Increase per unit value of cotton by value addition.  
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- COOPERATION AREA : 5- ARRANGING FINANCES FOR THE ACITIVITES  
- STRATEGIC GOALS : 
 Developing the financing and guarantee mechanisms like export credits and insurances to generalize the cotton trade among the 
OIC- CPCs;  
 Constituting facilitator and developer agreements and regulations at the national and intra OIC CPCs level;  
 Knocking financial institutions ( IDB, ADB, UNDP, UNIDO, etc.) for funding the program. 
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APPENDIX III  
EXPORT CASH FLOW FOR COTTON FINANCING 
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Source: International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation of Islamic Development Bank Group
 Cotton Financing     
 Coordination Unit 
Reporting  
Seed Cotton 
delivery 
Seed Cotton 
delivery 
Documentary Collection  
Delivery 
Note 
Delivery 
Note 
Deliveries 
Weighing 
Sampling 
Ginning 
Outturn 
CMA 
Bale 
Transport 
Monitorin
g
CMA 
Shipping Documents 
Monitorin
g
Payment  
Collateral 
Manager  
ITFC 
Collection 
Account 
1 
2 
3 
4 
7 
8 
9a 
9b 
13
b 
12 
14 
15 
13a 
Delivery  
5 
6 
 Transport Invoice  
 Payment  
10 
11 
Syndicate 
of 
Financiers 
Escrow 
Account 
249 
 
APPENDIX IV  
FORM OF OFFER FROM THE IMPORTER 
 
To:  
 
Bank-B 
P.O. Box:  
City/ Zip Code:  
Country: 
Facsimile:  
 
We, the importer, in conformity with the Murabaha Agreement (the Agreement) concluded 
by us with Bank-B on _____/_____/_______, and in accordance with the related section of 
the Agreement thereof, offers to buy the Goods of which we have bought and inspected or 
procured the inspection thereof to its satisfaction and taken delivery on behalf of Bank-B, on 
the terms and conditions provided in the related section of the said Agreement: 
 
(i) Quantity and general description:  ___________  
(ii) Name and address of Supplier: ___________  
(iii) L/C No. (if any): ___________  
(iv) Country of origin: ___________   
(v) Delivery Date: ___________ 
(vi) Purchase Price: ___________  
                 
THE IMPORTER 
 
********** 
Source: International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation of Islamic Development Bank Group 
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APPENDIX V  
FORM OF ACCEPTANCE BY BANK-B 
 
To: The importer 
 
Bank-B, in response to your, the importer’s, offer communicated through your telex/ fax 
number _________________ dated _____/_____/________, accepts the offer and hereby 
sells to you, on the terms and conditions provided in the related section of the Agreement 
concluded between us, Bank-B, and you, the importer, on ____/____/_______, the 
following the Goods (which the importer has bought and taken delivery of, on behalf of 
Bank-B): 
 
(i) Quantity and general description:  ___________ 
(ii) Name and address of Supplier: ___________ 
(iii) L/C No. (if any): ___________ 
(iv) Country of origin: ___________ 
(v) Delivery Date: ___________ 
(vi) Purchase Price: ___________ 
(vii) Sale Price: ___________ 
(viii) Due Date of Sale Price: ___________ 
 
 
BANK-B 
 
********** 
 
 
 
 
Source: International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation of Islamic Development Bank Group 
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APPENDIX VI  
KEYS TO READ THE BUSINESS PROCESS MAPS 
 
For brevity, two commonly sequential processes, "Prepare" & "Submit" process steps, are 
combined as just a "Submit" process step (implying preparation and submission of the 
documents). 
Workflow 
It is assumed that any clearance by several successive Fora or Managers/Senior Executive 
Officers implies that their respective comments will be taken into account before 
submitting the document to the next level or resubmitting it to the same level). 
RACI Charting 
ACI is a standard for responsibility charting. The letters R, A, C & I are used to signify 
the following: 
 R – Responsible: Does the Job. Execute. 
 
 A – Accountable: Take Ultimate Ownership. 
 
 C – Consult: Individuals who must be consulted prior to a final decision or action. 
“Consult” implies two-way communication. 
 I – Inform: Need To Know. Do Not Change The Decision. 
 
Modeling Legend 
 
 
Special Note: AGM Stands for Assistant General Manager; Deputy DEO stands for Deputy Chief 
Executive Officer in Bank-B. 
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APPENDIX VII  
DISBURSEMENT
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APPENDIX VIII  
REPAYMENT
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APPENDIX IX  
THE SURVEY ON TRADE FACILITATION in OIC 
MEMBER COUNTRIES 
Vis-a-Vis WTO trade facilitation 
negotiations on GATT articles V, VIII 
and X and Agreement on Implementation 
of Article VII (Custom Valuation) of 
GATT 
 
 
 
 
 
The objective of this survey is (i) to assess the level of implementation of GATT 
articles V, VII, VIII and X in your country so as to diagnose relevant needs and 
(ii) to identify important trade facilitation needs/remedies as a base for 
cooperation among OIC countries. Please be assured that your responses shall be 
maintained as confidential and in any deliverables aggregate results will be used. 
 
 
 
Who shall be completing this survey? This survey should be completed by a 
senior staff of the customs administration who is familiar with the above mentioned 
subject. In case you have any questions on the survey, please do not hesitate to contact 
Mr.Ahmet Suayb Gundogdu at agundogdu@isdb.org. 
 
 
 
Please return the completed questionnaire to: Ahmet Suayb Gundogdu, via email 
agundogdu@isdb.org or submit the hard copy.
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I. What is Your Perception of GATT Articles V, VII, VIII, and X in Regards to Level 
of Their Implementation in Your Country? 
 
 
 
Your Country: (_________________) 
 
 
Please mark the relevant boxes below to show your perception of the statements: 
 
1.1 International trade and customs legal framework as well as procedure open to the public and easily 
accessible.  
Strongly Disagree Slightly No Opinion Slightly Agree Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  Agree  Agree 
 
1.2 Traders can get update on changes in regulations and procedures promptly and without any 
inconvenience. 
 
Strongly Disagree Slightly No Opinion Slightly Agree Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  Agree  Agree 
 
1.3 Legal frame work is applied uniformly and impartially.  
    
 
Strongly Disagree Slightly No Opinion Slightly Agree Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  Agree  Agree 
 
1.3 There is an independent appeal system for traders for customs authorities’ decisions and this 
system efficiently operates.   
 
Strongly Disagree Slightly No Opinion Slightly Agree Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  Agree  Agree 
 
1.4 Traders, with an effective mechanism, are allowed to comment on change proposal from public 
authorities on regulations and procedures before their implementation. 
       
 
Strongly Disagree Slightly No Opinion Slightly Agree Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  Agree  Agree 
 
1.6 Importers can obtain advance ruling on tariff classification, customs valuation, rule of origin, 
etc. with an effective system in place.  
           
 
Strongly Disagree Slightly No Opinion Slightly Agree Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  Agree  Agree 
 
1.7 Import and Export clearance requires excessive documentation and consumes substantial time.   
 
Strongly Disagree Slightly No Opinion Slightly Agree Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  Agree  Agree 
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1.8 Transaction charges levied on import and export clearance are limited the cost of services rendered by 
the authorities. 
 
Strongly Disagree Slightly No Opinion Slightly Agree Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  Agree  Agree 
 
1.9 Penalties for minor breaches such as typing mistakes in customs transaction are reasonable.  
 
Strongly Disagree Slightly No Opinion Slightly Agree Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  Agree  Agree 
 
1.10 Irregular payments are not often needed to release goods from customs quickly.  
      
 
Strongly Disagree Slightly No Opinion Slightly Agree Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  Agree  Agree 
 
1.11 Document submission to trade related public authorities for approval is not difficult.  
     
 
Strongly Disagree Slightly No Opinion Slightly Agree Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  Agree  Agree 
 
 1.12 Implantation of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) has substantially decrease the 
average time of customs clearance.  
 
Strongly Disagree Slightly No Opinion Slightly Agree Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  Agree  Agree 
 
1.13 There is no discrimination against goods and vehicles in transit.  
           
 
Strongly Disagree Slightly No Opinion Slightly Agree Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  Agree  Agree 
 
1.14 Goods and vehicles in transit are not subject to unreasonable charges higher than the cost of service 
rendered.              
 
Strongly Disagree Slightly No Opinion Slightly Agree Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  Agree  Agree 
 
1.15 Transit procedure and regulations are clearly spelled out and easily available to public.     
 
Strongly Disagree Slightly No Opinion Slightly Agree Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  Agree  Agree 
1.16 Transit vehicles are not forced to use less convenient routes within the country while heading to their 
destination.     
 
Strongly Disagree Slightly No Opinion Slightly Agree Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  Agree  Agree 
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1.17 Overall, in which of the following areas in your opinion is the most problematic (please 
select the 4 most problematic areas and then rank them from 1 to 4 [1 = most problematic; 
4= least problematic]): 
 
a)   Customs valuation b)   Rule of origin of the goods 
 
c)   Inspection and release of goods d)    Import licenses 
e)   Tariff classification f)   Technical or sanitary 
requirements 
g)   Payment of fees and penalties  
 
 
 
 
1.18 What is the status of your country regarding to WTO Custom Valuation Agreement:  
 
 
 Implementation 
Year 
Provisions to the 
Agreement 
Your Notes 
Agreement on Custom 
Valuation 
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II. Priority Level for Trade Facilitation in Your Country 
 
Please imply the level of priority needed to be bestowed by your 
Government for each of the following trade facilitation areas in order to 
reduce cost and time of cross border trade (Please go through the whole 
list of measures prior to your decision,  for each: 1 = lowest priority;2 = 
medium priority; 3 = high priority; 4 = highest priority). 
 
2.1 Immediate and comprehensive publication as well as 
dissemination of existing/new trade rules and regulations. 
Lowest 1 2 3 4 Highest 
2.2 Formation or improvement of inquiry points for traders to keep 
up with the procedures. 
Lowest 1 2 3 4 Highest 
2.3 Formation or improvement of consultation mechanism for 
traders to comment on regulations and procedures before their 
implementation. 
Lowest 1 2 3 4 Highest 
2.4 Formation or improvement of an independent and efficient 
appeal system for traders to dispute customs authorities’ decisions. 
Lowest 1 2 3 4 Highest 
2.5 Formation or improvement of  an advance ruling mechanism 
for traders to obtain advance ruling on tariff classification, customs 
valuation, rule of origin, etc.  
Lowest 1 2 3 4 Highest 
2.6 Formation of an advance submission mechanism for traders to 
submit customs clearance documentation prior to arrival of 
commodities to customs area. 
Lowest 1 2 3 4 Highest 
2.7 Availability of post-clearance audit for trusted traders to clear 
goods before completing all customs procedures.  
Lowest 1 2 3 4 Highest 
2.8 Simplification and elimination of some documents needed for 
import and export clearance in customs. 
Lowest 1 2 3 4 Highest 
2.9 Adoption of international standards for harmonization and 
standardization of customs documents.  
Lowest 1 2 3 4 Highest 
2.10 Facilitating coordination and document collection among 
various domestic and foreign regulatory authorities by introducing 
Single Window.   
Lowest 1 2 3 4 Highest 
2.11 Availing online services such as submission and approval of 
customs declaration, payment of customs duties electronically, etc.  
Lowest 1 2 3 4 Highest 
2.12 Formation of special clearance channels (e.g. green, blue, red) 
for authorized traders in customs for express clearance.  
Lowest 1 2 3 4 Highest 
2.13 Capacity building for customs related testing bodies in order 
to decrease time needed for standard and conformity assessment 
tests.  
Lowest 1 2 3 4 Highest 
2.14 Port Efficiency  Lowest 1 2 3 4 Highest 
2.15 Overall, in which of the following areas in your opinion would be the most 
effective for trade integration among OIC countries (please rank them from 1 
to 4 [1 = most effective; 4= least effective]): 
 
a)   Capacity building in Trade Facilitation (e.g. establishment of national single 
window, capacity building for testing bodies, enhancing port efficiency, etc.)  
b)   Integrated Single Window among OIC countries  
c)   Mutual Recognition Agreement for standard and conformity 
assessment among OIC countries  
d)   Full Cumulation System for Rule of Origin among OIC countries 
e)   Other (Please indicate) 
 
2.16 Please use the space below to highlight any trade facilitation measure you think would be 
particularly effective in reducing your cost of doing business or in increasing/maintaining your 
country’s competitiveness. 
 
